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The first chapter explores how the size of a corporation undermines a court’s willingness 
to mete out tough sentences to corporate criminals, employing a unique dataset of Korean white-
collar offenders. I find that the Korean judiciary displays a strong bias towards chaebols, family 
business groups: the likelihood that convicted chaebol-related defendants receive suspended jail 
sentences rises compared to that of convicted non-chaebol counterparts.  The finding further 
shows that a greater bias can be observed for the top 10 business groups than for any of the lower 
ranking chaebols. Finally, I show that controlling for the in-group transactions, the bias is 
significantly diminished, which is consistent with the claim that a civil-law allows substantial 
expropriation of minority shareholders by weighing business group’s interests. 
The second chapter empirically investigates whether connections influence judicial 
decisions. Using data on Korean white-collar criminals, I investigate whether the judiciary favors 
newly retired senior judge attorneys (called “Revolving door attorneys") by giving their clients 
light criminal sanctions. I find that convicted white-collar offenders defended by Revolving door 
attorneys are more likely to receive suspended jail terms than those represented by ordinary 
attorneys. I find that the impact is discontinuous after the first year of departure from the 
judiciary: former senior judge attorneys who represent cases more than one-year after retirement 
do not alter the likelihood of leniency for clients. Lastly, I find that observed leniency disappears 
 v 
when cases become subject to media scrutiny, which suggest causal linkage between connections 
and lenient criminal penalties. 
The final chapter presents a CEOs' career-concerns model for the formation of business 
groups by focusing how different corporate structures induce CEOs to signal their talent to 
markets. The paper shows that with better legal protection of investors and an efficient 
monitoring system for firms' performance, CEOs can increase rents by choosing business groups. 
Why? Since they manage the subsidiaries of business groups, they have multiple channels (i.e., 
each firm in the groups) where they signal their ability to other shareholders relative to a large 
firm with multi-divisions. This leads CEOs to be less responsive to market pressure. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation investigates the interaction between economic organizations and judicial 
behavior. Finance and economics literature has highlighted how legal systems affect financial 
performance of firms. However, little of the literature has been devoted to how a specific form of 
economic organization affects and even biases judicial judgment and as a result, how the 
judiciary helps facilitate the organizations, especially in Korea where large family business 
groups dominate the national economy.  
The first chapter explores how the scale of a firm can hurt a court’s willingness to mete 
out tough sentences to corporate criminals, using a unique dataset of 252 convicted high profile 
Korean white-collar offenders. I find that the Korean judiciary displays a strong bias towards 
chaebols, family business groups (“chaebol bias”). The probability that convicted chaebol-
related defendants receive suspended jail sentences rises by 9.9 percentage points compared to 
convicted non-chaebol counterparts. In addition, convicted chaebol-connected defendants 
receive jail terms shorter by on average 18 months. Leniency remains robust after controlling for 
several sentencing factors, particularly the quality of defense attorneys.  
To investigate the source of this chaebol bias, I examine two testable hypotheses. The 
first is that, given the size of chaebols, lighter criminal sanctions are inevitable, amounting to a 
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too-big-to-jail situation (“size hypothesis”). Our evidence supports the size hypothesis: a greater 
the bias can be observed for the top 10 business groups than for lower ranking chaebols.  
The second, the “civil law hypothesis,” attributes observed leniency to judicial reluctance 
to constrain, in civil law jurisdictions, in-group transactions. We show that controlling for in-
group transactions significantly diminishes the chaebol bias. Especially for mid-sized chaebols 
(i.e., below top 10 chaebols) the inclusion of an In-group Transaction dummy removes the 
chaebol bias. This finding is consistent with the well-known claim that civil-law courts allow 
business group’s interests to justify substantial expropriation of minority shareholders. In sum, I 
attribute the chaebol effect to judicial concerns for economy-wide consequences of harsh 
sentences against chaebols and judicial hesitancy in civil law to limit in-group transactions. 
The second chapter highlights revolving door phenomena in the judiciary to examine if 
connections affect the behavior of the judiciary. Using a data set of 270 high-profile Korean 
white-collar criminals, I investigate whether the judiciary favors newly retired senior judge 
defense attorneys (“Revolving door attorneys”) by giving their clients light criminal sanctions 
(e.g., suspended jail terms) in Korea.  
To distinguish connections from skills of Revolving door attorneys, I exploit the length of 
retirement of former senior judge counsels as a source of exogenous variation in connections. 
Particularly, I hypothesize that preferential treatment granted to lawyers with senior judge 
experience substantially decays after one year of their retirement. I find that judicial connections 
have a sizable impact on sentences: convicted white-collar offenders defended by Revolving door 
attorneys are more likely (by around 15 percentage points) to serve suspended jail terms than 
those represented by ordinary attorneys. I also find that the impact is discontinuous after the first 
year of departure xz cfrom the judiciary: former senior judge attorneys who handle cases more 
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than one-year after retirement do not raise the likelihood of leniency for clients. Lastly, I find 
that observed leniency disappears when cases become subject to media scrutiny. These findings 
cannot be traced to any particular expertise or efforts of RDAs, which suggests causal linkage 
between connections and lenient criminal penalties 
The prevailing view of business groups is that the groups serve as substitutes for financial 
and labor markets that emerging countries often lack. This view regards business groups as a 
mechanism through which intra-group transaction costs are lowered. This argument sounds 
appealing, but fails to explain why business groups are prevalent in some developed countries 
with relatively well-functioning markets. 
This is the starting point of the third chapter. The chapter builds on CEOs’ career-
concerns model to explain the formation of business groups by focusing how different corporate 
structures induce CEOs to signal their talent to markets and affect shareholders’ learning 
procedures for CEO’s intrinsic ability. This paper offers theoretical explanations as to how 
monitoring and disciplining of a CEO in a conglomerate differs from that of a business group’s 
CEO. In this paper, we especially compare turnover of a CEO of a business group to turnover of 
a CEO of a comparable conglomerate. Under a specific circumstance where a market for CEOs 
places a heavy emphasis on general managerial talent rather than firm specific expertise (in out 
context, CEO’s firm-specific talent is highly correlated), replacement of a CEO of a business 
group seems to be less sensitive to poor performance of at least one of affiliates of the group.  
A conglomerate structure, however, is not always better at disciplining and monitoring a 
CEO. A diversified conglomerate tends to be more opaque than a business group because a 
conglomerate usually offers information on aggregate performance that contains limited 
information about talent of its CEO. This implies that firm performance is a noisier signal of 
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talent, allowing a CEO to extract high rents from a conglomerate. In conclusion, CEOs’ 
organizational choices are determined the parameter values used in the model: protection of 
outside investors and diversification, and precision of monitoring of CEOs.  
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2.0  TOO BIG TO JAIL: SENTENCING BIAS FOR BUSINESS GROUPS  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores whether mega-sized firms can bias the legal system and, if so, where 
such bias comes from. To answer these questions, we conduct quantitative and qualitative studies 
of sentencing outcomes for 252 high-profile, convicted corporate offenders in Korea. Why study 
Korea? Korea offers an ideal environment to study how judicial behavior differs according to an 
offender’s socio-economic status. Korea’s judiciary is notorious for leniency towards corporate 
offenders, especially ones tied to large family business groups, known in Korea as chaebols. 
Take, for instance, Lee Gun-Hee, the chairman of Samsung Group, Korea’s largest business 
group. In April 2008, Mr. Lee resigned his post after being charged with tax evasion and breach 
of fiduciary duty. Korea’s judiciary, in August 2009, gave him a slap on the wrist—a three-year 
suspended jail sentence. By Christmas of that year, President Lee Myung-bak pardoned him, 
clearing the way for his return to his former post in March 2010. A tycoon convicted of multiple 
felonies was able to return to power in less than two years.  
As another example, consider Jeong Mong-goo, the chairman of Hyundai Motor group 
(owner of Kia, the country's second-largest carmaker). In 2006, he faced criminal charges of 
embezzlement and self-dealing. A lower court sentenced him to three years in prison but an 
appellate court, giving weight to his contribution to the national economy, suspended the 
sentence and demanded a $1 billion donation to charity instead. In August 2008, he too was 
pardoned.  
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These two examples illustrate a systemic problem with Korea’s judiciary: hesitancy to 
harshly punish offenders whose companies are “too-big-to-jail.” As the size of a firm (or 
business group) connected to a defendant grows so does the likelihood of leniency. As the 
Financial Times put it, “[I]f Jeffrey Skilling, the former Enron chief executive, was South 
Korean, you could imagine him back at his desk, taking key decisions.” 1   This tendency 
contributes to Korea discount, the undervaluing of Korean stocks by foreign investors.  
The other reason for zeroing in on Korea is that studies of Korean corporate crimes give a 
clear picture of how civil law addresses outlawed self-dealing, especially self-dealing within 
business groups aimed at benefiting controlling shareholders. Many studies (Khanna and Palepu 
2000; Morck 2007) show that in countries where business groups are prevalent, related-party 
transactions that expropriate minority shareholders for the benefit of controlling shareholders are 
common. Many corporate governance studies (López de Silanes et al. 1999; López de Silanes et 
al. 2000; Djankov et al. 2008) claim that the regulation of self-dealing transactions varies 
substantially across legal origins; civil law is generally less protective of outside investors and 
minority shareholders.  
While existing studies focus on private enforcement against self-dealing such as legal 
arrangements and civil litigation, little attention has been paid to public enforcement, especially 
the role of criminal courts in constraining self-dealing.  This is mainly due to a lack of credible 
data (Djankov et al. 2008). In this respect, Korea is relatively rich in data. Especially after 
Korea’s 1997 financial crisis, prosecutors vigorously brought self-dealing cases to court, 
                                                 
1  Oliver, Christian. “The Korea discount: blame the businessmen.” Christian Oliver: beyondbrics. Financial Times, 
31 August 2010. Web. 22 April 2014. 
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producing more than 250 convictions. The abundance of Korean data fills this gap, allowing us 
to analyze how the Korean criminal courts, an example of civil law jurisdiction, perceives and 
disciplines related-party transactions. To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt at 
investigating sentencing disparities between business group members and ordinary white-collar 
criminals, and also exploring how civil law systems address self-dealing in their criminal courts. 
What makes this study unique is our dataset. Using news articles, court decisions, and electronic 
legal resources, we construct a unique dataset of sentencing outcomes for 252 convicted 
corporate offenders, most of whom committed outlawed self-dealing. The white-collar criminal 
cases that we analyze here concern large-scale corporate scandals that involve Samsung, 
Hyundai Motor Car, and SK Group. All crimes occurred between 1993 and 2006 and were 
adjudicated between January 2000 and June 2007 in Korea. 
The paper is the first empirical paper to confirm too big to jail in the judiciary: we find 
that Korea’s judiciary exhibits a strong bias towards chaebols (henceforth, the “chaebol bias”). 
The odds of imprisonment for convicted chaebol-connected defendants are 10.1 percentage 
points less than for ordinary regular white-collar criminals. The likelihood that criminals are held 
in pre-trial custody drops by 24.6 percentage points when they work for a chaebol. In addition, 
convicted chaebol-tied defendants serve shorter (by 18 months on average) prison terms even 
when they are held in jail. Moreover, we find that preferential treatment for chaebols remains 
robust even after controlling for the quality of legal representation. Whatever measures we take 
of the quality of defense attorneys, the judiciary is more likely to hand down lenient sentences to 
convicted chaebol-connected defendants. In short, we find strong evidence of chaebol bias.    
What drives the bias?  To answer this question, we examine two testable hypotheses. The 
first hypothesis is that owing to the size of chaebols, lighter criminal sanctions are inevitable. 
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Our evidence supports this size hypothesis: for the top 10 business groups, the bias is stronger 
than for chaebols outside this ranking. Specifically, compared to convicted non-chaebol 
defendants, jail sentences for convicted chaebol-related defendants are more likely, by 10.1 
percentage points, to be suspended. For defendants related to a top-10 chaebol, the gap widens to 
11.2 percentage points, but for those connected to smaller chaebols, the difference narrows to 8.7 
percentage points. In sum, observed leniency is largely driven by top 10 chaebols, confirming 
that ‘too-big-to-jail’ is a judicial version of ‘too-big-to-fail.’    
The second hypothesis is the “civil law hypothesis,” suggesting observed leniency can be 
attributed to the reluctance of judges in civil law jurisdictions to limit self-dealing in chaebols 
(López de Silanes et al.1997; López de Silanes et al.1998; Djakov et al.2008) . An extensive 
review of sentencing opinions reveals that for chaebol cases, the judiciary widely accepted “no-
private-gain” defenses, that a criminal acquired no direct private gain from crimes in question 
because the crimes generally involved in-group transactions that were designed to facilitate the 
interests of a whole business group (e.g., such as for propping troubled affiliates in the group). 
We also show that controlling for in-group transactions significantly diminishes the chaebol bias. 
Especially for mid-size chaebols (i.e., below top 10 chaebols) the inclusion of an In-group 
Transaction dummy nullifies the bias.   
These findings can be interpreted as evidence that Korea’s judiciary maintains a dual 
standard in assessing the degree of illegality of self-dealing; when crimes involve related-party 
transactions, especially for propping up a troubled chaebol subsidiary, courts rule that the crimes 
deserve less condemnation because the crimes facilitate the interest of a chaebol as a whole. This 
attitude ends up sanctioning lighter sentences for chaebol-related offenders, and seriously 
weakens the deterrence effect of criminal punishment against self-dealing.  This interpretation is 
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consistent with the well-known tendency of civil-law courts to allow substantial expropriation of 
minority shareholders.   
   “…in civil-law countries, the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholder in a transaction with a plausible business purpose is often seen as consistent with 
director’s duties, especially if the controlling shareholder is another firm in the group.” (López 
de Silanes et al. 2000 p 26, emphasis added). 
Overall our findings suggest that the chaebol bias has two sources. One source involves 
concerns for the economy-wide impact of harsh sentences against chaebol-related offenders. The 
other is a reluctance of civil law courts to strictly regulate in-group transactions to protect outside 
investors.  
Many law and finance studies view legal systems as the main determinants of ownership 
structures and financial markets in specific countries (López de Silanes et al. 1998; Porta et al. 
1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998; Rajan and Zingales 1998; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine 2003). Among this line of research, López de Silanes et al. (2000) and Djankov et al. 
(2008) are closely related to our work. Our research, in exploring the interaction between law 
and finance, shows how Korea’s criminal courts, as one of external governance mechanisms, 
address case involving the expropriation of minority shareholders.  In several aspects, our work 
complements and adds to these two works. To begin with, their key examples involve civil 
procedures, whereas our work addresses criminal procedures. While their work mainly depends 
on anecdotal evidence or hypothetical self-dealing cases, ours rest on a systemic analysis of 
judicial adjudications of actual self-dealing. Moreover, in contrast to their focus on legal 
tunneling, our work is devoted to outlawed tunneling; our work highlights the specific role of 
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criminal courts in limiting self-dealing and the reason civil-law criminal courts are lenient of 
expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder.  
Our work also offers a plausible answer to the puzzling question raised by Djkanov et al. 
(2008) as to why public enforcement is unrelated to more developed stock markets. They argue 
that the measure of public enforcement, that is, the severity of punishment prescribed by rules, is 
incomplete because it does not reflect actual law enforcement data. Our work confirms their 
conjecture that what matters in the regulation of self-dealing are actual judicial actions, not 
nominal statutes on the books. Without understanding the judicial stance regarding business 
groups demonstrated here, it is hard to explain the recurrence of corporate scandals in emerging 
markets where nominal statutes state that self-dealing transactions are unlawful and severely 
penalized (life in prison in Korea).  
Our work also contributes to the literature on sentencing outcomes for white collar 
crimes. Recent studies of sentencing disparities between white-collar criminals and other types 
of offenders have in large part stressed the identification of substantial offender characteristics, 
e.g. race/ethnicity and class (Hagan et al., 1980; Schanzenbach and Yaeger 2006). Focusing on 
the sentencing disparities among white-collar offenders, our study investigates the position of 
power (that is, disparities between a controlling shareholder and top management or between 
chaebol and non-chaebol offenders). Moreover, we make methodological contributions to the 
analysis of white-collar crimes. Posner and Yoon (2010) claim 20-40% of criminal cases are 
plagued with recognizable disparities in quality of legal representation. By establishing reliable 
measures of such quality, we can control for the impact of legal representation on sentences. 
Such control would allow for a better understanding of whether sentencing disparities result from 
socioeconomic status.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the historical and institutional 
backgrounds required to understand our work. Section 2.3 describes how we construct a data set. 
Section 2.4 details the variables and regressions to be reviewed. Section 2.5 advances the 
summary statistics and descriptive analysis of the main variables of the dataset. Section 2.6 
presents quantitative results. Section 2.7 provides in-depth analysis of the results and examines 
the source of observed leniency. Section 2.8 concludes and advances projects for future research. 
2.2 HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 Chaebol  
Many studies (Bertrand and Schoar 2006, Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon 
2010) illustrate that corporate governance works quite differently in firms with and without 
controlling shareholders. The primary governance problem of the former takes the form of 
“tunneling” where a powerful insider expropriates minority shareholders for its private gain 
(López de Silanes et al. 2000). Since chaebols are the Korean version of business groups 
controlled by wealthy families, this general description readily applies to chaebols.  
Chaebols play a dominant role in Korea’s national economy. Since the 1960s, they have 
received a considerable amount of government support. As a consequence, they have been the 
driving force of rapid economic growth in Korea. Table 2-1 illustrates that chaebols contribute 
vastly to the Korean economy. Over time, the total sales and assets of the top 30 chaebols 
continue to grow. In 1980, the total sales of the top 30 business groups accounted for 60.6% of 
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GDP; in 2011, that number had ballooned to 96.7%.  From 1980 to 2011, the total asset/GDP 
ratio went from 52.9 to 124.5%.  
 
Table 2-1 The Top 30 Chaebols in Korea 
Year 
Total 
Assets 
(A) 
Total 
Sales(S) 
Total No. of 
Affiliates 
Average No. 
of Affiliates 
GDP A/S*100 
S/GDP
*100 
1980 20.7 23.7 417 13.9 39.1 52.9 60.6 
1987 56.6 84.9 509 16.4 100.2 56.5 84.7 
1991 125.3 231.3 570 19.0 191.3 65.5 120.9 
1995 233.4 345.0 623 20.8 349.9 66.7 98.6 
1999 463.5 479.3 686 22.9 501.0 92.5 95.7 
2001 564.6 510.1 624 20.8 603.2 93.6 84.6 
2006 770.0 629.4 645 21.5 865.2 89.0 72.7 
2011 1460.5 1134.0 1019 34.0 1172.8 124.5 96.7 
Note: Computed by the author using data of Korea Free Trade Commission. GDP is measured by 2005 constant year price. A 
unit is KW 10 trillion (approximately USD 10 billion) and %, respectively.  
 
 
Family firms like chaebols usually adopt control-enhancing mechanisms such as 
pyramids or cross-holdings (López de Silanes et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and Land 
2002). These mechanisms separate cash flow rights from control rights, enabling a handful of 
family members to make key management decisions. Thus, these family members are able to 
govern major segment of a country’s corporate sector (López de Silanes et al.; Claessens et al. 
2000; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung. 2004). A dominant shareholder generally holds the 
position of chairman or president of a business group; a top manager holds the position of the 
CEO or director of an affiliate in the group. Whatever name he goes by, the dominant 
shareholder makes the key decisions of the affiliates. Before Asia’s 1997 financial crisis, outside 
directors never sat on a company’s board; hostile takeovers were practically unheard of in Korea. 
Such absence of internal and external discipline mechanisms enables controlling shareholders to 
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exercise virtually absolute power and reap private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Finally, chaebols seek, through several channels, to extend their influence on 
society. They appoint politically connected directors (Solidarity for Economic Reform 2009); 
they establish charity foundations (Solidarity for Economic Reform 2010); they found think 
tanks aimed at disseminating business-friendly ideologies. As a consequence, chaebols exercise 
immense influence. They seem ubiquitous and even omnipotent. Some satire their almighty 
power as follows “[i]t has become possible to live a Samsung-only life: You can use a Samsung 
credit card to buy a Samsung TV for the living room of your Samsung-made apartment on which 
you’ll watch the Samsung-owned pro baseball team.” 2     
 
2.2.2 Judiciary Selection Process in Korea  
Another institutional background required to understand our work is Korea’s judicial 
selection processes: appointment by the judiciary (or by the administration in the case of a public 
prosecutor). The understanding of the judiciary selection procedure is the key to the construction 
of reliable measures of the quality of defense attorneys.  
Those who want to pursue judicial careers must pass an entrance exam (the National 
Judicial Examination). Tiny allotments make the exam highly competitive. Over the last two 
decades, less than 1 out 20 (4.3%) applicants pass the exam. Successful candidates receive two 
years of training at a special educational institution managed by the judiciary (called Judicial 
                                                 
2 Harlan, Chico “In South Korea, the Republic of Samsung.” The Washington Post December 9, 2012; Print. 
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Research and Training Institute, JRTI). The training program is mainly aimed at enhancing 
technical skill and legal knowledge required to address legal problems. Once they complete their 
training, candidates with the highest grades are allowed, in principle, to choose the available 
position they desire. They may take jobs in on the bench, in the district attorney’s office, or in 
private practice.  
Since the judiciary offers prestige and power, candidates with the highest grades tend to 
pursue judicial careers. Approximately the top 30% of the candidates are entitled to serve in the 
judiciary or as public prosecutors. Judges are generally drawn from the group of highest 
performers, and prosecutors from the next highest performers. The rest of the candidates start to 
practice law in private law firms or private companies. Korea judiciary features civil law 
jurisdictions in which the Supreme Court appoints judges at a young age, rotating them through a 
variety of posts. No judges, even the Supreme Court justices, are appointed for life; none is 
elected. A newly appointed judge generally needs 15 years of experience to be elevated to a 
senior judgeship of each judicial panel in a district court (jibub-bujang-pansa), the next posting 
on the hierarchical ladder in the judiciary. To become a senior judge of a panel on a high court 
(gobub-bujang-pansa) requires on average another 10 years (for judicial structures in Korea, see 
Table 2-2).   
Most junior judges eventually become district court senior judges. Their career-mobility 
prospects, however, diminish significantly as the senior judges get closer to the upper posts of 
the bureaucratic ladder. In practice, not all the district court senior judges can move to the 
hierarchical ladder’s next step, high court senior judges. High-profile judges, especially senior 
judges, tend to leave office prior to their retirement if they fail to be promoted.  
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Table 2-2 Total Number of Judges in Korea by Ranks (as of 2013) 
 Ranks Number (%) 
Justice Supreme Court Justice 14 (0.5) 
 
Chief 
Judge 
 
High Court (or Patent Court) Chief Judge 
 
6 (0.2) 
District Court (or Administrative and Family Court)  Chief Judge 24 (0.8) 
 
Senior 
Judge 
 
High Court (or Patent Court) Senior Judge 
 
117 (4.1) 
Branch Court Senior Judge 39 (1.4) 
District court (or Administrative and Family court)Senior Judge 473 (16.6) 
 
Junior 
Judge 
 
Law Clerk of Justice 
 
105 (3.7) 
High Court (or Patent Court) Junior Judge 205(7.2) 
District Court (or Administrative and Family Court) Junior Judge 1875 (65.6) 
 Total 2858 (100.0) 
Notes: Data for Table 2-2 from Bub-won-jo-jik-bub (The Judicial Organization Act).  
 
Early retirement is very common in Korea’s judiciary. Since 1990, only 20 judges (for 
prosecutors, only 5) remained in office up to retirement age. This accounts for 1.3% (0.7%) of 
1519 (1353) retired judges (prosecutors) during the same period. After resignation, retired judges 
(or prosecutors) enter private practice. Their most likely post-retirement job is to practice law in 
law firms, often as criminal defense attorneys. Taken overall, judicial careers of a defense 
counsel (including those of public prosecutors) can be indicative of its talents and skills. 
Motivated by these observations, we constructed several proxies related to the quality of defense 
attorneys, one of key variables.   
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2.3 DATA DESCRIPTION 
2.3.1 Definition of White-Collar Crimes 
The white-collar crimes in our sample correspond to embezzlement and breach of 
fiduciary duty in Korea’s criminal code (article 356), which is roughly equivalent to 18 U.S.C. 
§1341 (Frauds and Swindles) or 18 U.S.C. §1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television). Bank and 
accounting fraud cases are included in the sample only when the fraud occurred together with 
embezzlement and breach of fiduciary duty. The offences analyzed here can be categorized as 
tunneling, and can be further divided into four sub-groups: (1) outright theft of corporate assets 
by a controlling shareholder (“embezzlement’’) (2) self-dealing transactions aimed at directly 
benefiting a controlling shareholder (“narrow self-dealing transactions”) (3) self-dealing 
transactions aimed at propping up other affiliated firm within a business group (“in-group 
transactions”)  (4) accounting fraud. The key difference between “narrow self-dealing 
transactions” and “in-group transactions” lies in the specific form of transactions in question. For 
“narrow self-dealing transactions”, a controlling shareholder is a direct beneficiary of self-
dealing. In contrast, “in-group transactions” occurs between a parent company and its subsidiary 
(or between subsidiaries). “Narrow self-dealing transactions” generally include 1) sales of goods 
or services to the company at inflated prices, 2) purchases from at excessively low prices, 3) loan 
to or from the company on advantageous terms” (Nenova and Hickey 2006). “In-group 
transactions” include 1) the subsidiary’s support of its parent by purchasing goods from the 
parent at non-market prices, 2) guaranteeing its parent’s debt, 3) making loans without proper 
collateral. The “in-group transactions” indirectly serve the interests of controlling shareholders 
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by retaining (or reinforcing) their control over a business group. This taxonomy will be relevant 
when we discuss a sentencing bias in favor of chaebols.  
2.3.2 Data Sources 
We constructed a unique criminal-level dataset. The dataset contains 252 white-collar 
offenders. They committed crimes between 1993 and 2006 and were adjudicated between 
January 2000 and June 2007 in Korea. The dataset involves several high-profile corporate fraud 
cases such as Samsung, Hyundai Motor Company, and SK group. All our cases resulted in 
convictions in Korea’s lower and high courts.  
About 40% of corporate crimes in our sample occurred around Korea’s 1997 financial 
crisis. The crisis was triggered in part by a number of chaebols’ unforeseen bankruptcies. To 
prevent system risk to the national economy, the Korean Government had no choice but to come 
to the aid of insolvent financial institutions. Following their bailout, the government investigated 
those responsible and took them to court.  
In response to the public wrath against conglomerates, the government launched a task 
force aimed at investigating and charging prominent individuals such as chaebols’ controlling 
shareholders and CEOs of chaebols’ subsidiaries. Our representative example is Daewoo, at the 
time the second largest business group. In 1999, the group collapsed under the weight of debts 
totaling more than $80 billion. Its founder, Kim Woo-jung, fled the country and was on the run 
for six years. The collapse of Daewoo inflicted enormous damage: its lenders, several large 
banks almost went bankrupt, thousands were laid off, and myriad lives disrupted. The task force 
charged Mr. Kim and seven of his lieutenants with violating criminal statutes.   
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Compiling such a dataset was a laborious undertaking; law enforcement authorities 
maintain no centralized record on such criminals, much less offer them up. We constructed the 
dataset using three distinct sources. 
2.3.2.1 NGO reports and News Coverage 
 
We were first guided by a series of special reports released by People’s Solidarity 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and Solidarity for Economic Reform (SER), civic watchdogs 
dedicated to monitoring corporate fraud in Korea. Their reports contain detailed information on 
small number of high-profile corporate crimes.  We then turned to news coverage. Our samples 
were selected from newspaper articles published between 2000 and 2007. We used the string 
{“embezzlement OR breach of fiduciary duty” “court decisions OR sentencing”}, where 
embezzlement and breach of trust corresponds to penal codes in Korea. While effective at 
constructing an extensive dataset, such maneuver has two drawbacks. First, for cases with 
multiple defendants, the media tends to deal with the highest-profile defendants only; we may 
have overlooked a number of defendants. Second, some news articles may have errors in 
reporting. More accurate and credible sources are court decisions discussed below. 
2.3.2.2 Judicial Decisions 
 
The written decisions we examine here are full-dress opinions. An extensive review of 
them produces considerable information required to build a unique dataset. We mainly highlight 
the criminal’s standing; is he involved with an affiliate of a conglomerate; is he a dominant 
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shareholder or top management? We also identify various factors related to criminal conduct 
from court decisions; the amount of losses criminals inflicted on victims, and compensation for 
the losses. These factors may be predictive of sentencing outcomes because the Supreme Court 
issues a guideline with which lower-courts should comply when determining sentences.  A 
standard measure for the seriousness of economic crimes is the size of monetary losses. Another 
decisive component is whether a criminal monetarily redeems the losses. The comprehensive 
examination of sentencing opinions is one of the unique aspect of our analysis. Compared with 
the U.S., the Korean judiciary describes in detail what factors it considers when determining 
sentences -- from a couple of paragraphs to several pages. Opinions touch upon not only 
aggravating factors but also mitigating ones. We draw attention to several of the latter. 
2.3.2.3 Internet Legal Resources  
 
To track defense attorneys’ careers, we relied on Lawnb (http://www.lawnb.com), 
Korea’s version of Westlaw and Lexis. Through Lawnb, we were able to access career paths of 
the defense attorneys: when a defense lawyer passed the entrance exam; whether he/she is a 
former judge (or prosecutor) or not; what positions he/she held; whether he/she is a top-10 law 
firm’s lawyer, which are key factors when measuring the quality of legal representation. Finally, 
we hone in on crimes of controlling shareholders and top management. Mid-level managers’ 
misdeeds are outside the scope of this study.  
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2.4 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND REGRESSION EXPLANATION 
2.4.1 Dependent Variables 
One of our primary dependent variables is a court’s decision to suspend a prison term. 
The variable Imprisonment is a dichotomy; taking on 1 if a convicted defendant receives a prison 
term and 0 if he/she receives a suspended one. Why do we highlight suspension of a sentence 
rather than acquittal? For those convicted of white-collar offenses, a suspension of jail terms is 
tantamount to acquittal in Korea for several reasons.  
First, the Korean criminal justice system has few public officers to supervise all those 
who received suspended sentences. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that suspended sentences 
will be resumed even if the offender violates his terms. Second, as noted in the Samsung case, 
controlling shareholders face few hurdles to returning to management as long as they receive 
suspended sentences. Moreover, even though a trial judge may be biased towards a chaebol, 
judges are highly unlikely to release a guilty defendant. Should judges do so, high courts could 
reverse the lower court decision.  Therefore what is more likely is that a biased judge orders a 
suspended prison sentence. Moreover, a judge can exercise a considerable amount of discretion 
over sentencing as long as sentencing outcomes fall within the range prescribed by the law. Such 
exercise of discretion is seldom subject to a judicial review in an appeal court.  
Another dependent variable we underscore here is a pre-trial status of offenders. The 
variable Pre-trial Detention is also a dummy variable, taking on 1 if a defendant is under pretrial 
custody and 0 otherwise. By exploring pretrial detention outcomes, we can have a sense of not 
only how the judiciary addresses corporate crimes but also how investigating authorities deal 
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with white-collar crimes during pre-trial procedures. This approach makes sense because a 
prosecutor exercises vast discretion in deciding whether a suspect is put under detention and 
what charges to bring if the prosecutor decides to seek an indictment. Moreover, the Korean 
criminal justice system has no equivalent of grand jury indictments, suggesting that a prosecutor 
holds exclusive authority over whether to drop a case.  
The last dependent variable is Length of Imprisonment, a continuous variable. By 
“imprisonment” we mean time spent in confinement. If a defendant receives a suspended jail 
term, the length of imprisonment is zero. As explained above, since suspended jail terms are 
essentially equivalent to acquittal, when evaluating the severity of punishment it seems 
reasonable to regard these cases as having no imprisonment. 
2.4.2  Explanatory Variables 
In our sample, a criminal’s standing can be broadly separated by a cross measure of a 
chaebol and a controlling shareholder. 
1. Chaebol: The literature provides various definitions of a chaebol (mainly family 
business group (Granovette 1995; Khanna and Rivkin 2001). For the clarity of analysis, 
however, we choose the administrative definition. For regulatory purposes, Korea Free Trade 
Commission (KFTC) has publicly announced a list of chaebols each year since 1987. The 
criterion has evolved. From 1987 to 2001, KFTC annually ranked the top 30 chaebols based on 
the size of their total combined assets of all affiliates. Since 2002, KFTC has employed a new 
standard in which a chaebol is any business group with the total combined assets of its affiliates 
surpassing approximately KW 5 trillion (approximately USD 5 billion). KFTC requires chaebols 
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to disclose such information as the identity of a controlling shareholder, their structures and 
affiliates’ financial statements. All information can be publicly available through a website.3  
The variable chaebol takes on 1 if a firm that a convicted defendant is connected with is a 
chaebol’s affiliate, and otherwise 0. Note that small- or medium-sized family-controlled firms 
are also pervasive in Korea. Accordingly, even when a firm of our sample is not a chaebol 
affiliate, the firm can be still under the control of a specific family. In other words, even if the 
firm is not a constituent firm of a chaebol, it may have a controlling shareholder.  
2. Controlling Shareholder: A controlling shareholder owns enough outstanding shares to 
control a firm. KFTC identifies controlling shareholders of chaebols—generally a founder or his 
family members. The family members are placed as top management such as the CEO or CFO of 
an affiliate (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung 2004). In this case, we still classify him as a 
controlling shareholder, not as top management. In other words, top executives in our sample 
refer to ones without any blood ties to founders. The variable Controlling shareholder takes on 1 
if a defendant is the controlling shareholder or the controlling shareholder’s family members, and 
0 if a defendant is a high-ranking non-family executive.  
3. Amount of Losses: In corporate fraud, the seriousness of a crime essentially depends on 
the amount of monetary losses. The losses serve as one of the most critical factors when 
determining a defendant's sentence. The losses are generally measured by the money value of 
harm that a court rules a defendant to have caused. Through extensive readings of court 
decisions, we can confirm the amount of losses that corporate fraud offenders inflicted.   
However, to some degree, it is an operative task to confirm the losses incurred by criminal 
                                                 
3 http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr/index.jsp 
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conduct (Richman 2012).  For a case with multiple defendants, the total amount of monetary 
losses is attributed to all of them. This implies that all defendants convicted of the same crime 
should be jointly responsible for the loss as a whole. This corresponds to sentencing practices in 
a trial court, where each defendant is held accountable for all the losses incurred by his criminal 
conduct. In this paper, the variable Amount of Losses is a log of [the monetary losses+1] that a 
defendant causes a firm. 
 4. No Compensation: The fact that defendants compensate victims monetarily is also 
considered a sign, like a guilty plea, of their accepting responsibility for offenses. This suggests 
that compensation of losses is one of the most important mitigating factors. The variable No 
Compensation takes on 1 if incurred losses are not fully restored and otherwise takes on 0. 
5. Quality of Legal Representation: This paper presents three measures in order to 
evaluate the legal representation available to defendants.  
1) NL: This measure is, by nature, a continuous variable. While the size of a defense team 
is a natural indicator of the quality of legal representation, it is still an imperfect measure. The 
heterogeneous abilities of attorneys should be considered. Following measures consider such 
heterogeneities.  
2) Top10L: The second measure is whether a defendant hires one or more from a top-10 
law firm. These elite law firms have resources and many experts specializing in criminal law, 
which may lead to more leniency for defendants. The binary variable Top10L takes on 1 if a top-
10 law firm is involved and 0 otherwise.  
In addition, we set out another measures of the quality of legal representation, measures 
closely related to how Korea selects its judiciary. As explained above, the careers of judges (or 
public prosecutors) can provide reliable information about the talent of defense lawyers.  
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3) HPL: This binary variable takes on 1 if a defense lawyer was a senior judge (or public 
prosecutor) in at least a district court. Note that these respective measures are not mutually 
exclusive; 3) is a subset of 1).  
6. Instance: Appeal courts tend to cut sentences of lower courts about top management 
cases without substantial changes in facts or evidence. To capture this effect on sentences, the 
variable Instance takes on 1 if a trial court is an appellate court, and on 0 if a lower court. This 
effect can be interpreted as one type of fixed effect. 
 
Table 2-3 Variable Definitions 
 
Note:  “Senior public prosecutor” includes the prosecutor general, a chief of high (district) public prosecutor’s office, and 
high (district) court senior prosecutor.   
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2.4.3 Regression Equation 
We present three regressions. The aim of the first regression is to see how courts address 
corporate fraud offenders; the second is to mainly examine how investigatory authorities and 
courts deal with such offenders, especially during pre-trial proceedings; the last one involves the 
intensity of criminal sanctions against white collar offenders. The examination of these 
regressions allows us to get a general view of how the Korean criminal justice system addresses 
white collar criminals. 
The first and second regressions will be run with a probit model. They use nearly 
identical independent variables except that the second ignores whether a criminal compensates 
victims monetarily. This configuration is reasonable because compensation is generally made 
before a verdict is reached, rather than before a trial is begun. At the time of deciding pre-trial 
detention, public prosecutors and magistrates take no account of compensation. 
 
Imprisonment = a+b1 Chaebol+ b2 Controlling Shareholder + b3 No Compensation+ b4 
Amount of Losses+ b5 Quality of Legal Representation + b6 Instance +e  
Pretrial Detention= a+ b1 Chaebol+ b2 Controlling Shareholder+ b3 Amount of Losses+ 
b4 Quality of Legal Representation + e 
 
The third regression investigates the duration of actual confinement, a continuous 
variable. This will be analyzed using a Tobit model. Why Tobit instead of OLS? When it comes 
to the length of imprisonment, a sentencing judge seems to go through two-stage decisions. The 
first involves the type of punishment: whether a defendant receives suspended or actual jail 
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terms. Once a sentencing judge decides on the type of punishment, the judge proceeds to another 
selection procedure: length of imprisonment. The two-stage decision procedure can be described 
as YJ = max (0, Y
*
J), where Y
*
J is the duration of an actual prison term (measured by months), a 
continuous variable generated by the classical linear regression model, and 0 involves a 
suspended prison sentence decision. 
 
Length of Imprisonment = a+b1 Chaebol+ b2 Controlling Shareholder + b3 No 
Compensation+ b4 Amount of Losses+ b5 Quality of Legal Representation + b6 Instance +e  
We predict that the probability of suspended imprisonment is negatively associated with 
a) the size of losses, but positively related to b) reparation for losses and c) quality of legal 
service. In addition, when considering corporate governance structures of a chaebol in which de 
facto and substantial decision-making power lie in the hands of controlling shareholders, the 
probability of imprisonment is positively related to d) offender’s role as a controlling 
shareholder. A remaining variable of interest is chaebol. The coefficient for chaebol throughout 
the paper is b1. If a sentencing court is unbiased and fair, b1 should not be different from zero; a 
chaebol itself is a just socio-economic characteristic of criminals rather than an offense or 
offender-related characteristic. If b1 is not zero, sentencing bias would appear to exist in the 
judiciary.  
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2.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES AND BASIC RESULTS 
We have defendant-level data. Our dataset consists of 252 Korean white-collar offenders. 
Panel B in Table 2-5 reports that 143 defendants were convicted in district courts. Of the 143, 42 
defendants were sentenced to actual jail terms, whereas 101 were given suspended jail terms. 
Then, 39 of 42 defendants subject to prison terms appealed to high courts. Of 101 criminals 
receiving a suspended jail term in district courts, 57 moved to an appeal court because 
prosecutors appealed for what they viewed as excessively light sentences. In addition, we have 
13 defendants whose cases involve appeal courts only.  Therefore, the total number of defendants 
in high courts amounts to 109 (see Table 2-5– Panel C), which ends up with 252 in total. 
As can be seen in Figure Figure 2-1-a, there exist variations over time in the number of 
adjudicated cases. Between 2003 and 2005, 63% (158 out of the 252) of cases were sentenced. 
These trends can be partly explained by the task force’s active involvement of white-collar 
crimes. Once we rule out cases the task force brought to court, we observe relatively flat 
caseload trends shown in Figure 2-1-b.  
Figure 2-1 Breakdown of Convicted Criminals by Sentencing Year 
 
 
Note: “Task force” denotes a special unit that the Korean government launched, mainly aiming at investigating and charging as 
criminals the chaebol’s controlling shareholder and CEOs of its subsidiaries who are allegedly liable for the 1997 financial crisis. 
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Table 2-4 shows that corporate crimes continued even after the 1997 financial crisis. 252 
criminals were charged for 906 felonies in total. Among the 906 felonies, 61% happened after 
1997.  
Table 2-5 shows that chaebol-related criminals account for 56% of our sample (140 out 
of 252). Non-chaebol criminals represent 44% (112 out of 252). Controlling shareholders 
constitute 49% and top management 51 % respectively. 
 
Table 2-4 Descriptive Statistics for White-Collar Crimes by Year 
Year Number Proportion 
before 1993 15 2% 
1994 34 4% 
1995 54 6% 
1996 114 13% 
1997 136 15% 
1998 118 13% 
1999 92 10% 
2000 92 10% 
2001 57 6% 
2002 72 8% 
2003 55 6% 
2004 43 5% 
2005 23 3% 
2006 1 0% 
Total 906 100% 
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Table 2-5 White-Collar Criminals by Position and type of Affiliation 
Panel.A : White-Collar Criminals by occupational and social position 
 Chaebol Non-Chaebol Total 
Controlling shareholder 59 66 125 
Top management 81 46 127 
Total 140 112 252 
Panel.B :White-Collar Criminals by occupational and social position: low court cases (n=143) 
 Chaebol Non-Chaebol Total 
Controlling shareholder 32 32 64 
Top management 53 26 79 
Total 85 58 143 
Panel. C : White-Collar Criminals by occupational and social position: high court cases (n=109) 
 Chaebol Non-Chaebol Total 
Controlling shareholder 27 34 61 
Top management 28 20 48 
Total 55 54 109 
Note: A controlling shareholder is generally a founder of a firm or his/her family members. Top management refers to a 
non-family CEO (or high-profile executive) or director.  A controlling shareholder may serve as the CEO or director of an 
affiliate. In this case, he/she is classified as a controlling shareholder. 
 
Table 2-6 suggests that convicted chaebol-related offenders are less likely to receive 
prison sentences than convicted offenders with no ties to chaebols; and non-family top 
management defendants receive lesser punishment than controlling shareholders. Table 2-6 – 
Panel A shows that a little over a quarter of the convicted defendants (65 out of 252, 25.7%) 
served prison terms. Of the convicted chaebol-related offenders, 20.7% (29 out of 140) were 
given prison sentences; of their convicted non-chaebol counterparts, 32.1% (36 out of 112) 
received prison sentences. Notable sentencing disparities were found in controlling shareholder-
top management pairs. Table 2-6– Panel A reveals that, of convicted non-family high-profile 
executive defendants, 4.7% (6 out of 127) received actual prison sentences; of convicted 
controlling shareholder defendants, that number was 47.2% (59 out of 125). More surprising 
observation is found in Table 2-6– Panel C: no convicted top management was incarcerated 
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because all top management’s prison sentences were later suspended by appeals courts. Table 
2-6 - Panel B reports that 143 defendants were convicted in district courts.  
 
Table 2-6 White-Collar Criminals by Affiliation and type of Punishment 
Panel. A : White-Collar Criminals by Type of Punishment (N=252) 
 
Suspended Jail Terms Actual Jail Terms 
Non- Chaebol Chaebol Non- Chaebol Chaebol 
Top Management 42 79 4 2 
Controlling Shareholder 34 32 32 27 
Subtotal 76 111 36 29 
Total 187 65 
Panel. B : White-Collar Criminals by Type of Punishment: Low Court Cases (n=143) 
 
Suspended Jail Terms Actual Jail Terms 
Non- Chaebol Chaebol Non- Chaebol Chaebol 
Top Management 22 51 4 2 
Controlling Shareholder 13 15 19 17 
Subtotal 35 66 23 19 
Total 101 42 
Panel. C : White-Collar Criminals by Type of Punishment: High Court Cases (n=109) 
 Suspended Jail Terms Actual Jail Terms 
Non- Chaebol Chaebol Non- Chaebol Chaebol 
Top Management 20 28 0 0 
Controlling Shareholder 21 17 13 10 
Subtotal 41 45 13 10 
Total 86 23 
Note: A controlling shareholder is generally a founder of a firm or his/her family members. Top management refers to a non-
family CEO (or high-profile executive) or director.  A controlling shareholder may serve as the CEO or director of an affiliate. In 
this case, he/she is classified as a controlling shareholder. 
 
 
A similar pattern could be discerned in pre-trial procedures. Table 2-7 reports that of our 
sample’s white-collar defendants, 44.8% (66 out of 147) were detained during trial procedures. 
Among them, the percentage of non-chaebol-connected detainees nearly doubles that of their 
chaebol-connected counterparts (62.2%, 38 out of 61, versus 32.5% 28 out of 86). As for 
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controlling shareholders, 72.3% (47out of 65) were detained compared to top management’s 23.1 
% (19 out of 82).  
 
Table 2-7 White-Collar Defendants by Pretrial Custody (n=147) 
 No  Pretrial  Custody Pretrial  Custody 
Non-Chaebol Chaebol Non-Chaebol Chaebol 
Top Management 17 46 11 8 
Controlling Shareholder 6 12 27 20 
Subtotal 23 58 38 28 
Total 81 66 
Note: A controlling shareholder is generally a founder of a firm or his/her family members. Top management refers 
to a non-family CEO (or high-profile executive) or director.  A controlling shareholder may serve as the CEO or 
director of an affiliate. In this case, he/she is classified as a controlling shareholder. 
 
 
We also observe differences in the quality of legal counsels between chaebol-connected 
defendants and non-chaebol ones. As seen in Figure 2, chaebol-related defendants received, by 
every measure, more qualified legal assistance (for all measures except the variable NL, the 
differences are significant at 1 % level and at 10% level for NL). Observing this circumstance, 
some may argue that access to legal resources gives rise to the aforementioned sentencing gaps. 
At the time of investigation, better-qualified attorneys generally defend the deep-pocketed 
chaebol-connected defendants, who are known to benefit from the early participation of more 
competent lawyers. If true, the Korea judiciary could escape blame for a chaebol-connected 
defendant winning a lenient sentence. This finding suggests that we need further investigation to 
confirm whether sentencing gaps do in fact stem from judicial bias rather than the quality of 
legal representation.  
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Figure 2-2 Measure of the Quality of Legal Representation 
 
Note: “NL” denotes the average number of defense lawyers assisting each defendant. “EJL” represents the defense lawyers with 
judge experience. “HPL” refers to the average number of defense lawyers with senior judge experience. “Top10” denotes the 
average number of defense lawyers from top 10 law firms.   
2.6 RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
2.6.1 Baseline Results 
The baseline regressions are presented in Table 2-8, Table 2-9, and Table 2-10. We find 
Korea’s judiciary, from pre-trial to trial procedures, to be strongly biased towards chaebols. In 
addition, when control and other independent variables are significant, they have the predicted 
signs. The variable No Compensation is positively related to the probability of convicted corporate 
criminals being incarcerated. The likelihood that convicted defendants receive suspended jail 
terms increases by 14% with restitution. The variable Amount of Losses is also positively 
correlated to the possibility of convicted criminals being imprisoned. The bigger the monetary 
loss, the more likely convicted offenders are to be incarcerated. As losses rise by every USD 0.1 
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million, the possibility of imprisonment rises by 4 percentage points and the probable sentence 
lengthens by 3.8 month. 
 
Table 2-8 Regression Results for the Probability of Imprisonment 
 
Note: “Imprisonment” indicates a dummy variables taking 1 if a convicted defendant is actually jailed, and 0 if he/she receives a 
suspended jail term. “Chaebol” denotes a dummy variable taking 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works is affiliated 
with chaebol, and 0 otherwise. “Controlling Shareholder” has 1 if a convicted defendant is a founder or a member of a founding 
family, and 0 if he/she is non-family top management (e.g. CEO or CFO). “Amount of Losses” is equal to ln (Monetary losses 
which a defendant inflicts on a firm+1). “No Compensation” has 1 if losses from crimes are not fully reimbursed, and 0 
otherwise. “Instance” has 1 if a trial court is an appeal court, and 0 if the court is a lower court. “NL” represents the total number 
of defense lawyers assisting each defendant. “HPL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is HPL, and 0 otherwise. 
“HPL” represents defense lawyer with Senior Judge experience. “Senior judge” includes Supreme Court Justice, High (District) 
Court Chief Judge, High (Disctrict) Court Senior Judge.“Top10_Dummy” is 1 if one of the defense attorneys is “Top10” and 0 
otherwise. . “Top10” indicates defense lawyer from one of top 10 law firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable  =  Imprisonment (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chaebol 
-.89** 
(.41) 
-.74* 
(.41) 
-.82** 
(.42) 
-.88** 
(.40) 
Controlling Shareholder 
2.96*** 
(.50) 
3.02*** 
(.50) 
3.13*** 
(.52) 
2.76*** 
(.48) 
No Compensation 
1.26** 
(.59) 
1.14* 
(.60) 
1.24** 
(.61) 
1.41** 
(.60) 
Amount of Losses 
.37*** 
(.09) 
.40*** 
(.10) 
.38*** 
(.10) 
.35*** 
(.09) 
HPL_Dummy 
-.85 
(.54) 
 
-1.09* 
(..62) 
 
Top10_Dummy  
-.73* 
(.41) 
-.65 
(.42) 
 
NL 
 
   
.07 
(.05) 
Instance 
-4.52*** 
(.86) 
-1.34*** 
(.40) 
-1.42*** 
(.41) 
-1.38*** 
(.40) 
Constant 
-4.82*** 
(.96) 
-5.35*** 
(.91) 
-3.5*** 
(.64) 
-5.75*** 
(.94) 
Observations 252 252 252 252 
34 
 
Table 2-9 Regression Results for the Probability of Pretrial Detention 
 
Note: “Chaebol” denotes a dummy variable taking 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works is affiliated with chaebol, 
and 0 otherwise. “Controlling Shareholder” has 1 if a convicted defendant is a founder or is a member of founding family, and 0 
if he/she is management (e.g. CEO or CFO). “Amount of Losses” is equal to ln (Monetary losses which a defendant inflicts on a 
firm+1).  
“NL” represents the defense lawyers of each defendant. EJL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is EJL, and 0 
otherwise. “EJL” denotes defense lawyer with judge experience.“HPL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is HPL, 
and 0 otherwise. “HPL” represents defense lawyer with Senior Judge experience. “Senior judge” includes Supreme Court 
Justice, High (District) Court Chief Judge, High (Disctrict) Court Senior Judge.“Top10_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense 
attorneys is “Top10” and 0 otherwise. . “Top10” indicates defense lawyer of a top 10 law firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable = Pretrial Detention (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chaebol 
-1.35*** 
(.41) 
-1.34*** 
(.43) 
-1.34*** 
(.43) 
-1.33*** 
(.41) 
Controlling Shareholder 
1.91*** 
(.41) 
1.91*** 
(.41) 
1.93*** 
(.42) 
1.95*** 
(.42) 
Amount of Losses 
.19** 
(.08) 
.19** 
(.08) 
.19** 
(.08) 
.18** 
(.08) 
HPL_Dummy 
-.12 
(.53) 
 
.02 
(.58) 
 
Top10_Dummy 
. 
 
-.02 
(.43) 
.00 
(.44) 
 
NL    
-.02 
(.07) 
Constant 
-1.20* 
(.72) 
-1.30** 
(.55) 
-.98 
(.91) 
-1.22** 
(.60) 
Observations 148 148 148 148 
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Table 2-10 Regression Results for Length of Imprisonment 
Dependent variable = Length of Imprisonment (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chaebol 
-18.6** 
(-8.5) 
-16.2* 
(-8.5) 
-16.9** 
(-8.4) 
-19.8** 
(-8.2) 
Controlling Shareholder 
63.6*** 64.0*** 
(-8.8) 
64.4*** 
(-8.8) 
59.4*** 
(10.3) (-8.7) 
No Compensation 
32.1** 
(-16.6) 
30.5* 
(-16.8) 
32.4** 
(-16.5) 
32.5** 
(-14.4) 
Amount of Losses 
8.5*** 
(-1.7) 
8.8*** 
(-1.9) 
8.5*** 
(-1.8) 
8.6*** 
(-1.7) 
HPL_Dummy 
-14.3 
(-9.5) 
 
-17.9** 
(-8.4) 
 
Top10_Dummy  
-10.6 
(-8.3) 
-9.6 
(-8.2) 
 
NL    
1.7 
(-1.1) 
Instance 
-27.9*** 
(-7.3) 
-27.4*** 
(-7.3) 
-27.8*** 
(-7.2) 
-28.6*** 
(-8.1) 
Constant 
-107.4*** 
(-21.3) 
-115.7*** 
(-19.5) 
-120.6*** 
(-29.6) 
124.4*** 
(-20.4) 
Observations 252 252 252 252 
Sigma 41.3 41.3 40.9 41.3 
 
Note: “Chaebol” denotes a dummy variable taking 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works is affiliated with chaebol, 
and 0 otherwise. “Controlling Shareholder” has 1 if a convicted defendant is a founder or is a member of founding family, and 0 
if he/she is management (e.g. CEO or CFO). “Amount of Losses” is equal to ln (Monetary losses which a defendant inflicts on a 
firm+1). “No Compensation” has 1 if losses from crimes are not covered, and 0 otherwise. “Instance” has 1 if a trial court is 
appeal court, and 0 if the court is a lower court. “NL” represents the defense lawyers of each defendant. EJL_Dummy” has 1 if 
one of the defense attorneys is EJL, and 0 otherwise. “EJL” denotes defense lawyer with judge experience.“HPL_Dummy” has 1 
if one of the defense attorneys is HPL, and 0 otherwise. “HPL” represents defense lawyer with Senior Judge experience. “Senior 
judge” includes Supreme Court Justice, High (District) Court Chief Judge, High (Disctrict) Court Senior 
Judge.“Top10_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is “Top10” and 0 otherwise. . “Top10” indicates defense lawyer of 
a top 10 law firm.  
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2.6.2 Robustness Check 
Table 2-11, Table 2-12, and Table 2-13 perform robustness check. Our robustness checks 
add several variables to the baseline regressions such as Regional and New Chief Justice dummy. 
Sentencing patters for corporate offenders may vary along lines of regional jurisdiction. To control 
this, we use a Regional dummy variable, which corresponds to 1 if the region includes Seoul or to 
0 otherwise. A ‘New Chief Justice’ variable controls the situation where a new chief justice, Yong-
hoon Lee (2005 to 2011), hardened the court’s stance on high-profile white-collar criminals. Since 
all judges are subject to a hierarchy of judicial structures, a new chief justice may affect the 
sentencing behavior of judges. As shown in and Table  
Table 2-11 to Table 2-13, however, these two dummy variables changed nothing in the 
results of the baseline regressions.  
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Table 2-11 Regression Results for the Probability of Imprisonment 
 
 
Note: “Chaebol” denotes a dummy variable taking 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works is affiliated with chaebol, 
and 0 otherwise. “Controlling Shareholder” has 1 if a convicted defendant is a founder or is a member of founding family, and 0 
if he/she is management (e.g. CEO or CFO). “Amount of Losses” is equal to ln (Monetary losses which a defendant inflicts on a 
firm+1). “NL” represents the defense lawyers of each defendant. EJL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is EJL, and 
0 otherwise. “EJL” denotes defense lawyer with judge experience.“HPL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is HPL, 
and 0 otherwise. “HPL” represents defense lawyer with Senior Judge experience. “Senior judge” includes Supreme Court 
Justice, High (District) Court Chief Judge, High (Disctrict) Court Senior Judge.“Top10_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense 
attorneys is “Top10” and 0 otherwise. . “Top10” indicates defense lawyer of a top 10 law firm. “New Chief Justice” denotes a 
dummy variable indicating that 1 if a case was sentenced after 2005, and 0 otherwise. “Region” denotes a dummy variable 
indicating that 1 if regional jurisdiction is Seoul, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable  =  Imprisonment (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chaebol 
-.86** 
(.41) 
-.71* 
(.42) 
-.80* 
(.43) 
-.86** 
(.41) 
Controlling Shareholder 
2.85*** 
(.49) 
2.98*** 
(.51) 
3.10*** 
(.53) 
2.64*** 
(.48) 
No Compensation 
2.03** 
(.83) 
1.95** 
(.85) 
2.12** 
(.88) 
2.11*** 
(.82) 
Amount of Losses 
.37*** 
(.09) 
.41*** 
(.10) 
.39*** 
(.10) 
.36*** 
(.09) 
HPL_Dummy 
-.81 
(.55) 
 
-1.05* 
(.63) 
 
Top10_Dummy  
-.89** 
(.43) 
-.83* 
(.44) 
 
NL   
 
 
.07 
(.05) 
Instance  
-1.44*** 
(.41) 
-1.46*** 
(.41) 
-1.51*** 
(.42) 
-1.42*** 
(.41) 
Constant 
-5.18*** 
(1.34) 
-6.19*** 
(1.32) 
-7.06*** 
(1.74) 
-5.91*** 
(1.29) 
Region  Y Y Y Y 
New Chief Justice Y Y Y Y 
Observations 252 252 252 252 
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Table 2-12 Regression Results for the Probability of Pretrial Detention 
 
Note: “Chaebol” denotes a dummy variable taking 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works is affiliated with chaebol, 
and 0 otherwise. “Controlling Shareholder” has 1 if a convicted defendant is a founder or is a member of founding family, and 0 
if he/she is management (e.g. CEO or CFO). “Amount of Losses” is equal to ln (Monetary losses which a defendant inflicts on a 
firm+1). “NL” represents the defense lawyers of each defendant. EJL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is EJL, and 
0 otherwise. “EJL” denotes defense lawyer with judge experience.“HPL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is HPL, 
and 0 otherwise. “HPL” represents defense lawyer with Senior Judge experience. “Senior judge” includes Supreme Court 
Justice, High (District) Court Chief Judge, High (Disctrict) Court Senior Judge.“Top10_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense 
attorneys is “Top10” and 0 otherwise. . “Top10” indicates defense lawyer of a top 10 law firm. “New Chief Justice” denotes a 
dummy variable indicating that 1 if a case was sentenced after 2005, and 0 otherwise. “Region” denotes a dummy variable 
indicating that 1 if regional jurisdiction is Seoul, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
  
Dependent variable = Pretrial Detention (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chaebol 
-1.24*** 
(.43) 
-1.28** 
(.45) 
-1.29*** 
(.45) 
-1.23*** 
(.43) 
Controlling Shareholder 
1.96*** 
(.42) 
1.92*** 
(.43) 
1.94*** 
(.43) 
1.98*** 
(.44) 
Amount of Losses 
.19*** 
(.08) 
.19*** 
(.08) 
.19** 
(.08) 
.18*** 
(.08) 
HPL_Dummy 
-.11 
(.55) 
 
.00 
(.67) 
 
Top10_Dummy 
. 
 
-.11 
(.45) 
.16 
(.47) 
 
NL    
-.02 
(.07) 
Constant 
-.07 
(1.47) 
-.13 
(1.39) 
-.26 
(1.59) 
-.14 
(1.36) 
Region  Y Y Y Y 
New Chief Justice Y Y Y Y 
Observations 148 148 148 148 
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Table 2-13 Regression Results for the Length of Imprisonment 
Note: “Chaebol” denotes a dummy variable taking 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works is affiliated with chaebol, 
and 0 otherwise. “Controlling Shareholder” has 1 if a convicted defendant is a founder or is a member of founding family, and 0 
if he/she is management (e.g. CEO or CFO). “Amount of Losses” is equal to ln (Monetary losses which a defendant inflicts on a 
firm+1). “NL” represents the defense lawyers of each defendant.  
EJL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is EJL, and 0 otherwise. “EJL” denotes defense lawyer with judge 
experience.“HPL_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is HPL, and 0 otherwise. “HPL” represents defense lawyer with 
Senior Judge experience. “Senior judge” includes Supreme Court Justice, High (District) Court Chief Judge, High (Disctrict) 
Court Senior Judge.“Top10_Dummy” has 1 if one of the defense attorneys is “Top10” and 0 otherwise. . “Top10” indicates 
defense lawyer of a top 10 law firm. “New Chief Justice” denotes a dummy variable indicating that 1 if a case was sentenced 
after 2005, and 0 otherwise. “Region” denotes a dummy variable indicating that 1 if regional jurisdiction is Seoul, and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
 
One may challenge our findings by claiming that leniency towards chaebol-connected 
offenders could be attributed to prosecutorial selection bias rather than sentencing bias. This may 
appear plausible because, in all our cases, public prosecutors choose to bring formal charges to 
trial. Systematic patterns in the prosecution of chaebol-connected criminals, should they be 
found, may yield a selection bias and affect our regressions analysis.  
Dependent variable = Length of Imprisonment (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chaebol 
-19.2** 
(8.2) 
-16.8** 
(8.3) 
-17.4** 
(8.2) 
-20.2** 
(8.2) 
Controlling Shareholder 
62.7*** 
(10.4) 
63.9*** 
(10.5) 
64.2*** 
(10.5) 
58.7*** 
(10.3) 
No Compensation 
42.5*** 
(16.2) 
41.7*** 
(16.3) 
43.1*** 
(16.4) 
43.1*** 
(16.0) 
Amount of Losses 
8.0*** 
(1.7) 
8.4*** 
(1.7) 
8.0*** 
(1.7) 
8.2*** 
(1.7) 
HPL_Dummy 
-13.1 
(10.0) 
 
-16.5 
(11.2) 
 
Top10_Dummy  
-13.2 
(8.4) 
-12.5 
(8.4) 
 
NL    
1.6 
(1.1) 
Instance 
-28.6*** 
(8.1) 
-28.6*** 
(8.1) 
-28.9*** 
(8.0) 
-29.2*** 
(8.1) 
Constant 
-111.0*** 
(26.4) 
-125.1*** 
(26.1) 
-133.0*** 
(31.4) 
123.8*** 
(25.9) 
Region  Y Y Y Y 
New Chief Justice Y Y Y Y 
Observations 252 252 252 252 
Sigma 40.9 40.8 40.9 41.3 
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Two scenarios are possible. First, a public prosecutor may be more willing to bring 
chaebol-connected cases to court in order to burnish his/her corruption-fighting reputation. This 
can lead the prosecutor to bring cases to court even if he/she may lose a case with low quality of 
evidence or even if he/she charges corrupt barons with minor counts. In the presence of such 
overzealous prosecution, the sentences to prosecuted chaebol–related defendants are likely to be 
more lenient than those of non-chaebol ones.  
The other possibility is that a public prosecutor can be reluctant to bring chaebol-
connected cases at trial. On one hand, chaebol–related defendants are armed with better legal 
profession as shown in Figure 2. Thus, prosecutors are less likely to win the cases. Trial 
outcomes are critical for prosecutors to be elevated to higher positions. Losing prosecutors are 
unlikely to be rewarded with promotions. On the other hand, prosecutors might be reluctant out 
of political considerations. Confronted by the colossal power of chaebols, prosecutors may 
hesitate to investigate them or prosecute only the most egregious chaebol-connected cases. 
Hence, those that are actually prosecuted are generally serious crimes that will receive harsh 
punishments.  
We argue that the second scenario, for several reasons, makes more sense in the context 
of Korea. In the U.S. the vast majority of prosecutors are elected officials; in Korea, all 
prosecutors are appointed. Since a prosecutor’s record is critical to promotion, a prosecutor cares 
intensely about winning prospects, not reputation. In addition, accused tycoons generally 
establish close connections with high-profile politicians, including the country’s president 
(example, politically connected firms). Since a prosecutor is appointed by the attorney general 
who in turn is a political appointee of the president, prosecutors are vulnerable to indirect 
political pressure. Consequently, we can infer that chaebol-related cases that do come to trial are 
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extraordinarily serious. This suggests that the selection bias that may exist in our dataset does not 
undermine the presence of sentencing bias toward a conglomerate, but strengthens it; since 
prosecutorial selection bias tilts the severity of offenses upward, this helps strengthen our claim 
for sentencing bias in favor of chaebols.  In this respect, it is sensible to interpret that the 
estimates presented here as lower bounds on chaebol bias. 
2.7 THE SOURCES OF TOO BIG TO JAIL 
2.7.1 Results of Analysis of Mitigating Circumstances 
In this section, we conduct an in-depth analysis of sentencing opinions, particularly 
focusing on mitigating circumstances. The analysis of mitigating factors vividly describes 
judicial perceptions of corporate crimes that are unlikely to be captured through mere regressions 
analysis. This analysis strengthens the findings in the previous sections.  
Table 2-14 shows that the most widely accepted defense, found in 146 out of 232 cases, 
is voluntary compensation for losses made to victims. The next most frequently accepted claim is 
the “no-private-gain” defense, claiming that a defendant acquired no private gain from 
wrongdoings because crimes generally involved in-group transactions that were consistent with 
the interests of a whole business group (e.g., to prop up troubled affiliates in the group). This 
claim, found in 135 out of 232 cases, mostly involved outlawed in-group transactions. The third 
is that a defendant has no criminal record; the fourth is “acceptance-of-responsibility” defense, 
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where defendants clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for their crimes. We present 
in detailed descriptions and examples of each defense.  
 
Table 2-14 The Descriptive Statics for the Defense Accepted by Judge 
 Chabol (n=132) Non-chaebol (n=100) P-Value 
‘Voluntary-compensation-for-losses’ defense 0.58 (76) 0.69 (69)* 0.096 
‘No-private-gain’ defense 0.71 (94)*** 0.41 (41) 2.52E-06 
‘No-criminal-history’ defense 0.43 (57) 0.57 (57)** 0.03 
‘Acceptance-of-responsibility’ defense 0.47 (63) 0.45 (45) 0.68 
‘Top-management’ defense 0.35 (47) 0.30 (30) 0.371 
Note 1: P-value shows the outcome of two-sample mean-comparison test. 
Note 2: ‘Voluntary-compensation-for-losses’ defense denotes the voluntary compensation for losses to victims by convicted 
criminals. ‘‘No-private-gain” defense indicates that a criminal acquired no private gain from crimes because crimes were 
generally in-group transactions committing for facilitating the interests of a whole business group (e.g., for propping troubled 
affiliates in the group). ‘No-criminal-history’ defense denotes a case in which white-collar offenders have a clean record. 
‘Acceptance-of-responsibility’ defense indicates that convicted defendants clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for 
their crimes. ‘Top-management’ defense represents that the convicted non-family top managers apologize for their involvement 
in crimes by claiming that they just followed past common management practices as employees. 
 
The detailed examination of mitigating factors reaffirms the existence of a chaebol bias 
and in several dimensions, supplements the bias. First, the analysis shows that voluntary payment 
of restitution leads judges to lower criminals’ reprehensibility, translating into more leniency for 
chaebols-linked defendants with vast financial resources. Second, considerations of one’s 
criminal record and defendant’s philanthropic activities (or contributions to the economy) also 
reflect judicial bias for chaebols because these defenses appear to be more relevant for chaebol-
connected defendants.  In the subsequent subsection, we attempt to answer one of the key 
questions in this paper: what motivates the judiciary to deal in too-big-to-jail sentences?  
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Table 2-15 Description and Example for Mitigating Factors 
No. of 
observation 
Factors Description Examples 
Critique from media or 
academia 
146 ‘Voluntary-
compensation-
for-losses’ 
defense 
When imposing a sentence, one 
of the most decisive mitigating 
circumstances a judge considers 
is the voluntary compensation 
for losses to victims by 
criminals.4  
Several patterns are worth 
notable in the defense. First, 
losses (or gains) from crimes 
are ill-defined. Courts define 
the gains so narrowly that 
private benefits of control were 
excluded.  
Second, the way a court deems 
restitution is, to some extent, 
arbitrary. For example, when 
damages are paid by one of 
several co-defendants, courts 
apply that restitution for other 
defendants who did not 
compensate victims. In 
addition, the judiciary 
considered compensation as 
one of mitigating factors if 
restitution was made prior to 
adjudication, which suggests 
that defendants do not 
necessarily make pre-
indictment restitution 
 Critics argue that this 
judicial behavior weakens 
the deterrent effect of 
criminal sanctions because 
it may facilitate the 
following opportunistic 
behavior: If a crime goes 
undetected, white-collar 
offenders retain their 
stolen assets; if detected, 
they make restitution, 
which buys them a 
suspended sentence.   
                                                 
44 Note that the compensation we refer to here differs from restitution American judges employ as criminal 
sanctions. In the Korean criminal justice system, judges, when imposing punishment, are allowed to select only two 
types of criminal penalty: fine and imprisonment (with penal labor). Thus Korean judges cannot order defendants to 
make restitution or give suspended imprisonment on the condition of restitution.  Exactly speaking, in addition to the 
two sanctions, a judge can choose imprisonment without penal labor. However, imprisonment without penal labor is 
seldom used. 
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135 ‘No-private-
gain’ defense 
This is one of the most common 
claims made particularly when 
crimes involve two 
circumstances. When crimes 
took the form of in-group self-
dealing transactions to prop up 
a troubled subsidiary, courts 
generally hold that a defendant 
committed the crimes for the 
good of the company. Along the 
same lines, if founding family 
members commit crimes to 
retain control over a business 
group, judges generally rule 
that the crimes did not serve 
private interests.   
 
In a Daewoo group case, 
for example, a firm was 
financed through 
accounting fraud and a 
loan obtained through the 
fraud was transferred to 
help a troubled subsidiary. 
The courts held that these 
crimes were not committed 
for private gain of 
defendants.  
 
Another example concerns 
a Samsung group case 
where defendants issued 
equity at unfairly low 
prices to cede control over 
Samsung Group to a 
controlling shareholder’s 
son. A judge held that the 
defendants, board directors 
who approved the equity 
issue, never intended to 
gain privately from their 
criminal conduct.   
As Dick and Zingales 
(2004) show, private 
benefits of control 
constitute quantifiable 
economic value in many 
cases, accounting for, on 
average, 14 percent firms’ 
equity value. This suggests 
that the private benefits of 
control are obviously a 
part of economic gains 
which can be critical 
motives for economic 
crimes. 
114 ‘No-criminal-
history’ defense  
 
The fact that white-collar 
offenders have a clean record 
serves as an extenuating factor 
in sentencing. By portraying 
themselves as law-abiding 
citizens, white-collar offenders 
claim to have made a mistake 
rather than commit crimes on 
purpose. Their claim is that 
they are in essence different 
from traditional street 
criminals. 
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108 ‘Acceptance-
of-
responsibility’ 
defense 
As in the United States 
Sentencing Guideline5, if a 
convicted defendant clearly 
demonstrates acceptance of 
responsibility for his crimes, 
this also serves as an 
attenuating factor, allowing 
judges to give more leniency. 
 There exist little criteria 
(even any descriptions of 
mitigating circumstances) 
for determining whether a 
defendant in question 
deserves the reduction of 
illegality under this 
defense, which suggests 
that this defense totally is 
under a regimen of 
unbounded judicial 
discretion. 6    
77 ‘Top-
management’ 
defense 
Hired top management in a 
business group plays a 
subordinate role in committing 
crimes. On trial, top 
management tends to invoke 
the defense that it just followed 
past common management 
practices as an employee. Many 
cases included in our sample 
occurred before the 1997’s 
financial crisis, at a time when 
few checks and balances might 
constrain a dominant 
shareholder. Many firms were 
plagued by outdated 
management practices, such as 
window dressing or off-the-
book accounts; given such 
circumstances, a court would 
tend to adjust downward 
illegality of a hired CEO.  
 
The CEO of Doosan 
Construction Company 
supplied $12 million off-
the-book funds for a 
controlling shareholder. 
The CEO invoked the top 
management defense. The 
court ruled that even 
though he failed to defy an 
untoward order from a 
controlling shareholder, the 
fact that he was swayed by 
a dominant shareholder 
justified a suspended 
prison term.   
 
                                                 
5 http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/3e1_1.htm 
6 In the U.S., the Guideline recounts specific cases where  a defendant qualifies under subsection (a), such as (A) 
truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely 
denying any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), 
(c) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt; and (d) voluntary resignation from the office or 
position held during the commission of the offense;  
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2.7.2 Testing the Size Hypothesis 
We investigate the source of chaebol bias by empirically testing two hypotheses. Our 
natural starting point for formulating the first testable hypothesis is to focus on the size of 
business groups. The hypothesis is: “the larger the business group, the more lenient its judicial 
treatment (we call it the size hypothesis).”  
The size hypothesis suggests that lighter criminal penalties might be intrinsic to the size 
of chaebols as in too-big-to-fail situations (Mishkin 2006). Recent leniency given to Wall-street 
executive is likely to be explained by this size hypothesis. This is easily confirmed by what the 
U.S. Attorney general Eric Holder told the Senate Judiciary Committee.  
“I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does 
become difficult to prosecute them, […] When we are hit with indications that if you do 
prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge it will have a negative impact on the national 
economy, perhaps world economy, that is a function of the fact that some of these institutions 
have become too large.”   
This size hypothesis is highly relevant in the Korean context for several aspects. First, the 
largest chaebols make substantial contributions to the national economy. For example, the total 
sales of the top 4 family business groups (Samsung, Hyundai motor car, LG, and SK) contributed 
to 49.2 percent of GDP and the total assets of their affiliates amounted to 43.5 percent of GDP in 
2005 (Solidarity for Economic Reform 2009). Since chaebols are mainly managed by a few 
controlling shareholders, judges worry about the economy-wide consequences of a harsh 
sentence against these tycoons.  
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These concerns lead the judiciary to engage in too-big-to-jail, suggesting a reason for 
Korea’s prevalence of suspended sentences (or shorter prison terms) for them.  
Note that many cases involving in-group transactions in our sample take the form of 
outlawed self-dealing in which a subsidiary bails out its parent in danger of bankruptcy. Column 
(2) in Table 2-16 confirms this hypothesis: the chaebol bias is stronger for the top 10 business 
groups than for those outside that ranking.   
In addition, a “national champion” ideology is also likely to present a rationale for the 
size hypothesis. Many Koreans support the notion that what is good for, say, Samsung is also 
good for Korea. They are proud of Samsung, Hyundai, and LG because they compete and shine 
in the world market. Thus they tend to defend chaebols regardless of their transgressions. For 
that reason, the judiciary cowers at the prospect of being adversarial.  
 
2.7.3 Testing the Civil Law Hypothesis 
The civil law hypothesis is motivated by several well-known studies that civil-law courts 
allow more substantial expropriation of minority shareholders than their common-law 
jurisdictions counterparts. We believe that this argument is pertinent to our exploration of the 
source of the chaebol effect for at least two reasons.   
First, consistent with law and finance literature, Table 18 shows that outlawed in-group 
transactions are overwhelmingly committed by chaebol-related defendants. For embezzlement 
and “narrow self-dealing”, there exist no significant differences between chaebol versus non-
chaebol offenders.  
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Second, Table 2-14 reports that for chaebol-related cases, the no-private-gain defense 
was the most commonly accepted claim, made in 94 out of 132. In addition, this defense is the 
only claim which is accepted more for chaebol-related cases than for non-chaebol cases at 1% 
significant level. This pattern is not found in other claims such as the voluntary-compensation-
for-losses defense and the no criminal records defense.  
 
Table 2-16 Sources of the Chaebol effect 
 
Note 1: Covariates include the variable Controlling Shareholder, Loss, Instance, No Compensation, and Amount of Losses. All 
results from probit. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficients significantly different from 0 at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Note 2.  “Top 1_10_chaebol” denotes a dummy variable indicating that 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works is 
affiliated with top 1 to 10 chaebol and 0 otherwise. “Less Top_10_chaebol” denotes a dummy variable indicating that 1 if a firm 
for whom a convicted defendant works is affiliated with below top 10 chaebol 1 and 0 otherwise. “Ingroup Transaction” denotes 
a dummy variable indicating that 1 if “No-private-gain” defense is accepted, and 0 otherwise. ‘No-private-gain” defense indicates 
that a criminal acquired no private gain from crimes because crimes were generally in-group transactions committing for 
facilitating the interests of a whole business group (e.g., for propping up troubled affiliates in the group). 
 
Specifically, we test the civil law hypothesis using an In-group Transaction dummy, 
indicating that 1 if the no-private-gain defense is accepted, and 0 otherwise.    
Column (3) in Table 2-16 shows the results that the In-group Transaction dummy lowered 
the likelihood of incarceration by 9.8 percentage points. Column (4) in Table 2-16shows that the 
Imprisonment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chaebol 
-.89** 
(.41) 
 
-.75* 
(.42) 
 
Top 1_10_chaebol  
-1.03** 
(.51) 
 
-.86* 
(.52) 
Less Top_10_chaebol  
-.80* 
(.47) 
 
-.68 
(.47) 
Ingroup Transaction   
-.88** 
(.42) 
-.86** 
(.43) 
Observations 252 252 252 252 
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inclusion of In-group Transaction dummy weakens the chaebol effect, 10.2 to 8.4 percentage 
points. This pattern is especially notable for mid-level chaebols. For top 10 chaebols, the 
inclusion of the In-group Transaction dummy attenuates the chaebol effect from 11.2 to 9.2 
percentage points. For chaebols outside the top 10, this dummy removes the correlation between 
chaebols and leniency.      
How should we interpret this result? We interpret this finding as evidence that the Korean 
judiciary reviews related-party transactions based on the interests of the business group rather 
than those of (minority) shareholders of each affiliate. Specifically, criminals attempted to justify 
related-party transactions in the name of a plausible business purpose, especially group 
management, i.e., management of constituent companies in accordance with the overall interest 
of the group.  Given such circumstance, a court would tend to adjust downward the 
blameworthiness of convicted criminals by deeming this circumstance as a mitigating factor. 
Such a tendency by the court suggests that leniency is just a reflection of the judicial 
considerations into weighing the group’s interests.  
This interpretation is line with the claim that civil law is less suspicious of conflicted 
transactions than common law, and subjects them to more lenient regulatory and legal scrutiny 
(Johnson et al. 2000). 
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2.8 CONCLUSION 
A central issue in social sciences has long been the interaction between legal and 
economic systems. The nexus between the two critical systems has been clarified by prominent 
scholars. In particular, finance and economics literature tends to focus on how legal systems 
affect economic outcomes.  However, little of the literature has investigated how a specific form 
of economic organization influences and interacts with judicial behavior and as a result, how the 
judiciary helps sustain the organization, especially in Korea where large family business groups 
dominate a national economy.  
We have explored these issues with a focus on how the judiciary addresses corporate 
fraud offenders involved with Korea’s large business groups. Using a unique data set about 
Korean corporate crimes, we have attempted to identify and quantify too big to jail phenomena 
in the judiciary. We find that courts are excessively leniently in dealing with tycoons; large 
family business groups and those who run them are often too big to jail. These findings are 
robust across different measures of the quality of legal representation and the use of additional 
covariates. In addition, we show that observed leniency can be explained by concerns for system 
risks caused by harsh sentences against chaebols and judicial unwillingness to regulate in-group 
transactions. 
Our study leaves one interesting topic for future research. Many studies show that family 
control is common around the world. To more examine too big to jail, further cross-country work 
is required to conduct.  
Existing studies about too-big-to fail investigate the moral hazard problem (Stern and 
Feldman 2004; Mishkin 2006): whether and how expectations of too-big-to-fail distort the 
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behavior of market participants. This question can be readily applied to too-big-to-jail, which 
creates a moral hazard problem for would-be white-collar criminals that parallels the too-big-to-
fail problem for big banks. Since the larger the firm, the more the likelihood of leniency, a 
controlling shareholder has strong incentives for size-maximization rather than profit-
maximization. That is, as a consequence of too big to jail, firms are expanding their size for 
reasons other than the realization of economies of scale. This argument is also worthwhile 
empirically testing. This alternative way of understanding the channel through which legal 
determinants interact with corporate governance offers a new point of departure for more 
rigorous theoretical models. 
Lastly, this research offers a critical implication to policy makers. Our findings and 
several anecdotal evidence show that large (financial) firms benefit from implicit government 
guarantee (too big to fail) and from the fact that they become the untouchables (too big to jail) 
due to their magnitude.  If both regulatory authorities and the judiciary fail to manage too-big-to-
fail (jail) problem ex-post, we need ex-ante measures to address these concerns: cap on the size 
of financial institutions or restriction of some type of risky behavior, so-called “Volcker rule.” 
For policy makers, this finding implies that we need to cap the magnitude of financial 
intermediaries or ban specific type of risky behavior. Our finding adds to supporting arguments 
for the Volcker rule.  
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3.0  REVOLVING DOOR ATTORNEYS AND THE POWER OF 
CONNECTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM KOREA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Connections matter. From individuals7 to firms,8 all economic agents spend large 
amounts of time and money establishing and sustaining their personal and professional 
connections. This is due to widespread belief that, for any economic entity, connectedness is a 
key determinant of success. There is ample empirical evidence of causal linkage between 
individual ties and socioeconomic outcomes in the private sector (Kranton and Minehart 2001; 
Rauch and Trindade 2002; Munshi 2003; Burchardi and Hassan 2011).  
This study focuses on the public sector for which there is limited empirical evidence as to 
whether connections affect decision making. In this paper, we examine whether connections 
affect behavior of the judiciary, focusing on revolving door phenomena in Korea’s judiciary. 
Using a unique data set of 270 Korean high-profile white-collar criminals, we investigate 
whether judges favor newly retired senior judge and public prosecutor attorneys 9 (Revolving 
door attorneys) by handing down light criminal sanctions to clients of Revolving door attorneys.  
                                                 
7 Facebook has1.11 billion people using the site each month (as of March 2013). For details, see an AP news article 
http://news.yahoo.com/number-active-users-facebook-over-230449748.html. Linkedin counts over 200 million 
members (as of 2012). For more information see http://blog.linkedin.com/2013/01/09/linkedin-200-million.  
8 To build political connections through which firms influence policy, firms not only make high campaign 
contributions but also have massive lobbying expenditures. The size of federal lobbying industry is known to be 
more than 4 billion dollars (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2012). 
9 Revolving door attorneys in this paper refer to defense attorneys with senior judge and public prosecutor 
experience. “Senior judge” includes Supreme Court Justice, high (district) court chief judge, high (district) court 
senior judge. “Senior public prosecutor” includes the prosecutor general, a chief of high (district) public prosecutor’s 
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The public tends to believe that connections Revolving door attorneys acquired during 
public service are key determinants of lenient criminal sanctions. Koreans sarcastically call this 
form of favoritism jungwanyeoo (前官禮遇), “showing respect to seniors,” or giving seniors 
“petty gifts,” a pervasive perception that discredits the judiciary as a whole. 10  
Since the suspension of a sentence in Korea is tantamount to acquittal,11 accused barons 
are eager to hire well-connected counsels to buy their way out of prison sentences, ensuring 
Revolving door attorneys  highly lucrative post-retirement salaries. In this regard, jungwanyeoo 
can be understood as a special case of the “revolving door” problem, the movement of public 
officials into the industry they formerly regulated. That is why former senior judge attorneys 
reaping benefits from such connections are termed “Revolving door attorneys.” 12  
There are at least two reasons why Revolving door attorneys are ideal for studying how 
connections sway the behavior of public officials. The first obvious benefit is ease with which 
                                                 
office, and high (district) court senior prosecutor. For brevity, whenever we refer to Revolving door attorneys, 
lawyers with senior judge careers through this paper, senior judges indicate senior judge and public prosecutor.  
10 One poll showed that 83.4 % of respondents agreed that jungwanyeoo is prevalent in criminal cases and 83.7% of 
respondents agreed that jungwanyeoo is a manifestation of unequal treatment before the law (source: poll by the 
Supreme Court in 2003, for more information see a news article. 
http://www.lawtimes.co.kr/LawNews/News/NewsContents.aspx?serial=12445&kind=ISU). 
11 First, the Korean criminal justice system has few public officers to supervise all those who receive suspended 
sentences. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that suspended sentences will be resumed if one violates its terms. 
Second, as long as they receive suspended sentences, convicted white collar offenders face few hurdles to returning 
to management. Take, for instance, Lee Gun-hee, the chairman of Samsung Group, Korea’s largest chaebol. In April 
2008, Mr. Lee resigned his position after being accused of tax evasion and breach of fiduciary duty. The judiciary, in 
August 2009, gave him a three-year suspended jail sentence. By Christmas of that year, President Lee Myung-bak 
pardoned him, opening the way for his return to his former post in March 2010. This tycoon, convicted of multiple 
felonies, was able to return to power in less than two years without a single day of confinement.  
12 There is substantial survey evidence that the public well recognizes the power of influence peddling of Revolving 
door attorneys: one poll has shown that while 53% of respondents would want to hire Revolving door attorneys, 
40% would want to hire talented attorneys. The poll also showed that people want Revolving door attorneys because 
they believe that 1) Revolving door attorneys  help enhance a defendant’s winning probability (47% of respondents), 
2) Revolving door attorneys have mediating ties between defendants and judges or prosecutors (31%), and 3) 
Revolving door attorneys help their defendants avoid worst-case scenarios (20%). Only 5% want Revolving door 
attorneys because they believed they were talented attorneys (source: poll by Department of Justice in 2011). For 
more information, see the news article (http://news.donga.com/3/all/20120704/47509937).  
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we can identify the judicial connections examined here, thanks to the simplicity of the 
institutional framework.  
For several reasons, the studies of the impact of political connections on legislation (e.g., 
lobbying) confront several challenges: (1) the unit of analysis is at issue. Since one bill may 
contain many provisions, focusing on the bill results in mis-measurement of the impact of 
lobbying (Kang 2012); (2) another challenge is to identify relevant actors connected with 
lobbyists in legislative procedures because legislation often involves multiple groups such as 
legislators, their staffs, or even high-profile public officials in the executive; (3) even if we 
identify specific policy makers related to lobbyists, problems may still remain because the 
impact of a few politicians in the legislature is likely to be limited, which leads to the imprecise 
estimation of the power of political connections (Acemoglu et al. 2010) .  
For Revolving door attorneys, judicial ties are easy to observe because it is not hard to 
check when they started and terminated their careers in the judiciary. In addition, the unit of our 
analysis is self-evident. Observing several pieces of anecdotal evidence, we can measure to the 
extent such connections affect sentences, focusing on whether Revolving door attorney-
represented convicted defendants are given leniency (e.g., the higher probability of suspending 
jail terms or shorter imprisonment length). Another advantage lies in the potential applicability 
of the results to more general institutional settings. Studies show that the incentive structures of 
judges in Korea, one of civil law jurisdictions bears a striking resemblance to those of civil 
servants (Levy 2005; Rasmusen and Ramseyer 1997, 2001; Garopa and Ginsburgh 2011). 
Therefore, the analysis and results of Revolving door attorneys can be readily applied to civil 
servants in the public sector.  
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In attempting to empirically examine whether the judiciary favors professionally 
connected lawyers, the key empirical challenge is an identification issue. The mere fact that 
Revolving door attorneys raise the likelihood of leniency for convicted defendants does not count 
as unquestionable evidence of favoritism. It could be due to their skills (or effort).  To 
distinguish connections from skills, we attempt to identify a time period when the power of ties 
plunges. We hypothesize that preferential treatment granted to Revolving door attorneys 
substantially declines after the first year of their exit from the judiciary. To check this hypothesis 
we adopt the following identification strategy: to use the length of retirement of former senior 
judge lawyers as a source of exogenous variation in sentencing outcomes across convicted 
defendants. Specifically, we group Revolving door attorneys along their length of retirement. 
This strategy appears reasonable because the length of their retirement is related to judicial 
connections, but orthogonal to unobservable features of defense counsels, such as their intrinsic 
talent or professional knowledge. This strategy helps us to isolate Revolving door attorneys’ 
connections from their other characteristics such as expertise, experience, and innate cognitive 
capability.  
Another identification strategy is to exploit knowledge of the mechanisms in which 
favoritism is more likely. The basic theory of corruption claims that corruption, or more broadly 
unethical behavior is sensitive to media scrutiny (Mark and Levitt 2002, Brunetti and Weder 
2003, Chowdhury 2004).13 This idea offers another chance to exploit variation across convicted 
                                                 
13 Brunetti and Weder (2003) show a strong association between the level of press freedom and the level of 
corruption across countries, which suggests that an independent press serves as an important check against 
corruption. Mark and Levitt (2002) investigate corruption among Japan’s elite sumo wrestlers. They find that match 
rigging is pervasive in the final days of sumo tournaments but that match rigging disappears during times of 
increased media scrutiny. 
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criminals within one attorney. If leniency is a result of favoritism, the impact of Revolving door 
attorneys on the probability of leniency is expected to decrease as media coverage increases.  
Our paper finds that judicial connections have sizable impacts on sentences. Convicted 
white-collar offenders who are represented by Revolving door attorneys are more likely to 
receive suspended jail terms relative to those represented by ordinary attorneys by about 15 
percentage points. In addition, among the guilty corporate offenders who are actually 
incarcerated, those defended by Revolving door attorneys serve shorter jail terms by 24 months 
relative to those represented by non-connected ordinary lawyers.  
We also find evidence on a time-variant feature of the connections: Revolving door 
attorneys’ power to exact lighter sentences remarkably drops off approximately the first year 
following their exit from the judiciary; control groups (ex-senior judge lawyers who represent 
cases more than one year after retirement) do not increase the likelihood of leniency for their 
clients.  
There is no plausible evidence to suggest that Revolving door attorneys are more 
competent than these control groups. Indeed, the groups share with Revolving door attorneys a 
considerable similarity in their career paths. They are equally capable lawyers with similar 
judicial careers but “weakly-connected” compared to Revolving door attorneys. Therefore, this 
suggests that the observed variance in the likelihood of lenient sanctions between the control 
groups and Revolving door attorneys is unlikely to reflect differences in expert skill or 
knowledge in criminal trial procedures. A reasonable interpretation of significant drops in the 
probability of leniency around one year after retirement is that Revolving door attorneys are 
given preferential treatment due to their connections.  
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Consistent with this interpretation, we find anecdotal evidence that the power of 
connections is temporary in a market for lawyers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the entry-
level salary of Revolving door attorneys reaches ten to fourteen times the salaries they earned in 
office. After one or two years, however, their rates steeply falls to the level of the salaries of their 
counterparts in law firms, which suggests that the premium they commanded for their legal 
services was attributed to privileged connections.    
Another notable finding is that leniency disappears when cases are subject to media 
scrutiny. In the absence of coverage, Revolving door attorneys’ clients are more likely to be 
given lighter criminal sanctions. With media coverage, however, the likelihood of leniency 
dramatically diminishes. Other factors such as expertise and efforts of Revolving door attorneys 
are unlikely to explain this pattern. A sensible interpretation is that this pattern reflects a situation 
in which outside scrutiny compels judges to refrain from favoritism. This suggests a link 
between Revolving door attorneys' connections and the leniency their clients enjoy. This finding 
may be interpreted as evidence that the best cure for corruption is openness (Mark and Levitt 
2002, Brunetti and Weder 2003, Chowdhury 2004).  
Our paper is closely linked to the vast literature on the value of political connections 
(Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Faccio 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2012; Ferguson and 
Voth 2012; Khurana et al. 2012). These studies attempt to assess the value of political 
connections by observing stock price movements for connected firms in response to political 
events affecting the connections. For example, Fisman (2001) shows that rumors of Indonesian 
President Suharto’s worsening  health condition negatively impact share prices 
for companies connected to him. Ferguson and Voth (2008) present similar results for German 
firms affiliated with the Nazi party. Faccio (2006) presents cross-country evidence that the value 
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of politically connected firms increases when their owners are elected to a top political position, 
especially in highly corrupt countries.  
Our paper complements and enlarges these studies. To begin, while previous studies have 
highlighted the value of connections, we focus on their power by exploring the extent to which 
connections influence criminal-sentencing decisions. Second, while many studies focus on the 
role of connections in the executive or Congress, our work expands such a scope by investigating 
the role of connections in the judiciary. Moreover, our work differs substantially from the 
existing literature in establishing a causal link between connections and policy outcomes of 
interest. Only a few studies in this field have explored whether political connections of firms 
affect public policy, ranging from corporate bailout (Faccio et al. 2006) to government 
procurement (Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2013) to bank finance (Khwaja and Mian 2005; 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven 2008). Studies showing a causal relationship between the 
connections and policy outcomes are very limited. Lastly, even though studies have shown that 
the behavior of policy makers is influenced by connections, we know less about what determines 
the functioning of connections. Our work investigates one such mechanism: media scrutiny. This 
finding contributes to efficient regulations of revolving door phenomena in the public sector.    
This paper adds to the literature on the revolving door phenomenon (Vidal, Draca, and 
Fons-Rosen 2012; Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2012). For example, Vidal, Draca, and 
Fons-Rosen (2012) show that connections to powerful politicians in office mainly determine the 
revenues of revolving door lobbyists. More specifically, they find that, for those lobbyists with 
past experience with a U.S. Senator, revenues drop by 24 percent when the former employers 
leave office. Our finding also confirms that professional connections are scarce assets with 
money premia but are perishable ones.  
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Our paper also contributes to the literature on how media coverage alters the behavior of 
policy makers (Besley and Burgess 2002; Dyck, Moss, and Zingales 2008; Lim, Snyder, and 
Stromberg 2012). In highlighting the relationship between the media and the judicial behavior, 
our work is closely related to the work of Lim, Snyder, and Stromberg (2012). They show that 
the media enhances the responsiveness of sentencing decisions to the public’s preferences. They 
find that non-partisan elected judges are, in the presence of press coverage, tougher on crimes. 
Yet, these patterns are not observed for appointed judges.  
Our paper differs from their work by showing that even appointed judges are not immune 
to the impact of media coverage (and in turn public preferences). In this vein, our work is in line 
with Vidal and Leaver (2011) who show that even tenured judges are not perfectly insulated 
from the public preferences because promotion to higher posts is by nature an outcome of 
political considerations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes historical and 
institutional backgrounds. Section 3.3 describes how the data set is constructed. Section 3.4 
details the variables and advances three hypotheses to be empirically tested. Section 3.5 presents 
descriptive statistics of variables of interest. Section 3.6 addresses the basic identification 
strategy. Section 3.7 provides empirical findings and offers the interpretation of the findings. 
Section 3.8 concludes. 
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3.2 HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND  
3.2.1 Entrance Exam and Two-Year of Training at JRTI  
Like many other civil law countries (Japan, Ramseyer and Rasmusen 1996 and 2001; 
France and Spain, Muniz-Arguelles and Fraticelli-Torres 1985), Korea’s judiciary features a two-
stage judicial selection process: an entrance examination and appointment by the judiciary.   
At the first stage, those who want to pursue legal careers must pass a highly competitive 
entrance exam (the National Judicial Examination).14 Before 1980, the annual quota was 100; it 
increased to 300 in 1981, to 500 in 1996 and to 1000 in 2007. Table 3-1 shows that over the last 
two decades (1993-2011), less than 1 out of 20 (4.3% of) applicants passed the exam. Upon 
passing the exam, applicants become candidates for judgeship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Those who would become judges, public prosecutors, and private attorneys usually studies law as an 
undergraduate major. However, note that no prerequisites for the entrance exam are allowed. Even though applicants 
without a JD degree can apply for and take the exam. However, judicial (prosecutorial) selection procedures 
changed from 2009 in Korea.   
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Table 3-1 Pass Rate for Korean Judicial Entrance Exam 
Notes: Computed by the authors using data of Department of Justice in Korea. “Applicant” represents those who take the 
National Judicial Examination to pursue legal careers. “Candidate” denotes those who pass the National Judicial Examination. 
Year Applicants(A) Candidates(B) Annual Pass rate (100 * B/A) 
1993 15,516 288 1.9% 
1994 16,390 290 1.8% 
1995 16,879 308 1.8% 
1996 18,572 502 2.7% 
1997 15,568 604 3.9% 
1998 15,670 700 4.5% 
1999 17,301 709 4.1% 
2000 16,218 801 4.9% 
2001 22,365 991 4.4% 
2002 24,707 998 4.0% 
2003 24,491 906 3.7% 
2004 15,446 1,009 6.5% 
2005 17,642 1,001 5.7% 
2006 17,290 994 5.7% 
2007 18,114 1,011 5.6% 
2008 17,829 1,005 5.6% 
2009 17,972 997 5.5% 
2010 17,028 814 4.8% 
2011 14,449 707 4.9% 
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All candidates must receive two years of training at Korea’s Judicial Research and 
Training Institution (JRTI). JRTI functions as a law school; candidates attend courses and take 
exams; they also receive on-the-job training at prosecutorial offices, district courts, and law 
firms.  
JRTI has been long blamed for strengthening the judicial hierarchy because the hierarchy 
has been formed and reinforced according to candidates’ entering class in JRTI. A key example 
is early retirement, the most distinctive trait of Korea’s judicial system. Senior judges who fail to 
get promoted are asked to retire in order to enhance their junior colleagues’ thin prospects for 
attaining higher ranks.  
When Lee Sang-Hoon (class of 1977 in JRTI), for instance, became a Supreme Court 
Justice nominee in 2011, six district or high court chief judges left office. Three of them were his 
classmates at JRTI, and others were from a previous cohort at JRTI (their average retirement age 
was 56).  
Upon completing their training in JRTI, candidates can choose their career: they may take 
their jobs in on the bench, in the district attorney office, or in private practice. In general, salaries 
of private attorneys are known to be higher than those of the judiciary. Since the judiciary, 
however, offers prestige and power, candidates with the highest grades tend to pursue judicial 
careers. Thus approximately the top 30% of candidates serve as judges or as prosecutors. Judges 
are generally drawn from the group of highest performers, which suggests that initial placement 
within legal careers is indicative of the entrance exam scores and JRTI grades.  
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3.2.2 Judicial Pyramids 
The Korean judiciary is characterized by a pyramidal structure: a very few at the top and 
most on the bottom. As of 2013, Table 3-2 shows that Korea’s judiciary employed 2844 judges in 
total.  Of these, junior judges (of a district or appeal court) account for around 73% (2080 out of 
2858).  
 
Table 3-2 Total number of Judges in Korea by Ranks (as of 2013) 
 Ranks Number (%) 
Justice Supreme Court Justice 14 (0.5) 
 
Chief 
Judge 
 
High Court (or Patent Court) Chief Judge 
 
6 (0.2) 
District Court (or Administrative and Family Court)  Chief Judge 24 (0.8) 
 
Senior 
Judge 
 
High Court (or Patent Court) Senior Judge 
 
117 (4.1) 
Branch Court Senior Judge 39 (1.4) 
District court (or Administrative and Family court) Senior Judge 473 (16.6) 
 
Junior 
Judge 
 
Law Clerk of Justice 
 
105 (3.7) 
High Court (or Patent Court) Junior Judge 205(7.2) 
District Court (or Administrative and Family Court) Junior Judge 1875 (65.6) 
 Total 2858 (100.0) 
Notes: Data for the Table comes from Bub-won-jo-jik-bub (The Judicial Organization Act).  
 
All junior judges are assigned to their posts by the Supreme Court Chief Justice. They 
have a 10-year service term, and most are generally reappointed. Judges must halt their work, 
even in mid-term, when reaching the statutory retirement, age of 65 (70 for Supreme Court 
Justices).  
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Most junior judges are elevated to the rank of district court senior judge. 15 However, not 
all the district court senior judges can attain the next step, high court senior judges.17  Their 
career-mobility prospects diminish significantly as the senior judges get closer to the upper posts 
of the bureaucratic ladder. For instance, high court senior judges face slim chances of promotion 
to (district or high) court chief judges or to Supreme Court Justices. Table 2 reveals that the 
number of upper seats available to high court senior judges is at most 40.  
Meritocracy is the most fitting keyword that characterizes Korea’s judiciary. From JRTI 
candidates to high court senior judges, judicial seniors routinely assess performance of their 
subordinates. Such meritocracy in the judicial system has numerous advantages: it rewards 
qualified judges and thereby keeps them from neglecting their duty: it prevents the judiciary 
from pandering to the public and neglecting minority rights (Maskin and Tirole 2004). 
Meritocracy, however, has its drawback: it makes the judiciary susceptible to seniority. This 
occurs because junior judges are aware that they will be ranked on merits based not only on 
objective factors (e.g., case-processing rate and reversal rate), but also on subjective evaluations.  
 
 
3.2.3 Number of Revolving Door Attorneys  
Table 3-3 documents that from 2000 to 2006, 37 senior judges, on average, left office per 
year prior to their retirement age, which constitutes 5% of the number of senior judgeship.  Such 
                                                 
15 To be eligible for a district court senior judge, a newly appointed judge generally needs 15 years of experience. 
17 To get promoted to a high court senior judge requires additional 10 year careers. 
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early resignation pervades Korea’s judiciary. Data show that since 1990, only 20 (5) judges 
(public prosecutors) remained in office up to retirement age, which accounts for 1.3 (0.7) % of 
1519 (1353) retired judges during the same period.  
Note that early resignation of senior judges is structural: senior judges, especially high 
court senior judges tend to be pushed out of office owing to pressure from younger groups when 
they fail to be promoted. Given hierarchical structures and the slim chances of promotion in the 
judiciary, getting older judges out of the way is the only means of letting younger ones rise, 
opening a door to thin the bureaucracy's highest ranks.  
Table 3-3 also shows that 95% of retirees entered private practice. Surprisingly, even 
retired Supreme Court Justices serve as private attorneys. More than four out of five (17 out of 
20) of retired Supreme Court Justices encounter their former subordinates in court as defense 
lawyers. Table 3-4 shows that Revolving door attorneys account for around 1% of all private 
attorneys in Korea. 
Table 3-3 Total Number of Retired Judges by Rank (2000-2006) 
 
Position prior to Retirement No. of Retirees No. of Retirees whose First Post-Retirement Job is 
Lawyers 
Panel A.  2000 to 2006   
Supreme Court Justice 20 17 (85%) 
High (District) Court Chief Judge 48 44 (92%) 
High court Senior Judge 26 22 (85%) 
District court Senior Judge 167 167 (100%) 
Junior Judge 236 220 (93%) 
Total 497 470 (95%) 
   
Panel B. Annual Average   
Annual Average no. of retired judges 71 67.1 (95%) 
Annual Average no. of retired senior 
judges 
37.2 35.7 (96%) 
 Notes: Computed by the author using data of the Korean Supreme Court. The number in parentheses in Panel  
A (B) reports the ratio of the total (annual average) number of retirees whose first post-retirement job is a lawyer to the total 
(annual average) number of retirees from 2000 to 2006 
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Table 3-4 Total Number of Attorneys and the Share of RDAs in Korea (2000-2006) 
 
Note: Computed by the author using data of Department of Justice in Korea. The number in parentheses reports the ratio of the 
annual average number of newly retired “senior judges and prosecutors” to the number of “(new) attorneys”. “New Attorneys” 
denote attorneys who start private practice at the given year. “Senior judge” includes Supreme Court Justice, high (district) court 
chief judge, and high (district) court senior judge.  
3.3 DATA DESCRIPTION18 
We constructed a unique defendant-level dataset. The dataset includes 270 Korean white-
collar offenders. They committed crimes between 1993 and 2006. They were adjudicated 
between January 2000 and June 2007 in Korea. The dataset involves several high-profile 
corporate fraud cases involving large family business group such as Samsung, Hyundai Motor 
Company, and SK group (for a comprehensive list of firms involving crimes, see Appendix Table 
A 5 List of Firms in our dataset). All our samples were convicted at Korea’s lower and high courts.  
3.3.1 Definition of White-Collar Crimes 
The white-collar crimes in our sample include embezzlement and breach of fiduciary 
duty under article 356 of Korea’s criminal code. This is roughly equivalent to 18 U.S.C.  §1341 
                                                 
18  I take, in part, this description from Choi, Kang, and Lee (2012).  
Year Number of Attorneys Number of New Attorneys. 
2000 4,228 (1.4%) 341 (20%) 
2001 4,618 (1.3%) 390 (17%) 
2002 5,073 (1.3%) 455 (15%) 
2003 5,586 (1.2%) 513 (13%) 
2004 6,300 (1.0%) 714 (10%) 
2005 6,997 (1.0%) 697 (10%) 
2006 7,603 (0.9%) 606 (11%) 
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(Frauds and Swindles) or 18 U.S.C. §1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television). Accounting 
fraud cases are included only when offenses occur along with embezzlement and breach of 
fiduciary duty. The statutory maximum sentence changes with the size of losses. Sentencing 
prescribed in the law ranges from 1 month to 5 years. When the size of incurred losses surpasses 
certain thresholds, criminal punishments escalate dramatically (Act on Aggravated punishment, 
Etc. of Specific Economic Crimes article).19  For instance, as the losses are  between KRW 5 and 
5 billion (approximately USD 5 million) , prison sentences jump from 3 to 25 years. Beyond 
KRW 5 billion, a life sentence can be imposed. Our selection excludes cases below KRW 5 
billion.  
3.3.2 Data Sources 
The basic challenge of our work has indeed been a lack of data. Given the popular 
interest in Revolving door attorneys inside and outside academia, one of the most striking facts is 
the absence of serious analysis of data. Since the official response of the judiciary is a denial of 
such favoritism, there is no available official data about jungwanyeoo. Several news articles on 
Revolving door attorneys mainly rely on anecdotal evidence or interviews with legal profession. 
Therefore scholars must painstakingly assemble and gather information from a variety of 
sources. To construct data, we focus on several high-profile corporate fraud cases, suggesting 
that our data is not exhausitve. Despite limitation of the data, given that high legal service fees of 
Revolving door attorneys , however, the focus on the high–profile cases allows us a better chance 
                                                 
19  The act can be found at http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawPopupView.do?hseq=15852,15852# 
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for studying the impact of Revolving door attorneys on the sentencing outcomes. Three sources 
are: 
3.3.2.1 NGO Reports and News Coverage 
 
We were first guided by a series of special reports released by People’s Solidarity 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and Solidarity for Economic Reform (SER), civic watchdogs 
devoted to monitoring corporate fraud in Korea. Their reports detailed information on a modest 
number of high-profile white-collar crimes. 20 To cover more cases, we turn to media coverage 
by searching for string {“embezzlement OR breach of fiduciary duty” “court decisions OR 
sentencing”}.  
3.3.2.2 Court Decisions 
 
An extensive review of court decisions offers critical information required to construct a 
reliable dataset. We first highlight several factors involving offenders: is he/she involved with an 
affiliate of a business group? is he/she a dominant shareholder or top exectutive? We also 
identify the key factor related to offenses; the size of losses that defendents inflicted on victims 
and . These factors are predictive of sentencing outcomes under the Supreme Court’s guidelines 
to which lower courts refer when determining sentences.   
                                                 
20 The SER’s reports can be found at  
http://www.erri.or.kr/report/report_view.php?code=economy&rpt_seq=16&pageNo=1&searchField=RPT_TTL&se
archString=%C8%AD%C0%CC%C6%AE 
The PSPD’s reports can be found at  http://www.peoplepower21.org/PSPD_press/778722 
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3.3.2.3 Internet Legal Resources 
 
To track defense attorneys’ career paths, We relied on “Lawnb,” Korea’s version of 
Westlaw and Lexis.21  Through Lawnb, We were able to identify when defense lawyers passed 
the entrance exam; if the lawyers served as judges, what positions they held; and how long they 
served. Finally, We hone in on only crimes of controlling shareholders and top management. 
Mid-level managers’ misdeeds are outside the scope of this study.  
 
3.4 KEY VARIABLES AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
This paper first examines as a primary dependent variable a court’s adjudication to 
suspend a jail term. IMPRISONMENT is a binary variable; taking on 1 if a convicted defendant 
receives an actual prison term and 0 if he/she receives a suspended jail term.  Why do we focus 
on suspension of a sentence rather than acquittal? We believe that a focus on a suspended jail 
term adjudication offers better opportunities to investigate the impact of judicial connections on 
sentencing decisions. It makes sense to suppose that even though a judge is affected by ties with 
Revolving door attorneys, he/she is unlikely to set a guilty defendant free, which is predicted by 
studies on corruption. The thoery of corruption (e.g., Arvind 2001) epitomizes corruption as 
requiring the three elements. First, a public official must have discretionary power. Second, there 
                                                 
21 http://www.lawnb.com/ 
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must be economic rents associated with this power. The third determinant of corruption relies on 
the likelihood of detection and punishment.  In view of the theory, the more likely outcome is 
that a judge delivers a suspended prison sentence as speicial treatments. First, acquittal decision 
that favors Revolving door attorneys could be reversed by appeal courts.22 Second, a judge would 
face intense criticism from the media or Congress, which harms his/her reputation. Moreover, 
judges in Korea have more discretionary authority than those in the United States. Even though 
sentencing is within a judge’s authority, plea-bargaining and federal-sentencing guidelines serve 
as tools for checking judges’ discretionary powers in the United States. However, Korea’s 
judiciary did not have such arrangements before 2008. Therefore, connections are likely to have 
more impact on sentencing decisions. Another dependent variable examined here is 
IMPRISONMENT LENGTH, a continuous variable (the unit is a month). By “imprisonment” we 
mean time spent in confinement. If a defendant receives a suspended jail term, the length of 
imprisonment is zero.  
 
3.4.2 Explanatory Variables 
Table 3-5 documents the main explanatory variables of our data.  
 
 
                                                 
22 In Korea, no double jeopardy. 
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24 One can access and download information on chaebols at http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr.  All information can be available to the public upon request or through the website. 
 Table 3-5 Explanatory Variables 
Variable Definition 
Chaebol 
In defining the variable chaebol, we rely on the administrative definition. For regulatory purposes, Korea Free Trade Commission (KFTC) has, since 1987, 
publicly announced chaebols each year. The criterion has evolved. From 1987 to 2001, KFTC annually ranked the top 30 chaebols based on the size of 
their total combined assets of all affiliates of a chaebol. Since 2002, KFTC has adopted a new standard that KFTC designates a chaebol as being any 
business group with the total combined assets of all constitutes of a  chaebol over KRW 5 trillion (approximately USD 5 billion). The variable chaebol 
takes on 1 if a firm that convicted defendant is involved with is a chaebol affiliate, and otherwise 0. 24 
Controlling 
Shareholder 
A controlling shareholder owns sufficient stakes to control a firm. KFTC identifies controlling shareholders of chaebols—generally a founder or his 
family members. Top management here refers to a CEO (or high-profile executive) or a director.  A controlling shareholder may serve as a CEO or 
director of an affiliate. In this case, he is classified as a controlling shareholder. In other words, top executives (or directors) in our sample refer to one 
without any family ties with a controlling shareholders.  
The variable Controlling Shareholder takes on 1 if a convicted defendant is a controlling shareholder or a member of his family, and 0 if the defendant is a 
non-family top executive like a CEO, CFO or director. 
Loss 
In corporate fraud, the size of losses determines the severity of crimes. Economic losses are generally measured by the monetary value of harm that a 
defendant has caused. The loss calculation is especially of importance when we measure the seriousness of the offenses. Through extensive readings of all 
court decisions, we can confirm the amount of losses that corporate fraud offenders inflicted and were not recovered before reaching a verdict.  
For a case with multiple defendants, the total amount of losses is attributed to all of them, suggesting that all defendants charged with the same crime 
should be jointly responsible for losses. This is consistent with court’s sentencing practices; each defendant is held accountable for the entire losses 
inflicted by crimes in question. In this paper, the variable Loss is the log of [the monetary losses+1] (measured by KRW) that a defendant caused a firm and 
were not recovered before reaching a verdict. 
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The Quality of s 
Legal 
Representation 
This paper presents two measures of evaluation of legal representation 
available to defendants following Choi, Kang, and Lee (2013):   
 
Ex-Senior Judge Lawyers 
This measure is a whether defendant hires retired senior-judge attorneys. This binary variable Ex-Senior Judges Lawyers 
takes on 1 if one of defense attorneys is a former senior judge and 0 otherwise.   
Top-10 Lawyers 
The measure is whether a defendant hires one or more counsels from top-10 law firms. This binary variable Top-10 
Lawyers takes on 1 if at least one of defense attorneys works for a top-10 law firm, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Revolving door attorneys An ex-senior judge and ex-senior public prosecutor lawyer who takes cases during one year of retirement 
Instance 
An appeals court, without substantial changes in facts or evidence, tends to lower sentences of a lower court. To capture this effect, the variable Instance 
takes on 1 if a verdict occurs in an appellate court, and 0 in a lower court. 
Media 
Coverage 
This variable is defined by the number of news articles covering a specific defendant from the starting date of an investigation to 1 day before reaching a 
final verdict. 
When constructing this variable, we face some challenges. It is not hard to check when a final verdict is reached. A problem arises in specifying when an 
investigation begins. An investigation is hard to observe from the outside since details of the investigation are not disclosed to the public. This makes me 
select a range of dates when the cases were investigated. Specifically, we assume that an investigation of a case begins at 6 months before opening the case 
in court. Given that an investigation is immediately followed by a prosecution, this approach seems plausible. The variable Media Coverage takes on 1 if 
the number of news items about defendants in question is at least one, and 0 otherwise. To construct the variable Media Coverage, we use the news site 
(www.donga.com) 
Survival 
The variable Survival takes on 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works remains in business, and 0 if a firm goes bankrupt during or after a trial. 
This variable will be employed as a proxy for wealth of defendants. 
Intrinsic 
Capability 
As explained in Section 3.2.1, initial job placement is a reliable proxy for a defense lawyer’s innate talent. The variable Intrinsic Capability is a multiple 
indicator variable takes on 2 if one of defense attorneys was a judge, 1 if one of defense attorneys was a prosecutor, and 0 otherwise.  
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3.4.3 Testable Hypotheses 
In this paper, we attempt to quantify the influence of connections by empirically testing 
several hypotheses regarding Revolving door attorneys.  These hypotheses are as follows: 
 
A.  As the imprisonment possibility increases, white-collar defendants on trial are 
more likely to hire Revolving door attorneys   
B.  Convicted white-collar defendants represented by Revolving door attorneys are 
more likely to get lighter punishment (i.e., higher probability of suspending jail 
terms or shorter prison terms)  
C.  Whether a judge favors Revolving door attorneys depends on media scrutiny 
 
 
As explained earlier, the second hypothesis can be easily put forward from several news 
articles on Revolving door attorneys and the last one rests on what is predicted by the theory to 
confirm corruption. The first hypothesis can be readily drawn from the main feature of white-
collar criminals. The reason the problems related to Revolving door attorneys burgeon in 
imposing sentences essentially grows out of the non-linearity of the payoff function for 
defendants. While there is little difference between actual and suspended jail terms in the payoff 
function for judges, for white-collar offenders there is a sharp distinction between them. 25 
Therefore the first best strategy for accused corporate offenders is to obtain the judgment of 
acquittal but receiving a suspended jail term is not only the second best strategy but also the 
most feasible one. 
                                                 
25 This claim is consistent with views of U.S. sentencing commission, which acknowledged that the sentencing 
guidelines were written, in part, to “ensure a short but definite period of confinement for a larger portion of these 
‘white collar’ cases, both to ensure proportionate punishment and to achieve deterrence ” See Fifteen years of 
Guidelines Sentencing 56 (2004). 
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3.5 DESCRIPIVE STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES  
3.5.1 Criminals 
The dataset used for this study is a defendant level. The dataset consists of 270 
observations.  Panel B in Table 3 reports that 155 defendants were convicted in district courts. Of 
the 155, 50 defendants were sentenced to actual prison terms, whereas 105 were given suspended 
jail terms. Then, 42 defendants subject to actual prison terms appealed to high courts. Of 105 
criminals receiving suspended jail terms in district courts, 58 moved to appeal courts because 
prosecutors appealed against light sentences. In addition, we have 15 defendants whose cases 
involve appeal courts only.  Therefore, the total number of defendants in high courts amounts to 
115 (see Panel C in Table 3 6), which ends up with 270 in total as seen in Panel A in Table 3-6. 
Table 3-7 breaks down our dataset by the convicted defendants’ social and occupational 
status. Chaebol-related criminals account for 57% of the dataset (155 out of 270) and non-
chaebol 43% (115 out of 270). Controlling shareholders make up 49 % of my dataset and hired 
CEOs 51%.  
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Table 3-6 White- Collar Criminals by Affiliation and type of Punishment 
 
Panel. A : White-collar criminals by type of punishment (n=270) 
 
Suspended jail term Actual jail term 
Non- Chaebol Chaebol Non- Chaebol Chaebol 
Top Management 42 84 4 8 
Controlling Shareholder 35 33 34 30 
Subtotal 77 117 38 38 
Total 194 76 
Panel. B : White-collar criminals by type of punishment: low court cases (n=155) 
 
Suspended jail term Actual jail term 
Non- Chaebol Chaebol Non- Chaebol Chaebol 
Top Management 22 54 4 7 
Controlling Shareholder 14 15 20 19 
Subtotal 36 69 24 26 
Total 105 50 
 
Panel. C : White-collar criminals by type of punishment: high court cases (n=115) 
 
Suspended jail term Actual jail term 
Non- Chaebol Chaebol Non- Chaebol Chaebol 
Top Management 20 30 0 1 
Controlling Shareholder 21 18 14 11 
Subtotal 41 48 14 12 
Total 
89 26 
Note: A controlling shareholder is generally a founder of a firm or his/her family members. Top management refers to a CEO (or 
high-profile executive) or director.  A controlling shareholder may serve as a CEO or director of an affiliate. In this case, he is 
classified as a controlling shareholder, suggesting that Top management is a non-family CEO (or director). 
 
 
76  
Table 3-6 suggests that chaebol-related offenders are less likely to receive prison 
sentences than non-chaebol offenders; Table 3-6 – Panel A shows that a little over a quarter of 
guilty defendants (76 out of 270, 28.1%) served prison terms. Of the chaebol-related offenders, 
24.5% (38 out of 155) were given prison sentences; of their non-chaebol counterparts, 33.0% (38 
out of 115) received prison sentences. In lower courts, 27.3 % ( 26 out of 95) of chaebol-related 
offenders went to prison whereas 40% (24 out of 60) of non-chaebol counterparts were held in 
jail. In high courts, sentencing disparities between chaebol and non-chabol criminals appeared to 
decrease. 19.3% (12 out of 62) of chaebol-related offenders went to prison whereas 26.4% (14 
out of 53)of non-chaebol counterparts were held in jail.  
 
Table 3-7 Types of White- Collar Criminalsby Position and type of Affiliation 
 
 Chaebol Non-Chaebol Total 
Controlling shareholder 63 69 132 
Top management 92 46 138 
Total 155 115 270 
Note: A controlling shareholder is generally a founder of a firm or his/her family members. Top management refers to a CEO (or 
high-profile executive) or director.  A controlling shareholder may serve as a CEO or director of an affiliate. In this case, he is 
classified as a controlling shareholder, suggesting that Top management is a non-family CEO (or director). 
 
 
 
3.5.2 Defense Attorneys 
Table 3-8 shows that the average defendant hires around 4 defense counsels on average. 
Of the 4 defense counsels, 1.8 is the avearge number of retired senior judges; the average number 
of Revolving door attorneys is 0.6.  
We also observe differences in the quality of legal counsel between chaebol-related 
defendants and non-chaebol ones. As seen in Panel-B and Panel-C, chaebol-tied defendants 
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received, by every measure, more qualified legal assistance. As explained earlier, the differences 
are attributed to the fact that  chaebol-connected defendants have much stronger incentives to 
evade jail and they are also affordable enough to pay high legal fees. 
Table 3-8 Defense Attorneys 
Lawyers TOP-10 Law Firm  
Lawyers 
Ex-Senior Judge 
Lawyers 
Revolving door 
attorneys 
Average Number of Total observations 4.1 2.4 1.8 0.6 
Average Number of  Total Observations 
( chaebol Samples) 4.3 3.1 2.1 0.7 
Average Number of Total Observation  
( non-chaebol sample) 3.7 1.4 1.4 0.4 
Note 1: All information is defendant-level data.  
Note 2: “Lawyer” represents private attorneys that each defenant hires.“Top-10 Law Firm Lawyer” denotes counsels from a top 
10 law firm that each defenant hires. “Ex-Senior Judge Lawyer” represents counsels with “senior judge” and “senior public 
prosecutor” experience that each defenant hires. “Senior judge” includes the Supreme Court Justice, high (district) court chief 
judge, high (district) court senior judge. “Senior public prosecutor” includes the prosecutor general, a chief of high (district) 
public prosecutor’s office, and high (district) court senior prosecutor.  
“Revolving door attorney ” denotes an Ex-Senior Judge Lawyer who takes cases during one year of retirement. 
3.5.3 Other Variables 
Table A 1 reports some descriptive statistics for other variables of interest. The criminals 
inflicted, on average, $2.2 billion economic losses to shareholders, firms, and outside investors; 
however, the median is $15.1 million. This huge disparity is attributed to bankruptcy of Daewoo, 
the second largest conglomreate in 1997. The criminals were sentenced to, on average, 33-
month-prison terms. Once suspended prison sentences are excluded, the average actual 
imprisonment length sentenced extends to 45 months. The longest prison length is 8 years. The 
amount of available press coverage varies tremendously, from none to 177 per case. Its median 
value is zero, suggesting that media pays disproportionate attention to some high-profile 
defendants.  
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3.6 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY  
The main objective is to relate the professional ties of defense attorneys to sentencing 
results. A naive attempt to estimate this relation is as follows.  
 
Sentencing Decision = b0 + b1 connections+ b2′ X+e              (A) 
 
Where X is a vector of controls that contain several factors related to the nature of the 
crime or the defendant’s profile: Chaebol, Controlling Shareholder, Loss, and Instance variables 
. However, estimation of the naive equation by a Probit (or Tobit) model may generate problems. 
The presence of unobserved innate talent of defense counsel is likely to bias the estimate of b1 
upwards. It seems reasonable to think that offenders represented by lawyers with high intrinc 
capability will be more likely to receive lighter criminal sentences. The first step in our 
identification strategy therefore is to address this concern. Undestanding the judicial appointment 
procedure offers a plausible solution to this problem. As was shown in Section II, the initial job 
placement for young jurists is indicative of entrance exam scores and JRTI grades. Since these 
factors are set when young jurists begin their legal careers, initial job placement is a plausible 
proxy for innate ability of defense attorneys. Moreover, the highly competitive evironment of the 
entrace exam and JRTI drive all candidates to make their best efforts. This suggests that variation 
in the first job placement after JRTI reflects the differences in instinsic talent among attorneys, 
rather than the differences arising from endogenous effort decisions.28 In other words, since 
                                                 
28 J. Ramsyer (2012) presents three proxies for judicial talent: (1) the selectivity of the university a judge attends (2) 
the number of years a judge failed the entrance exam to the LRTI, and (3) the fact that LRTI students work as 
interns in the courts.  
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initial placement of each candidate was determined before his judicial experience, this serves as 
a proxy for innate cognitive ability of defense attorneys.  
The next step is to define the connections. As explained earlier, if we just define the 
connections based on judicial careers of attorneys, this is not hard work. It may be, however, a 
challenging task to define corruption in a way that connections should be distinguished from the 
skills of defense attorneys. To address this problem, we borrow ideas from the existing studies 
on lobbying and corruption. 
Why does our empirical strategy rely on studies of lobbying? This is because Revolving 
door attorneys are closely analogous to revolving door lobbyists in a lobby industry. The 
primary reason people is willing to hire Revolving door attorneys is due to the public belief that 
they have previleged access to sitting judges through the attorneys. This is why Revolving door 
attorneys are paid a large premium in a market for lawyers, as explained below in detail. This 
structual similarity allows us to refer to findings in research on lobbying in estabilishing a 
reliable empirical strategy. A general consensus of this line of research is that connections are 
valuable assets but not permanent ones. In particular, many studies on political connections show 
that the value of political connections is highly volatile in response to events affecting their 
connectedness (e.g. a rumor that a health condition of a dictator is very serious , or a news that a 
connected politician leaves office). In our context, such events are likely to occur each year due 
to prevalent early retirement practices in the judiciary. The annual entry of newly retired senior 
judges into a market for attorneys renders judicial connects of incumbents almost obsolet. In 
addition to a legislative regulation as mentioned in in Section I, several news articles and 
interviews with legal profession also confirm such time-variation features of judicial 
connections. 
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Keeping these facts in mind, we will employ the length of retirement as a source of 
exogenous variation that affects the power of ties between Revolving door attorneys and the 
judiciary. Since the date of their resignation is orthogonal to the time-invariant inherent ability or 
expertise of the counsels, this offers us a plausible identification strategy. In particular, we split 
ex-senior-judge lawyers (hereafter ESJLs) by their retirement length; ESJLs who take cases 
within one year of retirement (Group 1 Lawyer, i.e., Revolving door attorneys); ESJLs who 
represent cases between one year and two years after retirement (the variable Group 2 Lawyer); 
ESJLs who plead cases more than two years after retirement (the variable Group 3 Lawyer).  
These latter groups of lawyers whose personal connections have weakened will be the 
reference control group in regressions to follow. If retirement length determines special 
treatment as is generally assumed, we should expect a noticeable downfall in the likelihood of 
leniency up to one year after retirement. We arrive at the following specification:  
 
Sentencing Decision = b0 + b1 Revolving Door Attnorey+ b2 Group 2 Lawyer+b3 Group 
3 Lawyer+ b4′ X+ Intrinsic Capability +e    (B) 
 
The final identification strategy employs knowledge of the mechanisms through which 
unethical behavior is more likely. Studies document that corruption reacts to media scrutiny or 
public monitoring. This idea offers a chance to exploit variation across clients who employ 
individual lawyer. If leniency is the upshot of active connections, the impact of Revolving door 
attorneys on the likelihood of leniency should disappear as outside scrutiny increases. On the 
contrary, if leniency is the upshot of defense attorneys’ skill, the effect of Revolving door 
attorneys on the likelihood of leniency will not vary with the level of public scrutiny, or 
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alternatively may increase with media coverage. In sum, if Revolving door attorneys have better 
trial outcomes than other counsels (first difference) in circumstances that are more likely to allow 
for favoritism than other circumstances (additional difference), then it is more likely that 
favoritism has been identified.   
 
Sentencing Decision = b0+ b1 REVOLVING DOOR ATTORNEY+ b2 REVOLVING 
DOOR ATTORNEY× Media Coverage + b3 Group 2 Lawyer + b4 Group 2 Lawyer  × Media 
Coverage + b5 Group 3 Lawyer + b6 Group 3 Lawyer × Media Coverage +  b7 Media Coverage 
+ b8′ X + Intrinsic Capability +e  (C) 
 
 
 
3.7 RESULTS 
3.7.1 The Impact of Judicial Connections on Sentences 
 
Table 3-9 displays the estimates of regression (C).  In Columns (1) and (2) are the 
estimates for the model controlling for Covariates X (and intrinsic capability of defense 
attorneys). All covariates are included in the specifications, but not shown in the Table.  
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Table 3-9 The Impact of Revolving door attorneys on Sentences 
Note 1: Covariates include the variable Chaebol, Controlling Shareholder, Loss, Instance. Intrinsic Capability is also 
included.  The results of (1) and (2) from probit and tobit, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate coefficients significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Note 2: A dependent variable is IMPRISONMENT, a dummy variable taking 1 if a convicted offender receives an actual jail 
term and 0 if he/she receives a suspended one. Another dependent variable is IMPRISONMENT LENGTH, measured by 
months of prison terms.  
Note 3: “Revolving door attorney” is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense attorneys is an “Ex-Senior Judge 
Lawyer” (ESJL, lawyers with “senior judge” and “senior public prosecutor” experience) who takes cases within the first year 
of retirement: GROUP 2 Lawyer is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense lawyers is an ESJL who takes cases 
between one year and two years after retirement. GROUP 3 Lawyer is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense 
lawyers is an ESJL who takes cases more than two years after retirement. “Senior judge” includes the Supreme Court Justice, 
high (district) court chief judge, high (district) court senior judge. “Senior public prosecutor” includes the prosecutor general, 
a chief of high (district) public prosecutor’s office, and high (district) court senior prosecutor.  
Note 4: “Media Coverage” is constructed based on by the number of news articles covering a defendant from a starting date 
of investigation to one day before reaching a final verdict. Specifically a dummy variable Media Coverage takes 1 if the 
number of news articles about defendants in question is at least one, and 0 otherwise. An investigation of a case is assumed to 
begin at 6 months before opening the case.  
We find that Revolving door attorneys significantly increase the likelihood that their 
clients are given leniency. The effect of Revolving door attorneys is sizable. Convicted white-
collar offenders with Revolving door attorneys are more likely to receive suspended jail terms by 
about 15 percent points than ones with non-connected counsels. In addition, convicted corporate 
Dependent Variable : Sentencing Outcome 
(1)  IMPRISONMENT (2)   IMPRISONMENT LENGTH 
Revolving door attorneys -.90** 
(.40) 
-34.6** 
(13.7) 
Revolving door attorneys × 
Media Coverage    
.95* 
(.57) 
39.1** 
(18.6) 
GROUP 2 
Lawyer 
.23 
(.39) 
5.2 
(12.3) 
GROUP 2  Lawyer 
×   Media Coverage 
-1.01* 
(.59) 
-17.2 
(20.7) 
GROUP 3 Lawyer -.02 
(.36) 
-7.8 
(11.1) 
GROUP 3  Lawyer 
×   Media Coverage 
.01 
(.54) 
6.9 
(17.3) 
   Media Coverage    .27 
(.54) 
.6 
(14.3) 
Observations 270 270 
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offenders defended by Revolving door attorneys serve shorter jail terms by 24 months relative to 
those represented by ordinary lawyers without connections.  
Table 3-9 also presents evidence on a time-sensitive feature of judicial ties. The results 
show that the effect of Revolving door attorneys on leniency discontinues approximately one 
year after retirement; not even ex-senior judge attorneys who take cases more than one year after 
having resigned raise the likelihood of leniency for their clients: control groups (Group 2 and 3 
Lawyers in our regressions) have little influences on the likelihood of lighter punishments.  
How should we interpret these results? There is no plausible evidence to suggest that 
Revolving door attorneys are more competent than the two groups of counsels because these 
control groups share a considerable amount of similarity in their career paths: graduates of the 
several selective universities, the most exceptional candidates at JRTI, and elites in the judiciary. 
This suggests that the observed variance in the likelihood of lenient sanctions among these three 
groups of lawyers is unlikely to reflect the differences in their professional expertise (or intrinsic 
capabilities). Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the sudden drops in the odds of leniency around 
one year after retirement is that the judiciary gives Revolving door attorneys undue preferential 
treatment. If the connections of Revolving door attorneys are time-sensitive, we expect Revolving 
door attorneys to suffer considerable declines in their incomes after one year of exit from the 
judiciary.  
Upon retirement, by how much surge in salaries do Revolving door attorneys enjoy?  
Data on the amount of fees that Revolving door attorneys charge their clients is not generally 
accessible, but using several sources, their post-retirement salary can be estimated. The first 
source is their self-disclosure. All nominees for high-profile positions (of the executive or of the 
judiciary) are required to disclose their financial status. Once they are appointed, they also must 
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file public reports of their finances during their terms. This allows us to track income variations 
by their career history. 
For instance, when Lee Gang-Gook, a former Justice was nominated to be the 
Constitutional Court Chief Judge in 2005, he acknowledged in his confirmation hearing that he 
was paid USD 44,000 monthly from a law firm.  More direct data on the revenues of Revolving 
door attorneys comes from their social security records. In Korea, the social security 
administration keeps track of earnings because social security is generally financed through 
income. Table 3-10 shows the amount of a starting salary for Revolving door attorneys. This 
allows us to draw a direct comparison of the salary between the public and private sector. A 
direct comparison reveals that a salary 29 rises up from ten to fourteen-fold right after senior 
retirees are reemployed in the private sector, suggesting that Revolving door attorneys are 
effectively cashing in on their judicial connections. 30  
Table 3-10 Monthly Salary of Former Senior Judge Lawyers (as of 2008) 
Post prior to 
Resignation 
Salary prior to 
Resignation(A) 
Starting Salary (B) B/A 
Supreme Court Justice 6,800 80,000 11.7 
High Court Chief Judge 6,400 95,000 14.8 
District Court Chief Judge 6,400 69,000 10.7 
High Court Senior Judge 6,400 72,500 11.3 
Note: Data on starting salaries is based on social security records. “Starting salary” denotes an entry-level monthly salary of 
former “senior judge” attorneys in the private sector. Information on monthly salaries of judges is obtained from the Judicial 
Organization Act (Bubwonjojikbub). The unit of salaries is KRW 1000, which roughly corresponds to USD. 
29 As of 2008, South Korea’s GDP per capita is USD 28,000 which corresponds to USD 2,300 per month, and the 
Korean top 1 percent income is USD 360,000 which corresponds to USD 30,000 per month.  
30 More relevant comparison appears to be one made between retirees and their counterpart in private law firms, i.e., 
attorneys without judicial career. But direct comparison is hard to make because their counterpart in law firm are 
more likely to be associates or partners whose compensation structure is totally different. 
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Prior to a full-fledged analysis, note that this data present indirect evidence on Revolving 
door attorneys. A notable point is that a former Supreme Court Justice earned less than a former 
High Court Chief Judge. The differences in legal expertise are unlikely to explain this “reversal 
of fortune” because the former is a more qualified jurist than the latter.  The plausible 
interpretation is, therefore, that retired Justices or several high-profile judges settled in law firms 
tend to engage in “consulting and related services” rather than a legal proceeding in a court, 
which suggests that law firms invent strategy that high-profile retirees use their influence to 
solicit customers and then leave the actual legal battles to juniors in the law firms. 31  
One year after resigning, however, their salary drops to a level comparable to their peers 
in the private sector, which suggests that the premium that they command for legal services is 
sort of a rent associated with privileged connections.  
 
“Newly retired lawyers in large law firms says that, the law firms earn on average annual 
revenue of three million dollar by hiring one Revolving door attorneys (e.g., a high court senior judge)." 
The law firm share earnings with Revolving door attorneys from 50 to 50, to 70 (Revolving door 
attorneys) to 30 (the firm), converting an annual salary of 1.2 to 1.3 million dollar for the attorneys. 
However, such a high salary is not permanent. After at most two years of their entrance into markets for 
lawyers, Revolving door attorneys’ earnings are known to plunge to 0.1 to 0.2 million dollar”.32 
 
                                                 
31 In this respect, some Revolving door attorneys fit “shadow lobbyists”, lobbyists evading legal requirement to 
register and file regular activities and their funding  (Wedel 2012, p483)  
32 
http://www.fnnews.com/view?ra=Sent1201m_View&corp=fnnews&arcid=201302190100161980009158&cDateYe
ar=2013&cDateMonth=02&cDateDay=19 
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Another piece of anecdotal evidence illustrates that after one or two years of a “grace 
period”, Revolving door attorneys’ compensation structures turn into those of regular law firm 
members, suggesting that such high entry-level salaries are not guaranteed any more and they are 
paid based on their contributions to law firms’ earnings. 33  
Supplementary anecdotal evidence also reinforces our finding that the power of 
connections is subject to decay. For instance, Kang Byoung-seob, a former Seoul district court 
chief judge, resigned in August 2004. Between 2004 and 2005 he worked as a sole practitioner 
and in 2006 joined one of the top 10 law firms. This example appears to reflect a situation in 
which Mr. Kang exclusively reaped benefits from his former position and then during the second 
year of retirement entered a law firm so as to maintain his revenues, which otherwise would have 
dropped due to weakening connections. Taken together, the evidence above provides support for 
the hypothesis that Revolving door attorneys are given undue preferential treatment for their 
connections.   
A remaining question arises as to the fleeting feature of favoritism: why one year only? 
Two explanations might serve as plausible answers. On one hand, this feature seems connected 
to the steady, annual stream of retired senior judges flowing into the lawyer market. As 
explained earlier, the early retirement practices of senior judges are stable in Korea, which 
implies that new Revolving door attorneys start private practice every year, rendering outdated 
the connections of old Revolving door attorneys  .  
On the other hand, the social psychology of corruption (Benerjee, Mullainathan, and 
Hana 2012) is likely to answer this question. They argue that “to fully understand how corruption 
becomes norm, there is a need to try to understand the psychology of when and where people 
                                                 
33 http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2013&no=696818.  
87  
feel more or less comfortable about engaging in corruption (Banerjee, Mullainathan, and Hana 
2012 p. 64).”  They claim that the key psychological factor is “a tendency to try to legitimize 
corruption.” This argument is relevant to our institutional setting. Note that within the judiciary, 
jungwanyeoo has long been excused as “giving senior small gifts.” In this respect, one-year 
special treatment is sufficient. Indeed, entry-level salaries of Revolving door attorneys are 
equivalent to what they took several years to earn in office. The first year salary resembles a one-
time retirement bonus. Therefore, if preferential treatment is repeatedly given to specific 
Revolving door attorneys for more than one year, this is no longer petit favor, which makes 
judges uncomfortable about favoring the attorneys. 
 
3.7.2 The Impact of Media Scrutiny on the Power of Connections 
Now we investigate our third hypothesis. To study what determines the extent to which 
professional links influence sentences, we interact several proxies for legal representation of 
convicted criminals with the publicity dummy variables. We find that the influence of Revolving 
door attorneys on sentencing outcomes changes with media scrutiny. As Table 3-11 and Table 
3-12 show, the attorneys raise the probability that their clients get lighter criminal sanctions 
when no media coverage exists. If media covers cases, these impacts are nullified.  
To further examine the impact of media coverage on the influence of connections, we 
introduce another control group, defense counsels of a top 10 law firm. There are at least two 
reasons why top 10 law firm lawyers can be a comparison group. First, in terms of the expertise 
required to defend criminals, they are similar to Revolving door attorneys. About 66% of Group 
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2 and 3 Lawyers (81 out of 120) are employees in a top 10 law firm.34 In addition, elite law firms 
have many experts specializing in criminal law and considerable resources, which leads to more 
leniency for defendants. The other reason is that an analysis of the defense counsels of a top 10 
law firm offers another chance to understand the relationship between connections and media 
publicity. Table 3-11 and Table 3-12 show that defense attorneys of a top 10 law firm help lower 
the risks of incarceration only when the media covers their cases. Note that this observation 
starkly contrasts with that of Revolving door attorneys in Subsection B. 
Table 3-11 Impact of Media Coverage on the Power of Connections 
Note 1: Covariates include the variable Chaebol, Controlling Shareholder, Loss, Instance, and Intrinsic Capability. The results of 
(1) and (2) from probit and tobit, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficients 
significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Note 2: A dependent variable is IMPRISONMENT, a dummy variable taking 1 if a convicted offender receives an actual jail term 
and 0 if he/she receives a suspended one. Another dependent variable is IMPRISONMENT LENGTH, measured by months of 
prison terms.  
Note 3: “Revolving door attorney” is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense attorneys is an “Ex-Senior Judge Lawyer” 
(ESJL, lawyers with “senior judge” and “senior public prosecutor” experience) who takes cases within the first year of 
retirement: GROUP 2 Lawyer is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense lawyers is an ESJL who takes cases between 
one year and two years after retirement. GROUP 3 Lawyer is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense lawyers is an ESJL 
who takes cases more than two years after retirement. “Senior judge” includes the Supreme Court Justice, high (district) court 
34 Note that Revolving door attorneys from top-10 law firms are classified as Revolving door attorneys, which implies that top 10 
law firm lawyers and Revolving door attorneys are mutually exclusive.  
Dependent Variable : Sentencing Outcome 
(1)  IMPRISONMENT (2)  IMPRISONMENT LENGTH 
Revolving door attorneys -.69* 
(.37) 
-22.9* 
(13.6) 
 Revolving door attorneys  × 
Media Coverage 
.39 
(.53) 
14.8 
(18.0) 
Top-10 Lawyer .44 
(.35) 
14.1 
(11.4) 
Top-10 Lawyer  
×   Media Coverage 
-1.29** 
(.54) 
-38.6** 
(16.9) 
Media Coverage .77* 
(.41) 
22.6* 
(13.6) 
Observations 270 270 
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chief judge, high (district) court senior judge. “Senior public prosecutor” includes the prosecutor general, a chief of high (district) 
public prosecutor’s office, and high (district) court senior prosecutor.  
Note 4: “Media Coverage” is constructed based on by the number of news articles covering a defendant from a starting date of 
investigation to one day before reaching a final verdict. Specifically a dummy variable Media Coverage takes 1 if the number of 
news articles about defendants in question is at least one, and 0 otherwise. An investigation of a case is assumed to begin at 6 
months before opening the case.  
 
 
This pattern is unlikely to be explained by the expertise or efforts of Revolving door 
attorneys. A plausible interpretation is that this pattern reflects a situation in which judges 
respond to outside monitoring, as one would expect from theory to confirm corruption As many 
studies on corruption document (Mark and Levitt 2002, Brunetti and Weder 2003, Chowdhury 
2004), increased monitoring reduces corruption. Therefore, our results can be interpreted more 
broadly to suggest that the best cure for corruption is openness.   
 
Table 3-12 Impact of Media Coverage on the Power of Connections 
Note 1: Covariates include the variable Chaebol, Controlling Shareholder, Losses, Instance, and Intrinsic Capability.  The results 
of (1) and (3) from probit and (2) and (4) from tobit, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate coefficients significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Note 2: “Media Coverage case” denotes case in which the number of news articles about defendants in question is at least one, 
and “No Media Coverage” represents cases in which the number of news articles about defendants in question is 0.  
Note 3: A dependent variable is IMPRISONMENT, a dummy variable taking 1 if a convicted offender receives an actual jail 
term and 0 if he/she receives a suspended one. Another dependent variable is IMPRISONMENT LENGTH, measured by a 
month of prison terms.  
Note 4: “Revolving door attorney” is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense attorneys is an “Ex-Senior Judge 
Lawyer” (ESJL, lawyers with “senior judge” and “senior public prosecutor” experience) who takes cases within the first 
year of retirement. “Senior judge” includes the Supreme Court Justice, high (district) court chief judge, high (district) 
court senior judge. “Senior public prosecutor” includes the prosecutor general, a chief of high (district) public 
prosecutor’s office, and high (district) court senior prosecutor. “Top-10 Lawyer” takes on 1 if at least one of the defense 
attorneys works for a top-10 law firm, and 0 otherwise. Note that Revolving door attorneys from a top-10 law firm are 
classified as Revolving door attorneys.  
 
Dependent Variable : Sentencing Outcomes 
 
No Media Coverage  Media Coverage  
(1) 
IMPRISONMENT 
(2) 
IMPRISONMENT  
LENGTH 
(3) 
IMPRISONMENT 
(4) 
IMPRISONMENT  
LENGTH 
Revolving door attorney 
-.97** 
(.42) 
-35.6** 
(15.3) 
-.45 
(.38) 
-10.9 
(11.6) 
Top-10 Lawyer 
.25 
(41) 
4.8 
(13.4) 
-.89** 
(.44) 
-23.1* 
(13.5) 
Observations 149 149 121 121 
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There appears to be several channels through which media publicity substantially limits 
the power of connections:  
Elitism: high-profile judges seem to have a strong ego as elites. They do not want to see 
their name on the front page of newspapers for favoring their friends, a dishonor to self-esteem. 
 Pandering: Media coverage makes the preferences of judges more aligned with those of 
the public (Lim, Snyder, and Stromberg 2012). The judiciary has long been blamed for excessive 
leniency towards tycoons. 35 Media scrutiny over high-profile cases leads judges to pander to the 
preference of the public, harsher sentences against powerful defendants.   
Career concerns: Career concerns may dissuade them from sinking into corrupt practices. 
If a judge, for example, especially favors his former senior colleague, a current defense attorney, 
this may hurt his reputation. His marred reputation negatively affects their promotion prospects. 
Indeed, public resentment trumps favoritism given to Revolving door attorneys. These career 
concerns get more serious especially when cases are more subject to media coverage, suggesting 
that the cases involve high-profile, white-collar offenders.    
Relatedly, it is important to note that even in civil law, when reaching the final stage of 
their career paths, judges seeking promotion need to satisfy not only their senior colleagues but 
also various audiences, especially outside the judiciary such as politicians and the press. 36 As a 
                                                 
35 In June 2012, for instance, during a confirmation hearing, the Supreme Court Justice nominee Kim chang-seok 
was under severe attack for his pro-Samsung rulings. Lee gun-hee, the Chairman of the Samsung business group 
was charged with evading tens of millions of dollars in taxes and embezzling corporate money. A nominee, a Seoul 
Appeal Court Senior judge gave a suspended 3 year jail term even if he acknowledged that the economic losses 
incurred by Mr. Lee were larger than the amount a lower court had confirmed by 22.7 million dollars. In his 
confirmation hearing, he was challenged repeatedly by lawmakers for a series of pro-business and anti-labor union 
ruling.  After the confirmation hearing, the opposition party announced the statement questioning nominee Kim’s 
qualification out of concerns that he was more likely to tilt the Supreme Court in favor of large corporations. Even 
though a congress approved Mr. Kim to be a new Justice, the observation of the confirmation hearing is sufficient to 
drive prospective nominees to be concerned about external audiences 
36 Following Garoupa and Ginsburg (2011), the audiences refer to “other branches of government, lawyers, law 
professors, and the public more generally”. 
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consequence, this makes promotion-motivated senior judges more responsive to the public’s 
preferences.  
This analysis is also relevant in Korea when we consider the procedures of appointment 
to Korea’s Supreme Court: the Justice nominees are appointed by the president after 
confirmation by Congress. Recall that leniency given to convicted white-collar criminals is a 
manifestation of unequal treatment of law. Knowing the public concerns about leniency toward 
corrupt tycoons, promotion-motivated judges tend to be tougher on white-collar criminals.  
Our interpretation is that these differences are attributed to the differences in incentive 
structures between the two defense counsel groups. When high-profile criminals (who are 
generally subject to more media coverage) are sentenced to jail terms, switching to other elite 
law firms is common because among name brand law firms considerable differences in talent are 
unlikely to exist. Imprisonment hence could be a big blow to an elite firm. This drives attorneys 
of a top 10 law firm to be more sensitive to sentencing outcomes when cases draw media 
scrutiny. An alternative explanation is that increased publicity should further deepen the desire to 
be renowned for belonging to a top 10 law firm. Winning leniency in more egregious cases 
signals their potential to the market, leading to better job prospects. In contrast, publicity 
neutralizes the influence of connections for Revolving door attorneys.  
 
3.7.3 Different Comparison Groups: Ex-Junior Judge Lawyers and “narrowly defined 
Revolving Door Attorneys” 
In Table 3-13, we re-run our baseline regression by adding, as a new control group, ex-
junior judge lawyers. The result in Table 13-A shows that the judiciary does not favor one-time 
junior judges: the criminals who are assisted by counsels with junior judge experience are given 
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no leniency. Unlike for the cases with Revolving door attorneys, for cases with ex-junior-judge 
attorneys any discontinuity in the likelihood of leniency was not observed approximately a year 
following their exit. This finding implies that special favors are exclusive to retirees who reached 
the level of at least district court senior judges.  
This result is interpreted as evidence that hierarchical relationship is one of key 
determinants of jungwanyeoo. The main advantage of such interpretations is to clearly explain 
why an ex-junior judge attorney is not eligible for special treatment from the court: juniors never 
remained at the top of the judicial ladder in which they established hierarchical relationship with 
their subordinates. In addition, this finding can be interpreted as evidence that special treatment 
is a “deferred compensation” for long service that junior judges cannot reap.  
An alternative interpretation is that favors revolving door attorneys receive is severance 
pay for which early-retired senior judges are eligible. In the name of tradition, early resignation 
is prolonged for long in the judiciary. Early retirement mainly benefits remaining younger judges 
because given the strictly hierarchical judiciary, getting old judges out of the way is to let 
younger ones rise, opening a door to thin bureaucracy's highest ranks. In this respect, 
jungwanyeoo leads senior judges in office to leave office before a retirement age because their 
sacrifices will be rewarded with special treatment from judges in office.37  
In additional effort to shed light on the channel through which connections function in the 
judiciary, we repeated a regression by including different comparison groups: “narrowly defined 
Revolving door attorneys.” Narrowly defined Revolving door attorneys refer to situations where 
Revolving door attorneys take cases that occurred under their former jurisdictions. Narrowly 
defined Revolving door attorneys  have been blamed for the most blatant forms of unethical 
                                                 
37 As Koh (1989) about amakudari, unless the practice of early retirement ceases, 
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behavior because sitting judges were subordinates or same-seniority colleagues of Revolving 
door attorneys.  
In addition, hiring “narrowly defined Revolving door attorneys” reflects a situation in 
which lawyers are strategically selected to exploit deeply personalized relationships between 
lawyers and sitting judges. This interpretation is also consistent with the work of Khurana et al. 
(2012). They estimated the market valuation of personal connections to former U.S. Vice-
President Richard Cheney, using the stock market returns of companies with personal 
connections to him. Their finding was that contrary to the public belief, the value of ties to 
Cheney is estimated precisely as zero. They interpret this finding as evidence that frequent media 
reports of potential conflicts of interest between Cheney and connected firms kept him from 
favoring companies with which he had personal connections. We interpret this as evidence that 
career concerns are effective at controlling rent-seeking through personal ties with high-level 
public officials. 
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Table 3-13 Comparison Group: Ex-junior judge Attorneys 
 
 
 
Note 1: Covariates include the variable Chaebol, Controlling Shareholder, Loss, Instance, and Intrinsic Capability.  The 
results of (1) and (2) from probit. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficients 
significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Note 2: A dependent variable is IMPRISONMENT, a dummy variable taking 1 if a convicted offender receives an actual 
jail term and 0 if he/she receives a suspended one.  
Note 3: “Revolving door attorney” is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense attorneys is an “Ex-Senior Judge 
Lawyer” (ESJL, lawyers with “senior judge” and “senior public prosecutor” experience) who takes cases within the first 
year of retirement “Senior judge” includes the Supreme Court Justice, high (district) court chief judge, high (district) 
court senior judge. “Senior public prosecutor” includes the prosecutor general, a chief of high (district) public 
prosecutor’s office, and high (district) court senior prosecutor.  
Note 4: “Media Coverage” is constructed based on by the number of news articles covering a defendant from a starting 
date of investigation to one day before reaching a final verdict. Specifically a dummy variable Media Coverage takes 1 if 
the number of news articles about defendants in question is at least one, and 0 otherwise. An investigation of a case is 
assumed to begin at 6 months before opening the case.  
 
Dependent Variable : IMPRISONMENT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Revolving door attorneys 
 
-.94*** 
(.33) 
 -.89*** 
(.29) 
Revolving door attorneys   ×   
Media Coverage 
 
1.36*** 
(0.47) 
 1.29*** 
(0.35) 
Ex-Junior Judge Attorneys .33 
(.37) 
-.01 
(.39) 
  
Ex-Junior Judge attorneys ×   
Media Coverage 
.17 
(.53) 
.76 
(.58) 
  
Newly Retired Junior Judge 
Attorneys 
  
1.04* 
(.55) 
.68 
(.54) 
Newly Retired Junior Judge  
Attorneys×   Media Coverage 
  
-.48 
(.73) 
.39 
(.76) 
Media Coverage .46* 
(.23) 
-.14 
(.33) 
.52** 
(.21) 
.00 
(.28) 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
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In Table 3-14, we repeat the baseline regression with an inclusion of “narrowly defined 
Revolving door attorneys” as a new comparison group. Contrary to the widespread allegations 
that the judiciary strongly favors “narrowly defined Revolving door attorneys”, they fail to make 
any difference in sentencing outcomes. To probe such allegations, we split Revolving door 
attorneys into two subgroups: “narrowly defined Revolving door attorneys” and “broadly defined 
Revolving door attorneys”, defined as “Revolving door attorneys but not included in narrowly 
defined Revolving door attorneys.”   
Column (2) of Table 3-14 shows that observed leniency is entirely driven by “broadly 
defined Revolving door attorneys” in case with no publicity. An immediate interpretation is that 
judicial connections in question are structural ones rather than individual ones. A more relevant 
interpretation is that the fact that Revolving door attorneys and sitting judges worked together as 
colleagues on the same courts prior to one’s resignation seems to be indicative of corruption. 
Such situations were often featured in news articles and watchdog groups’ reports 39 and finally 
became subject to regulation. Alternative interpretation is that this result is also the outcome of 
consideration into career concerns. Knowing that favoring narrow Revolving door attorneys may 
lead to future accusations, judges are likely to treat with caution cases represented by their ex-
supervisors.  
 
 
 
                                                 
39 As explained at Subsection C in Section II, PSPD reports examine how many of those cases that would have 
fallen into under their previous jurisdictions are assigned to Revolving door attorneys during their first year of 
resignation. 
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Table 3-14  Comparison Group: “narrowly defined RDA” 
Note 1: Covariates include the variable Chaebol, Controlling Shareholder, Loss, Instance, and Intrinsic Capability.  The results 
from probit. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficients significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively 
Note 2: “Narrowly defined RDA” refers to a “Revolving door attorney” who takes cases which would have fallen into under 
his/her previous jurisdictions prior to resignation. “Broadly defined RDA” is defined as a “Revolving door attorney”  but not 
included in the narrowly defined RDA.   “Revolving door attorney” is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense attorneys 
is an “Ex-Senior Judge Lawyer” (ESJL, lawyers with “senior judge” and “senior public prosecutor” experience) who takes cases 
within the first year of retirement.  
Note 3: “Media Coverage” is constructed based on by the number of news articles covering a defendant from a starting date of 
investigation to one day before reaching a final verdict. Specifically a dummy variable Media Coverage takes 1 if the number of 
news articles about defendants in question is at least one, and 0 otherwise. An investigation of a case is assumed to begin at 6 
months before opening the case.  
 
 
3.7.4 Demand for Revolving Door Attorneys   
Our testable hypothesis about demand for Revolving door attorneys is that demand is 
assoicated with the risk of incarceration. Choi, Kang, and Lee (2013) show that for Korean 
white-collar criminlas, the likelihood of imprisonment is associated with a) the size of losses 
inflicted by the criminal and b) the fact that an offender is a controlling shareholder of chaebols. 
Following their findings, we employ as proxies for the risk of incarceration, the variables 
Dependent Variable : IMPRISONMENT 
 (1) (2) 
Narrowly defined RDA 
-.48 
(.39) 
-.52 
(.41) 
Narrowly defined  RDA”  ×    Media 
Coverage 
.56 
(.52) 
.53 
(.54) 
Broadly defined RDA  
-.82** 
(.38) 
Broadly defined RDA × Media 
Coverage 
 
-1.06** 
(.50) 
Media Coverage 
.40* 
(.23) 
.14 
(.27) 
Observations 270 270 
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“Controlling Shareholder, and Loss.” In addition, we add to the basic regression the wealth of 
defendants. This makes sense when considering the high fees of Revolving door attorneys. As 
proxies for wealth of convicted wrongdoers, we use the variable “Controlling Shareholder, 
Chaebol, and Survival.”  
As Table 3-15 shows, the hypothesis is confirmed by the basic OLS for demand for 
Revolving door attorneys . When the control variables are significant, they have predicted signs, 
except the variable Loss. Furthermore, the Table shows that other proxies for legal representation 
of defendants such as the number of defense attorneys, the number of ex-senior or ex-junior 
judge attorneys replicate the results. These findings can be interpreted as evidence that those 
likely to be subject to harsh criminal sanctions hire Revolving door attorneys .  
These findings are consistent with existing studies on white-collar offenders (Szockyj 
1998; Frase 2005; Richman 2013). These studies argue that white-collar offenders are amenable 
to deterrence due to their rational and profit-oriented motivation. Imprisonment thus effectively 
deters white-collar crimes. Moreover, it is generally perceived that high-profile white-collar 
offenders exhibit distress at the thought of incarceration. In sum, white-collar criminals have 
much stronger incentives to evade jail. These arguments provide reasonable explanations for 
why high-profile corporate offenders prefer Revolving door attorneys.   
Relatedly, these findings suggest that the estimates we presented in Subsection A appear 
to be biased. This selection bias for Revolving door attorneys, however, does not undermine our 
main finding that the influence of connections of Revolving door attorneys on sentencing is 
considerable. On the contrary, it strengthens it. The selection bias tilts the severity of punishment 
upward, suggesting that Revolving door attorneys’ clients are exposed to the risk of tougher 
sanctions. Nonetheless, that convicted offenders pleaded by Revolving door attorneys end up 
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receiving more lenient punishments suggests that the extent of the power of connections could be 
underestimated. Taken together, it is reasonable to interpret that the estimates presented in 
Subsection A  are lower bounds on the effect of connections on sentencing 
 
Table 3-15 Demand for Quality of Legal Representation 
Note 1: Results from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.  
Note 2: “Lawyer” represents private attorneys that each defenant hires.“Top-10 Law Firm Lawyer” denotes counsels from a top 
10 law firm that each defenant hires. Revolving door attorney” is a dummy variable taking 1 if one of the defense attorneys is an 
“Ex-Senior Judge Lawyer” (ESJL, lawyers with “senior judge” and “senior public prosecutor” experience) who takes cases 
within the first year of retirement “Senior judge” includes the Supreme Court Justice, high (district) court chief judge, high 
(district) court senior judge. “Senior public prosecutor” includes the prosecutor general, a chief of high (district) public 
prosecutor’s office, and high (district) court senior prosecutor.  
Note 3: The variable Survival takes on 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant works remains in business, and 0 if a firm goes 
bankrupt during or after a trial. This variable will be employed as a proxy for wealth of defendants. 
   
Dependent Variables:  Quality of Legal Representation 
 Revolving door 
attorneys 
Ex-Senior 
Judge Lawyers 
 
Lawyers 
TOP-10 Law Firm 
Lawyers 
Chaebol .20** 
( .09) 
.52 *** 
( .17) 
.62* 
(.35) 
1.48*** 
(.33) 
Controlling Shareholder .20* 
( .11) 
.48 *** 
( .18) 
1.50*** 
(.38) 
1.14*** 
(.37) 
Loss 
 
-.00 
( .01) 
.01 
( .02) 
-.04 
( .05) 
-.04 
(.06) 
 
Survival 
.34*** 
(.09) 
.73*** 
( .172) 
1.32*** 
( .36) 
1.68*** 
(.34) 
Constant .24** .82*** 2.54*** .34 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
R2 0.073 0.100 0.095 0.162 
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
How much influence do ex-judges (or ex-prosecutors) have on litigation outcomes when 
they appear as lawyers? This paper has empirically addressed this question using an actual 
conviction dataset on Korean corporate crimes. Our paper provides strong evidence that 
connections greatly influence the behavior of the judiciary and the impact of connections is time 
and media-sensitive.  
Our analysis yields insights into how to regulate a nuanced form of influence peddling such 
as the revolving door situation that is prevalent in public sectors. At a general level, our findings 
contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms of brokering influence, which is common in 
developed countries. For instance, in the United States and other European countries, there are 
growing concerns about the revolving door phenomenon. In Japan, Amakudari (the placement of 
bureaucrats retiring from one of Japan’s ministries in public-or private-sector jobs) has long been a 
subject of attention (Colignon and Usui 2003. The Economist 2010). However, the traditional 
approach to corruption offers little guidance in understanding and regulating this type of influence 
peddling using connections. If we define corruption as the breaking of a rule by a public official for 
private gain, jungwanyeoo cannot be categorized as judicial corruption; there is neither any money 
under table exchanged between Revolving door attorneys and judges nor any clear violation of the 
law.  
In this respect, our findings have several implications. First, our findings validate 
“cooling off periods”, as an effective method of regulating abuses arising from the revolving 
door phenomenon (Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen 2012). The shelf life of jungwanyeoo suggests 
that “cooling off periods” could be the appropriate policy measure legislators could enforce.  
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Second, our findings show that judges avoid seeming to favor Revolving door attorneys 
when faced with outside monitoring, suggesting that an active strategy would be that of 
establishing mandatory sentencing guidelines in our contexts. This could be effective at checking 
potential corrupt behavior for two reasons. The guidelines circumscribe a judge’s discretion over 
sentencing. Moreover, the guidelines would lower monitoring costs by making monitoring easier 
from outside.  
Finally, our findings provide useful insights into the institutional design aimed at 
addressing the revolving door problem in the judiciary. Given the impacts of media coverage on 
favoritism, it could be effective to establish specialized courts committed to corruption cases so 
as to draw more public attention to how the courts deal with cases.  
We conclude our paper by presenting several issues for future research.  
First, our study can be readily extended to analyze the impact of new regulations on 
Revolving door attorneys in Korea. After our sample period, two major policy interventions were 
made: advisory sentencing guidelines in 2008 and a one-year cooling-off period in 2011. 
Therefore a natural extension of our work would be to update data and then investigate how 
Revolving door attorneys reacted to changing circumstances.  
The second issue relates to a channel through the media environment influences judicial 
connections. While our findings provide a clear (negative) relationship between media coverage 
and the influence of connections, not much is known about mechanisms of media attention that 
constrain the operations of connections. In this paper, we claim that judges’ concerns for future 
careers amplified by media attention may offset the influence of connections. This claim is 
motivated by many studies that reputation concerns are driving forces for careerist judges (Levy 
2005, Alesina and Tabellini 2007), which suggests that even appointed judges may be responsive 
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to public’s preferences owing to their career concerns. This might be especially true for high-
level judges whose promotion prospects are largely affected by political factors. Note that the 
public perception of jungwanyeoo is a manifestation of unequal treatment of law. However, our 
work does not present direct evidence confirming a hypothesis that career concerns of judges 
played a critical role in curbing favoritism. Therefore, it might be instructive to construct reliable 
proxies for career concerns and then conduct empirical research.   
The final question involves a micro-foundation for favoritism granted to Revolving door 
attorneys. In this paper, we have presented the cultural view on the micro-foundation: deference 
toward Revolving door attorneys is attributed to seniority of civil law. However, it is still not 
obvious why sitting judges defer to Revolving door attorneys who are unlikely to directly affect 
their promotion prospects. Therefore more serious theoretical analysis is required to answer this 
question.  
As a starting point, it is worthwhile highlighting early retirement practices closely 
associated with Revolving door attorneys. As explained in Section II,  senior judges who fail to 
get promoted tend to retire due to pressure from younger judges. Most of retirees move to the 
private sector and begin private practice as Revolving door attorneys. In this vein, jungwanyewoo 
can be modeled as an implicit contract between senior and junior judges. This implicit contract is 
mutually beneficial: by adhering to the contact, senior judges are more likely to select early 
retirement because their sacrifices will be rewarded with the benefit in retirement.  
At the same time, keeping this contract benefits young judges, because their promotion 
prospects improve if jungwanyewoo keeps such early resignation practices steady. To this end, 
juniors favor Revolving door attorneys in return. We believe that this explanation might be a first 
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step in the analysis of a micro foundation a Revolving door situation. This promises to be an 
exciting and important area of future research. 
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4.0  CAREER CONCERNS, INFORMATION STRUCTURES, AND THE 
FORMATION OF BUSINESS GROUPS 
4.1 MOTIVATION 
Business groups are prevalent in emerging markets and even in some developed 
economies (Morck 2007; Colpan, Hikino, and Lincoln 2010). Business groups- e.g., the Japanese 
keiretsu and the Korean chaebol- play a significant role in national economies. For example, in 
Korea, the total sales of the top 4 family business groups (Samsung, Hyundai Motor car, LG, and 
SK) comprised 49.2 percent of GDP and the total assets of firms controlled by the top 4 families 
amounted to 43.5 percent of GDP in 2005 (Solidarity for Economic Reform 2009a). Despite a 
growing body of empirical literature, little theoretical work has been conducted on the formation 
of a business group. That is, theoretical explorations of a business group are still in the early 
stages of development. This paper advances a theoretical model for the formation of a business 
group. Using a career concerns model, we develop a general framework to account for how a 
business group occurs rather than a conglomerate.  
The innovation in our analysis is to shed light on how different corporate structures 
influence the way CEOs signal their talent to shareholders and the way shareholders estimate 
managerial talent of CEOs. Many studies (López de Silanes et al. 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002) have centered around the separation of ownership and control 
in a business group. This separation gives rise to two well-known corporate governance 
problems; a divergence of interests of a controlling shareholder from those of minority 
shareholders (López de Silanes et al. 2000) and the entrenchment of controlling owners (Morck, 
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Wolfenzon, and Yeung 2005). Our model abstracts from specific ownership structures among 
affiliates of a business group.  
Instead, we identify a trade-off between business group and conglomerate corporate 
structures by focusing on the claim that the sensitivity of turnover to performance appears to be 
different between the corporate structures.  To build intuition behind this claim, let us start by 
looking at CEO’s turnover in a conglomerate. Since a CEO of a conglomerate has only one 
single channel (i.e., one firm) in which he signals his talent to shareholders, excessive extraction 
of rents is more likely to end up with job dismissals. These concerns deter a CEO from 
appropriating high rents from a conglomerate. But a CEO of a business group has multiple 
channels where he signals his competence to stockholders of constituent firms. Given an 
environment in which CEO’s talent on various tasks is highly correlated, he can receive higher 
payoffs by extracting the maximum rents in at least one (but not all) firms of a business group. 
Under a condition in which observed signals (i.e., each firm’s performance) are perfectly 
correlated, even extraction of the maximum rents in one affiliate of the group seems to have little 
effects on formation of belief about CEO’s talent and in turn, on incumbent’s retention prospects.   
Why? Since shareholders know that each firm’s profits are determined by CEO’s general 
skills and rents, and that no firm-specific talent exists, they infer that differences in financial 
performance between affiliates in the group are totally due to differences in rents extracted from 
each firm. Thus shareholders of a firm whose performance is poor relative to that of other 
affiliates appear to place no weight on the firm’s performance and to estimate CEO’s talent 
based on other affiliates’ better performance. In this respect, shareholders of a business group 
seem to be biased in favor of the incumbent when estimating his managerial talent because they 
only consider observations favorable to him. 
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A conglomerate, however, does not always have stricter disciplining mechanisms. A 
diversified conglomerate is less transparent than a business group. An increase in diversification 
of a conglomerate makes it harder for shareholders to monitor a CEO. Moreover, a conglomerate 
provides aggregate performance measures relative to a business group. Such complexity of an 
organizational structure creates information loss, resulting in imprecise monitoring. This allows a 
CEO to extract high rents in a conglomerate. 
Our model predicts that CEOs’ organizational choices essentially depend on the 
parameter values used in the model: protection of outside investors and diversification, and 
precision of monitoring of CEOs. For some configurations of the parameter values, it is optimal 
to choose a business group, and for other configurations of the parameter values, it is optimal to 
form a conglomerate.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 4.3 establishes a general framework for the emergence of a business group and 
a conglomerate using career concerns model. Section 4.4 discusses some extensions of the basic 
model. Section 4.5 presents some open questions for further research. 
 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEWS 
This paper builds on various literatures. A career concerns model starts with the seminal 
work of Holmström (1999). He claims that manager’s career concerns induce efficient 
managerial behavior even if there are no explicit incentive contracts. Dewatripont, Jewitt, and 
Tirole (1999) present a model in which agents with multi-task seek to manipulate market 
evaluation of their talent, and apply the model to examine incentives of bureaucrats. Using this 
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model, Alesina and Tabellini (2007) explore normative principles on the allocation of policy 
tasks between politicians and bureaucrats. They argue that bureaucrats want to signal their 
competence for career concerns, while politician for reelection. Thus, politicians are preferred 
when effort is more important than ability, while bureaucrats are better for technical works in 
which high-ability is required. In our model, a CEO has concerns for future reputation, but acts 
as politicians because his primary interest is reappointment in the annual general meeting.  
Specific points made in this paper relate to disparate parts of the political economy 
literature. Our basic approach to a career concerns model draws on Persson and Tabellini’s work 
(2000). In their work, an election plays a crucial role in weeding out incompetent politicians. So 
politicians who want to be reelected have strong incentives to perform well before the election; 
incumbents endeavor to make themselves appear competitive by lowering rents they take. We 
modify their model to account for CEO’s managerial behavior in a business group. In our model, 
the annual general meeting in a firm serves as a mechanism for disciplining manager’s rent-
seeking. The key differences between our model and that of Persson and Tabellini are as follows: 
a politician usually regards voting districts as given, whereas a manager chooses a firm’s 
boundary or structure, suggesting that, unlike a politician, a CEO has a way of averting pressure 
from shareholders and pursuing private benefits of control.  
A vast literature on boundaries of the firm has started with Coase’s breakthrough work. 
Grossman and Hart (1996) develop the theory of the firm in terms of property rights. Existing 
studies have little guidance on a business group because transactions within the group occur 
between firms. Since a business group is a nexus of firms, transactions within a business group is 
coordinated through the price mechanism, while controlling shareholders of a business group 
harmonize transactions via the exercise of power. Thus, property rights view of the firm does not 
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fully explain how and why a business group happens, rather than a conglomerate.  
Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that a business group serves as substitute for financial 
and labor markets that emerging countries often lack.  They view a family business group as “a 
mechanism through which intra-group transaction costs are lowered, by encouraging information 
dissemination among group firms, reducing the possibility of contractual disputes, and providing 
a low-cost mechanism for dispute resolution.” This argument is appealing, but fails to advance a 
convincing analysis of why business groups are so prevalent in some developed countries with 
relatively well-functioning markets. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) provide new reasoning for 
pyramidal ownership in a family business group.  They seek to explain why families adopt a 
pyramidal structure to control firms in a business group, rather than a horizontal structure. They 
argue that pyramids have an edge over horizontal structures in payoffs and financing, especially 
when diversion is expected to be high due to poor protection of investors. But they explain how 
ownership structures of a business group will be determined, but not how a freestanding firm 
transforms into a business group. That is, they do not present any specific model of formation of 
a business group. 
Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) present empirical findings that confirm the 
importance of general managerial skills. To explore which CEO characteristics and ability 
matters, they obtain detailed assessment of 316 CEO candidates for positions in firms funded by 
private equity investors. They found that general talent such as execution and resoluteness 
matters for success. They concluded that “CEOs with greater overall talent appear to be 
associated with better performance.” Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) also argue that surges in pay 
reflect a shift in the importance of “managerial ability” relative to “firm-specific human capital”, 
which operated to strengthen executives’ bargaining power by allowing for better outside 
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options.  
4.3 A  CAREER CONCERNS MODEL APPROACH 
4.3.1 Setup 
4.3.1.1 Definitions of a Conglomerate and a Business Group 
 
 
Before developing a theoretical model of a business group and a conglomerate, it is worth 
defining a business group and a conglomerate. There are various definitions of a business group 
(Granovetter 1995; Khanna and Rivkin 2001). In our paper, the definition of a business is the 
following; a group of two or more legally independent firms under common control. The firms 
may be listed or closely-held ones, operating in diverse (often unrelated) industries. Common 
control of the firms is taken through formal (e.g., equity; Chang 2003) and informal (e.g., family 
ties; Poppo and Zenger 2002) mechanisms. We assume away any specific ownership structures 
of a business group. This means that member firms in a business group are linked by a common 
CEO, but not by cross-ownership.  
A conglomerate refers to a stand-alone firm operating in diversified areas. A 
conglomerate may be composed of several firms like a business group, but we assume that these 
are wholly owned by one core firm, implying that many firms of the conglomerate are one entity 
from an economic point of view. Both a conglomerate and business group are engaged in 
multiple lines of business but the former differs from the latter in a corporate structure (Kandel et 
al. 2013),   
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This classification seems too simplistic. In fact, the boundary between a business group 
and a conglomerate is not clear in that the two terms are interchangeably used in many financial 
literature. The key idea behind this classification is that only one annual general meeting occurs 
in a conglomerate (if a conglomerate consists of several companies, an annual general meeting 
occurs only in a parent company), whereas the general meeting of shareholders is separately held 
in every constituent firm of a business group. 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Conglomerate with multi-divisions 
 
 
Consider a three-period model (t = 0, 1, 2). Shareholders of a conglomerate are 
homogeneous and risk-neutral. Their payoff, ω are: 
 
ω = µ1 + µ2, 
where µt  are profits of a conglomerate in period t. We assume that the profits depend on 
CEO’s competence and rents. That is, profits of a conglomerate are: 
 
µt = ηt − rt, (1) 
where ηt is CEO’s talent and rt are private benefits of control for a CEO. This setup is 
inspired by many studies (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 2002; Bae, Kang, and Kim 2002; 
Baek, Kang, and Im 2006) that CEO’s rent-seeking motives are driving forces for the creation of 
a business group. In our model, a business group is detrimental to social welfare due to rent-
seeking. This is sharply contrast with a view (Khanna and Palepu 1997) that a business group 
sometimes plays a positive role by making up for some missing institutions in developing 
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countries.  
rt is constrained to be nonnegative but is assumed to have an upper bound; r¯ < ∞. The 
existence of rt is closely related to weak legal and regulatory protection for public shareholders. 
Thus, r¯ is a parameter to measure how much legal protection is given to minority shareholders. 
A high upper limit corresponds to poor protection of minority shareholders. For example, good 
corporate governance and rule of law decrease r¯. The existence of a upper limit of rents is one 
of the most critical assumptions in the model. Without this, the annual general meeting of a firm 
does not play a role in screening out incompetent managers.  
Key properties of a career concerns model are that a measure of CEO’s productivity is 
incompletely known to both himself and shareholders. In our model, ηt is initially is unknown to 
both shareholders and a CEO. However, they share common prior beliefs about ηt. For 
concreteness, ηt is assumed to be a random variable with normal distribution having mean η¯ and 
variance σ η 2  (that is, η ∼ N( η¯, σ η 2  )).  
In this setting, note that σ η 2   is a given parameter involving uncertainty in estimation of 
CEO’s talent. When σ η 2   is low, shareholders can infer CEO’s talent more precisely. In the 
context of our model, σ η 2   can be interpreted in two ways; difficulty of CEO’s tasks and the 
degree of diversification of both business organizations. An increase in technicality- the degree 
to which tasks of a CEO require specialized expertise and technical skills- is highly likely to 
increase σ η 2. Corporate diversification is also closely associated with higher σ η 2. When diverse 
areas of business organizations are associated with a different level of difficulty, then overall 
variance of tasks also becomes larger as the organizations become more diversified (for 
politician and bureaucrat, see Alesina and Tabellini 2007).  
In our model a CEO makes two different decisions; what corporate structures he will 
111  
establish (at time 0) and how much rent he will appropriate for himself (at time 1 and 2).  Let s 
be the size of a conglomerate, and pI  be the likelihood that the current CEO will be reelected at 
the annual general meeting and will stay in the firm through period 2. 
 
A CEO’s payoff, ν is:   
ν = s [lnr1 + pI lnr2] 
 
The payoff solely depends on private benefits accrued to control of a conglomerate. 
These are intangible benefits, like the power and influence stemming from running a big 
business group or tangible ones, like money from tunneling. We assume that rt is CEO’s private 
information.  This suggests that shareholders cannot write a contract for optimal rents with a 
CEO ex-ante because they cannot observe rents. Moreover, private benefits of control are 
assumed to be proportional to s, the size of firms.40 In a benchmark model, we make the 
assumption that there exist no economies or dis-economies of scope with respect to rents. 
 
4.3.1.3 Business Group 
 
 
Consider a business group having two legally independent firms, i and j. For 
concreteness, firm i (j) is assumed to hold no stake of the firm j (i). In our model, the only way a 
business group emerges and sustain is to name the same person as a CEO of each member firm, 
                                                 
40 Some may question whether rt has the linear relationship with s.  A manager of a firm with larger assets enjoys 
more rents, but large publicly traded companies usually have more well-functioning corporate governance 
arrangements which prevent him from extracting rents. 
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which suggests that our model abstracts from specific ownership structures of a business group. 
Many studies show that most of business groups adopt various control enhancing mechanisms 
such as pyramidal structures, dual class shares, and crossholdings (for crossholdings Chang 
2003). In this respect, this setup seems unrealistic, but this allows us to restrict attention to how a 
CEO signals his talent differently depending on corporate structures.  Shareholders’ payoffs of 
firm i of a business group are:  
 
ωi = µ1i + µ2i  (i = i, j) 
 
Like a conglomerate, firm i’s profits of a business group are: 
 
µi t = ηt – rt (i = i, j) (2) 
 
 
In a business group, shareholders’ payoffs of firm i solely depend on firm j’s profits. Firm 
j’s activities do not have any impact on firm i’s financial performance. In other words, there is no 
externality among constituents within a business group. We assume that both firms’ profits are 
determined by one common factor η, which captures comprehensive elements affecting firms’ 
profits. η can be understood as CEO’s general capabilities, rather than firm (or sector)-specific 
skills required to manage a firm. A rapid rise in CEO pay is indicative of the importance of these 
general managerial capabilities, a reflection of a shift in the composition of managerial skills 
required to manage a modern corporation (Murphy and Zabojnik 2004).  Many studies about 
executive compensation show that over the past three decades, general managerial skills (i.e., the 
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skills transferable across companies, or even industries) become increasingly more crucial for the 
CEO job, suggesting that the managerial labor market places a relatively less emphasis on certain 
types of knowledge specific to one particular firm. This trend leads to a dramatic rise in CEO’s 
compensation since 1980s. 
For instance, before Meg Whitman was appointed as the CEO of HP, she served as an 
executive or CEO in diverse companies from the Walt Disney company to e-bay. When HP 
announced that it named Meg Whitman CEO, it released the following statement to explain why 
HP chosen her. “Meg is a technology visionary with a proven track record of execution. She is a 
strong communicator who is customer focused with deep leadership capabilities. Furthermore, 
as a member of HP’s board of directors for the past eight months, Meg has a solid understanding 
of our products and markets. (emphasis mine)”. Speaking on behalf of the board, the executive 
chairman Ray Lane also told that “Whitman has the right operational and communication skills 
and leadership abilities to deliver improved execution and financial performance. (emphasis 
mine)” 
 This example clearly shows that there are CEO’s comprehensive and general 
characteristics to which firms pay attention when recruiting a CEO.  
In a business group, a CEO’s payoff is: 
 
ν = Σsi [lnr1i + piI lnr2i ]   (i = i, j), 
where si  is the size of firm i, rt
i are rents that a CEO expropriates in firm i in period t,  
piI is the reappointment probability of an incumbent in firm i.  
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4.3.2 Timing of the Game 
Period 0 (a choice of a corporate structure): a CEO of firm i confronts an opportunity 
to enter a new business area and chooses the boundaries of the firm. To launch a new business, 
firm A may set up a new firm, firm B (that is, form a business group) or it may create a new 
division within itself (that is, form a conglomerate with multi-divisions). When the CEO decides 
to found a new firm, he is assumed to also take control of the newly founded firm, j (that is, firm 
i and j are under common control exercised by the same CEO). In addition, the combined size of 
firm i and j is assumed to equate to that of a conglomerate with the extra division. We normalize 
the size of the conglomerate to be 1. We assume that the two firms’ size is identical. Hence the 
size of each firm of a business group is 1/2. 
Period 1: [conglomerate] In the beginning, the CEO chooses r1 not knowing his own 
capability η. Then Nature decides η, and firm i’s profits µ1 are determined according to equation 
(1). Shareholders can monitor µ1, rather than r1 and η, which suggests that shareholder can only 
observe firm i’s profits but cannot know the composition between talent and rents. At the end of 
period 1, the annual general meeting of a conglomerate is held. In the general meeting, 
shareholders of firm i cast a vote on whether to reappoint the incumbent CEO. If the incumbent 
wins, he still takes control of firm i at period 2. Otherwise, they appoint a new CEO whose talent 
is randomly drawn from the same distribution.  ηo denotes talent of potential opponents in a CEO 
market. Thus, ηo ∼ N (η¯, σ η 2). We assume that competence is a permanent feature: a CEO with 
competence η in period 1 retains that level of competence in period 2 as well.   
[business group] In the beginning of period 1, a CEO chooses r1
i and r1
j before the value 
of η is realized.  Nature decides η, and µ1i and µ1j are determined so as to satisfy equation (2). We 
assume that µ1
i and µ1
j are publicly observed by all the shareholder in a business group. At the 
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end of period 1, the annual general meeting is held in both firms simultaneously. We assume that 
shareholders of each firm cast a vote independently. As explained before, if the incumbent is 
ousted, a new CEO with ηo ∼ N (η¯, σ η 2) will be appointed. We assume that competence is a 
permanent feature: a CEO with competence η in period 1 retains that level of competence in 
period 2 as well.   
Period 2:  [conglomerate] The reappointed CEO decides r2, and then µ2 is determined as 
before. The game ends.  
[business group] The reappointed CEO who decides to establish a business group 
chooses µ2
i and µ2
j respectively.  After decisions are made, then µ2
i and µ2
j are determined as 
before. The game ends. 
4.3.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium 
4.3.3.1 Conglomerate with multi-divisions 
 
As a benchmark case, we first characterize an equilibrium of the case in which a CEO 
chooses a conglomerate and analyze how CEO’s career concerns motives induce his equilibrium 
behavior. In period 2, since a CEO knows that there is no more oversight by shareholders, he has 
no incentives to perform well. Thus he seeks to appropriate as much rents as he can. He sets r2 to 
be r¯, and after the realization of η, firm A’s profits in period 2 are: 
 
µ2 = η − r¯ 
 
This indicates that higher η allows shareholders to have higher payoffs. Evidently 
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shareholders prefer a CEO with high η. Shareholders exercise their voting rights in deciding 
whether to retain an incumbent CEO. Given the fact above, shareholders’ equilibrium voting 
strategy is as follows. Since shareholders can observe µ1 rather than η or r1, they seek to estimate 
incumbent’s talent given µ1 and equation (1), expecting that the incumbent will choose 
equilibrium rents, r∗ (yet to be derived). 
E (η | µ1) = η˜ denotes expectation of CEO’s estimated talent given µ1. 
 
η˜ = µ1 + r∗ 
 
Given this estimate, shareholders’ voting behavior is straightforward. If η˜ exceeds the 
expected talent of potential opponents, shareholders vote for him. If η˜ is equivalent to the 
expected talent of potential challengers, they vote randomly. Otherwise, they oust the 
incumbent CEO.  Let pI be the probability than the incumbent is reappointed. 
 
 
 
Given the strategy above, how does the CEO choose r∗? To answer, first calculate the 
probability that the incumbent keeps control of the firm when choosing r1: 
pI = Prob [η˜ ≥   η¯] = Prob [µ1 + r∗  ≥   η¯] 
= Prob [η ≥   η¯ − r∗ + r1] = 1-F (η¯ − r∗ + r1), 
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where F is the cumulative distribution function of η.  In period 1, the incumbent will 
choose r1 to maximize his expected payoffs, ν: 
 
M axr1 [lnr1 + [1-F (η¯ + r1 − r∗)] lnr¯] (3) 
 
Equation (3) illustrates a trade-off that the incumbent is facing. High r1 increases the first 
period’s payoffs, but it, at the same time, it lowers pI. Knowing this, he attempts to bias the 
process of inference upward by abstaining from extraction of high rents. 
The first-order condition of equation (3) is 
, where f is the probability density function of η. 
In equilibrium, the CEO’s optimal choice of rents should be consistent with shareholders’ 
inference about that choice. Thus in equilibrium r1 = r1∗.   
. 
Since f (η¯) is the density of the normal distribution of η evaluated at its mean, f (η¯) = 
1/ση √2π. This follows that 
 
 
Let what has been analyzed be a ‘career concerns’ strategy, and νc be equilibrium payoffs 
to a CEO when using this strategy in a conglomerate.  
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As has been shown in equation (4), r∗ will decrease with the size of r¯. In our model, r¯ is 
the second period payoff to a CEO as long as he is reappointed. Thus high r¯ strengthens his 
incentives to remain his current position, which leads him to choose small r1 to distort 
shareholders’ assessment of talent upward.  
But the effect of high r¯ on a CEO’s overall payoff is ambiguous. High r¯ implies a 
higher payoff in period 2, and this simultaneously makes a CEO set r∗ to be low. This may lower 
a CEO’s overall payoff.   
Equation (4) also shows that r∗ is getting smaller as shareholders can monitor a CEO’s 
talent more precisely (that is, when σ η 2   is small). This is because µ1 is a good indicator of how 
much talented a CEO is when σ η 2   is small. Thus a CEO who cares about reappointment 
attempts to produce high µ1 by taking low r1. Note that if σ η 2 goes to zero, the optimal rents will 
be r¯, rather than 0. If stockholders can observe CEO’s talent without any uncertainty, µ1 would 
not signal his talent any more. Then, he has no incentives to make high µ1 in order to influence 
shareholders’ inference procedure. He always chooses r¯, and the retention probability is still 1.  
As Holmström argues, “in order that there be some returns to the manager for good 
performance, it must be that present performance acts as information about future performance.”  
Without any uncertainty about CEO’s managerial ability, he has no incentive to abstain from 
excessive extraction of rents. If we introduce a little vagueness over talent (that is, σ η 2   is just 
very small, but not zero), he is worried about his future reputation and will not choose the 
maximal rents.  
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Equation (4) suggests that a CEO fails to fool shareholders in equilibrium even if he tries 
to bias shareholders’ inference in his favor. Why? Shareholders who anticipate CEO’s 
equilibrium rents adjust belief on η by discounting high µ1. Thus, the CEO’s retention probability 
is still 1/2, which coincides with the initial belief about talent. 
 
4.3.3.2 Business Group with Firm i and j 
 
In this section, we will explore an equilibrium of the case in which a business group has 
two legally independent firms, i and j. Let us consider the following strategy; a CEO chooses r¯ 
in period 1 as if he does not care about reappointment.  We call it a ‘full-extraction’ strategy.  
We beg the following question. Can it be optimal for a CEO to follow a full-extraction 
strategy in any of the two firms of a business group? To answer, we first consider the case in 
which a CEO takes a full-extraction strategy in a conglomerate. pF denotes the turnover 
probability when adopting a full extraction strategy in a conglomerate with multi-divisions. 
Following the same procedure in the previous section, we can find out the probability that the 
CEO will be reappointed when choosing r1,  
 
p I 
F = 1 − F (η¯ − r*1 + r1) 
 
Since we know that the CEO sets r1 = r¯ (this is a full extraction strategy), and r∗ ≠ r¯, 
thus p I 
F = Max {0, 1 − F (η¯ − r*1 + r¯)} (6) 
120  
This indicates that p I 
F < pI = 1/2 (it is due to the fact that r¯ > r∗). As expected, when 
the CEO chooses a full extraction strategy, his turnover possibility increases. Now we return to 
the initial question.  
Let us propose the following equilibrium strategy in a business group. In one firm (e.g., 
firm i), the incumbent CEO pursues a career concern strategy explained above, but in the other 
one (e.g., firm j), he uses a full extraction strategy in period 1.41 We call it a ‘hybrid strategy.’ As 
has been already analyzed, when choosing a career concerns strategy, the CEO’ will be replaced 
with the probability 1/2. If the CEO adopts a ‘full-extraction strategy’ in firm j, will the winning 
probability be less than 1/2?  
The answer is no. Calculate the reappointment probability when he implements a full 
extraction strategy in firm j of a business group. Unlike shareholders of a conglomerate, 
shareholders of a business group can perfectly observe both µ1
i and µ1
j. Given a hybrid strategy, 
stockholders of the group observe two signals about CEO’s talent and find that µ1i > µ1j. Since 
the shareholders know that each firm’s profits are determined by CEO’s general skills and rents, 
and that ηi= ηj= η (that is, no firm-specific talent exists), they infer that differences between µi 
and µj are totally due to differences in rents extracted from each firm. In equilibrium, 
shareholders of firm j conjecture that low µj is attributed to a full extraction strategy, rather than 
to CEO’s poor talent. Thus they seek to estimate the CEO’s talent conditioning on µi, rather than 
on µj. Note that shareholders in our model vote to appoint more competent CEO, not to punish 
for excessive rent-extraction per se. Thus the reelection probability of the CEO in firm j is ½, 
                                                 
41   Since we assume that the size of the two firms is identical, it does not change our result if a CEO chooses a full 
extraction strategy in firm A and pursues a career concern strategy in firm B. However, if the size of two firms are 
not the same, this is not the case. We will address this issue in section 4.4. 
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which coincides with the reelection probability in firm i. Expected payoffs to a CEO in a 
business group, νb are:  
 
Comparing νc with νb, we reach the following conclusion. A business group offers a CEO 
higher rents than a conglomerate as long as σ η   is less than the condition that guarantees an 
interior solution to equation (3).  
What is the implication of the condition above? When ση is large, reelection prospects are 
more subject to accident. This weakens CEO’s incentives for better performance by taking low r1. 
In the extreme case where σ2η is very large, the reelection probability may not be much lowered 
even if he extract r¯, suggesting that it may be optimal to set r1 to be r¯, rather than r∗. To rule out 
this case, ση should be less than 
1
√2𝜋 
 [rln r¯], which is the necessary condition for an interior 
solution to equation (3). Once we exclude a corner solution, we will come to the conclusion that a 
business group always does offer a CEO higher rents than a conglomerate with multi-divisions.  
What is the key intuition behind this conclusion? Since a top manager of a conglomerate 
has only one single channel in which he signals his talent to shareholders, excessive extraction of 
r1 harms his future reputation. These concerns may derive r∗ down to zero (this will not happen in 
equilibrium). Specifically, when shareholders can estimate CEO’s competence correctly (that is, 
σ2η is very small), he seldom chooses high r1 for fear of losing control firm i. 
This is not the case in a business group. A CEO of a business group has multiple channels 
where he signals his ability. He can get higher payoffs by pursuing the full-extraction strategy in 
at least one firm of a business group. In this respect, a business group allows for a CEO to make 
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less sensitive to market pressure because a business group creates space for a CEO by offering 
more chances to reveal his talent. Shareholders of a business group appear to be biased in favor 
of the incumbent when estimating his talent because they only consider observation favorable to 
the CEO. Bad observation has very little effect on formation of belief about a CEO’s ability. As a 
result, the shareholders are worse off even if they have more information about talent. This is 
analogous to what Prat (2005) dubs as ‘wrong kind of transparency,’ suggesting that a principal 
can be hurt from observing more information about her agent.  
Why do these paradoxical results occur?  This happens because observed signals are 
perfectly correlated in a business group. In our model, µ1
i and µ1
j appear to be two separate 
signals, but these are perfectly correlated with each other, which suggests that they are jointly 
determined from one draw of talent.  
The underlying intuition is as follows. In a business group, the more the firms’ profits 
depend on CEO’s general managerial talent, the more likely shareholders’ estimates are to be 
biased in favor of the incumbent. When firms’ performance is excellent, the shareholders think 
that this is due to the CEO’s good managerial skill. If the firms experience bad outcomes, the 
shareholders attribute this to factors uncorrelated with talent, for example, rents, or bad luck in 
some cases. But if firms’ performance depends on firm-specific managerial capability as well as 
general capability, this perfect correlation will not be sustained, which results in different 
outcomes. 
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4.3.4 A Trade-off between a Business Group and a Conglomerate 
In what we have analyzed so far, a CEO has faced no trade-off between a conglomerate 
and a business group. In our model, a business group is always better for a CEO in that it offers 
him multiple channels to signal his talent to shareholders, which generates higher rents. If this is 
always the case, we will observe only one type of a corporate structure around world; a business 
group. Many studies of corporate governance document that in the U.S. and U.K. a conglomerate 
is common. To explore this, we will identify the conditions under which different business 
organizations emerge. A starting point is the recognition that a conglomerate is less transparent 
than a business group. Morck et al. (2005) argue that “many smaller firms, rather than one huge 
one, might conceivably allow better monitoring of professional managers by the family.” But 
they do not advance specific rationales for their argument.  We offer several rationales for this 
arguments. As Alesina and Tabellini (2007) points out, multi-dimensionality of tasks is 
intimately related to a higher variance of ability. An analogous argument can readily apply to 
diversification of a conglomerate. As a conglomerate becomes more diversified, then overall 
variance of the tasks is also likely to increase. But note that this also holds in a diversified 
business group. Thus another rationale is required.  
The key idea is that a business group offers disaggregated performance measures, while a 
conglomerate provides aggregate performance measures, which leads to information loss. Unlike 
a business group, performance of each business unit of a conglomerate cannot be easily 
identified from outside. Specifically, the mixture of several business units into one aggregate 
performance measures is likely to make observed signals noisier. We present two anecdotal 
evidence supporting our claim; dismantlement of a conglomerate and an issuance of tracking 
stocks. Over the last two decade, many conglomerates have been dismantled, and focused their 
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business to their core competencies. For instance, Pfizer, the world’s biggest pharmaceuticals 
company, restructures by spinning off not just its four smaller non-pharmaceutical divisions 
(nutrition, consumer health, animal health and capsule-making) but also its huge “established 
products” division.  
Empirical literature reports a rise in stock price around announcement of spin-offs (see 
Hite and Owers 1999). One explanation for this phenomenon is that investors can perceive value 
more clearly after the spin-off. As Robert Allen, the chairman of AT & T says, “investors 
couldn’t understand the strategy of the combined firm,... (after the spin-offs) investor will clearly 
understand it now.”(Krishnaswamia and Subramaniam 1999) 
 Another example is tracking stocks whose dividends are tied to a specific division of a 
conglomerate. A recent study reports a positive abnormal stock return upon the creation of 
tracking stocks, which suggests that tracking stocks serve as a mechanism for resolving 
information asymmetries and principal agent problem. (for detail, see Morck et al. 2005) We 
have claimed that a conglomerate use aggregate performance measures relative to a business 
group and that such entanglement creates information loss, which results in precise monitoring. 
To incorporate this claim into our model, we now assume that profits of a conglomerate are: 
 
µt = ηt − rt + εt, (8) 
where η ∼ N (η¯, σ η 2) as before, εt  is a noisy term with ε ∼ N (0, σ ε 2), cov (η, ε) = 0. 
εt is a random variable representing a conglomerate’s opaqueness. E (ε) = 0 means that 
aggregate performance measures offers shareholders precise information on average42, and cov (η, 
                                                 
42 If E(ε) ≠ 0, this performance measure is biased, suggesting that this measure systematically provide false 
information to investors. This assumption seems unreasonable. 
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ε) = 0 indicates that even a diversified conglomerate can be better monitored if it has transparency 
enhancing arrangements (e.g., tracking stocks or more transparent information disclosure systems), 
because we assume that a conglomerate’s opaqueness is related to aggregate performance 
measures, rather than its diversification. Except this, everything else is equivalent to the model in 
the previous section.   
Let us characterize an equilibrium. The key differences lie in the inference process of a 
CEO’s talent. Observing µ1, shareholders can no longer precisely estimate η1 due to ε. Instead, they 
can conjecture the sum of η and ε. Using Bayesian inference for normal mean, 
 
 
 
piI  denotes the probability that the incumbent will be reappointed when monitoring is 
imprecise due to ε in a conglomerate (superscript i denotes imprecise monitoring). 
Let us calculate piI 
piI     = Prob [E(η1|µ1) ≥   η¯] = Prob [η1 + ε1 ≥   r1 – r1∗ + η¯] 
=  1-G(η¯ – r1∗ + r1), 
where G is the cumulative distribution function of η + ε, the sum of two normal.  
In period 1, the incumbent will choose r1 to maximize his payoffs: 
 
M axr1 [lnr1 + [1-G(η¯ − r∗ + r1)]lnr¯]             (9)  
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The first-order condition of equation (9) is  
 
 
where g is the probability density function of η + ε. In equilibrium, r1 = r∗. 
Since g(η¯) is a density of the normal distribution of η + ε evaluated at its mean, g(η¯) = 
 
 
G has the same mean, but larger variance than F. Thus we must have  
 
 
The  finding  above  shows  that  a  CEO  of  conglomerate  can  extract  more  rents  
under imprecise monitoring.  Equilibrium payoffs to the CEO are  
 
Comparing equation (7) with equation (11), we establish the following propositions. 
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This proposition contains several implications. First, we confirm a trade-off between a 
business group and conglomerate under imprecise monitoring. Note that without any noise a 
CEO always would decide to form a business group, which guarantees him higher rents (as long 
as r∗ is an interior solution).   
Once we allow for noise, this is not the case anymore.  Even if the condition that r1 is an 
interior solution is satisfied, when  r¯ln r¯ < √2𝜋 𝜎⁄ 𝑛  [ση2+ σε2],  a CEO decides to form a 
conglomerate. Whether he chooses to form a business group or a conglomerate depends on the 
parameter values used in our model; r¯, ση2, and σε2. 
Second, higher r¯ facilitates a business group. This makes sense because a business 
group allows a CEO to extract the maximum rents in at least one firm of a business group. 
Payoffs to a CEO of a business group become larger with the size of r¯. This helps us better 
understand why a business group is especially common in emerging markets with weak 
institutions. In our model, high r¯ indicates that the CEO can extracts a considerable amount of 
rents, which often happens in emerging markets.  
Third, irrespective of corporate structures, uncertainty over a CEO’s talent (measured by 
ση2) is a source of rents. As uncertainty over competence become larger, better outcomes occur 
more accidentally, which makes the link between abstention of rents and higher profits 
weakened. Knowing this, a CEO becomes less motivated by career concerns, which leads to 
high r1.  
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Finally, a CEO of a conglomerate has an additional source of rents relative to a CEO of 
a business group; imprecise monitoring due to a noisy signal. Intuitively, as σε2 becomes higher, 
signals about talent become less informative. This makes shareholders put less emphasis on 
observed signals, which weakens the CEO’s career concerns motives.  
Proposition 1 offers interesting insights into ‘conglomerate discount’, which suggests 
diversified conglomerates trade at a discount relative to matched portfolios of pure-play firms. 
Many finance literature shows that diversification destroys shareholders’ value because it often 
leads to over-investment or misallocation of resources among divisions. In the context of our 
model, conglomerate discount can be explained in the following two ways. First, as a 
conglomerate become more diversified, ση2 is likely to increase, which leads to high r1∗. 
Moreover, imprecise monitoring allow the CEO to extract more rents in a conglomerate.  
 
Proposition 2. It is not optimal to implement a full extraction strategy for all the firms in a 
business group.  
Proof. Suppose that a manager pursues the full extraction strategy in all the firms of a 
business group.   Hence the strategy yields the same financial outcomes across the firms, which 
are observed by all shareholders of a business group. This implies that he does not take 
advantage of a hybrid strategy any more. If it is optimal to pursue a full extraction strategy in all 
the member firms of a business group, this follows that 
 
r¯ ∈  argmax [lnr1 + [1 − F (η¯ + r1 − r∗)lnr¯]. 
However, as we already see, r¯ is not the optimal solution to the equation above. 
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Proposition 2 explains why not all the firms of a business group exhibit poor 
performance. Implementing a full extraction strategy in every member firm of a business group 
cannot be optimal. Thus, a CEO of a business group abstains from excessive rent-seeking in at 
least one firm of a business group. Hence, performance of several firms of a business group can 
be as good as a standalone firm. This result is consistent with some empirical evidence. Khanna 
and Palepu (2000) find that performance of affiliates of the most highly diversified business 
group exceed those of stand-alone firms in India. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) examine the effect 
of group affiliation on firm profitability for samples of 14 developing economies and report 
higher average return on assets among firms of business groups in all countries. Proposition 2 
also suggests that there must be variations across firms’ performance within the group. This 
happens because a CEO of a business group extracts the maximum rents in some firms, while not 
in others. Suppose that a business group adopts a pyramidal structure. This may generate positive 
effects on the firm at the apex of the pyramid, and negative impacts on other firms (usually, a 
core firm in the group) that suffer from expropriation under the pyramidal structure.  
A recent work corroborates proposition 2. Almedia et al. (2009) explore the relative 
valuation of the Korean chaebol firms. Their findings demonstrate that the group’s central firm 
trades at a discount relative to other public firms in the group. They argue that it is due to 
shareholders’ anticipation of value-destroying pyramidal acquisitions by the central firms. 
4.3.5 A Hypothesis on the Relationship between a Business group and its 
Diversification 
Proposition 1 suggests a hypothesis about the relationship between a business group and 
its diversification.  A hypothesis is that when outside investors are protected well (captured by 
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small r¯ and low σε2 in our model) and business areas of firms are focused (captured by low σ η 2    
in our model), a CEO can raise rents by forming a business group rather than a freestanding firm.  
Why? When shareholders can estimate talent of a CEO almost correctly, he seldom 
chooses a high r1 due to career concerns in a conglomerate. In a business group, however, a CEO 
can raise r1 by using a ‘hybrid strategy’. This accounts for the existence of a business group even 
in some Western European countries with relatively well-functioning financial markets.  
Proposition 1 offer a theoretical prediction about the relationship between a business group and 
its diversification. The prediction is that relative to a business group in emerging markets, a 
business group in developed countries tends to be more focused. Kandel et al. (2013) document 
that US business groups were focused in a single sector in the 1930s and 1940s, operating in a 
small number of industries (often utilities). This historical facts are consistent with our model’s 
predictions.  
More empirical works are required to empirically testing the hypothesis above. In this 
subsection, we offer a preliminary result.  Khanna and Yafeh (2007)’s works present nine 
countries’ a business group heterogeneity data’. 43 From their works, we obtain diversification 
index, which is measured as the number of two-digit industries in which a business group 
operates (For details, see Khanna and Yafeh 2007). Higher values corresponds to more 
diversification of a business group. We will this index as an indicator representing σ η 2   . We 
also find some indices about r¯, which represents the degree of protection of outside investors. A 
series of works by shleifer et al. (1998) provides various measures to indicate how corporate 
governance arrangements work in the nine countries above. Indicators which we use here are (1) 
                                                 
43 The nine countries is as follows. Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Taiwan, and 
Thailand.  
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rule of law,44 (2) assessment of efficiency of judiciary system, 45 (3) risk of expropriation,46 and 
(4) GNP (measured as a constant dollars of 1994). Higher values of all indicators corresponds to 
low r¯.   
If our theoretical prediction makes sense, the correlation among the two indices will be 
negative. To identify the relationship, we conduct a simple correlation test using the data above. 
Table 4-1 presents the basic result. Table 1 show that, diversification index displays the negative 
correlation with r¯. This means that poor assessment of rule of law and risk of expropriation is 
correlated with high degree of diversification. However, efficiency of judiciary system, which is 
another index of r¯, does not show negative correlation with diversification index. Since the 
number of the sample is limited, and we do not control for some factors that may affect 
diversification, we do not attempt to generalize the results above. Further careful empirical work 
is needed to verify the conjecture. 
 
Table 4-1 Correlation between Diversification & Protection of Outside Investors 
 
Diversification 
Rule of Law -0.124 
Efficiency of Judiciary 
System 
0.292 
Risk of Expropriation -0.294 
GDP -0.445 
                                                 
44  Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country risk rating agency International 
Country Risk (ICR). Average of the month of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. 
Scale from zero to 10 with lower scores for less tradition for law and order.  
45    It refers to shareholder rights, creditor rights, size and breadth of capital markets for 49 countries. These 
indicates are produced by the country risk rating agency Business International Corp. It may be taken to represent 
investors’ assessment of conditions in the country. Average between 1980 and 1983. Scale from 0 to 10; with lower 
scores lower efficiency levels. 
46 Risk of expropriation ICR’s assessment of the risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization.” 
Average of the month April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10 with 
lower scores for the country risk.  
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4.4 EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL 
4.4.1 The Size of Member Firms of a Business Group 
In our benchmark model, we assume that the size of firm i and j of a business group is the 
same. Now we relax this setting in order to investigate what happens if the size of member firms 
is different. In our model, we assumed that the size of a firm is closely related to the amount of 
rents to extract. Thus, the following proposition always holds as long as we keep the assumption 
above. 
 
Proposition 3. A full-extraction strategy occurs in a firm whose size is relatively small. 
Likewise, a career concerns strategy is pursued in a firm whose size is relatively large. 
 
 
4.4.2 An Increase in Competence Correlation in a Business Group  
Now we relax the assumption that two signals in a business are perfectly correlated. If 
firm’s profits depend on not only general talent but also firm specific skills of a CEO, do our key 
findings still hold?  
The answer is yes. A change in competence correlation influences a shareholders’ 
learning procedure for CEO’s managerial capability. To make an analysis manageable, suppose 
that a business group has only two affiliates, firm i and firm j and that two firm specific 
capabilities are highly correlated but not perfectly.   
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We make two points. The first point is that better financial performance of one firm 
improves shareholders’ estimation of CEO’s abilities in the other firm of the group. This makes 
sense because the two abilities are correlated. The second point is that the marginal impact of 
firm j’s performance on estimation of firm i-specific competence increases as the correlation 
increases. In contrast, the marginal effect of firm j’s performance on estimation about firm j-
specific talent decreases in the amount of correlation.  
The key intuition underlying these observations is as follows. From the perspective of 
firm i’s shareholders, the more correlated are the two competences, the more informative is the 
firm j’s performance about firm i-specific competences. The firm j’s outcomes serves basically 
as an additional signal about the firm i-specific talent.  Making this additional signal (i.e., firm j’s 
outcomes) more indicative of underlying firm i-specific talent is tantamount to deceasing the 
informational value of the direct observation of firm i’s performance. As the correlation 
increases, shareholders of firm i places less weight on their firm’s performance relative to that of 
other firms. This inference procedure happens especially when firm i’s financial outcomes are 
poor.   
Let us suppose one extreme case in which the two capabilities are perfectly correlated. 
This implies firm that is, firm j’s performance is a perfect substitute of firm i’s performance, 
leading firm i’s shareholders to be biased in favor of the incumbent in spite of poor performance. 
In this respect, a threat of dismissals is relatively less effective in disciplining a rent-seeking 
CEO, suggesting that the CEO are entrenched in a business group. At the other extreme case in 
which the two capabilities are independent each other. In this case, shareholders of each firm 
care only about their own signal, the same learning procedure for a CEO in a conglomerate.  
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4.4.3 The Effect of Competitive Markets for CEOs on a CEO’s Career Concerns 
In this subsection, we will explore the effect of competitive CEO labor markets on their 
career concerns. There are several ways to incorporate this effect into our model.  One way is to 
assume that potential challengers have the higher expected ability than the incumbent has.  Note 
that ηo denotes talent of candidates in the relevant CEO markets.  We assume that ηo ∼ N(ηˆ, σ2) 
and that ηˆ > η¯.  p I ηo denotes the incumbent’s retention likelihood when opponents have ηo  ∼ 
N(ηˆ, σ2η ).  Given the conditions above, 
 
p I
 ηo=  Prob[η˜ ≥ ηˆ] = 1-F(ηˆ − r1 + r1), 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of η.   
 
Since we assume that ηˆ > η¯, 1 − F (η¯ − r1∗ + r1) = pI  >  p I ηo = 1 − F (ηˆ − r1∗ + r1), 
which suggests that the incumbent’s reelection prospects diminish as ηˆ becomes higher. As 
long as the annual general meeting serves as a mechanism for screening out a less competent 
CEOs, the more competitive markets for CEO are, the higher profits are.  
There is another rationale for why competitive markets for CEOs matters in order to rein 
CEO’s rent-seeking behavior back.  With imprecise monitoring, when uncertainty about CEO’s 
ability increases, well-functioning markets for CEOs deter him from extracting high rents, but 
under the same condition, underdevelopment of these markets allows him to appropriate  high  
rents. See a conglomerate under imprecise monitoring. Suppose that a conglomerate decides to 
discipline a CEO through a wage contract instead of an annual retention vote. For concreteness, 
at the beginning of period 1, a conglomerate makes a wage offer, y, in order to recruit more 
competent candidates such that y = E (E(η | µ1)), where let E be unconditional expectations 
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over µ1, and let E be expectations over η conditioning on the realization of µ1.  As assumed 
earlier, no annual general meeting exists at the end of period 1. Everything else coincides with 
the setup in the previous section. In this setting, the CEO’s overall payoff is 
 
ν = [lnr1 + lny + lnr2] 
 
In period 1, the incumbent will choose r1 to maximize his payoffs: 
 
M ax r1 [lnr1 + lnE (E(η | µ1)) + lnr¯]  (12)  
 
Since we already know that 
 
This result provides several implications. First, the optimal r∗ does not depends on r¯ any 
more, which means that r¯ does not change the CEO’s equilibrium behavior. Second, higher 
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talent raises the CEO’s payoffs via two channels; he will receive a higher wage according to the 
wage contract, and he will extract more rents in period 1. But the effect of higher talent on 
shareholder’s welfare is unclear.  Clearly, higher expected talent boosts µ2, but it reduce µ1 by 
allowing the CEO to extract high r1∗.  The most fundamental results emerge when σ2 becomes 
higher. Suppose that markets for CEOs are very competitive, which implies that everyone can 
track and find all the records of candidates performance and their career profiles. This makes our 
model one of infinitely repeated games, in which a CEO with career concerns never chooses r¯ 
even in any period. Since firms seek to recruit candidates with past good performance, abstention 
from extraction of excessive rents will be rewarded by better future job offers. This benefit can 
be also captured by y = E (E(η | µ1)), which represents implicit wages offered by markets for 
CEOs. Comparing (10) with (13), we present the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. With imprecise monitoring, an increase in difficulty of a CEO’s tasks 
generates the opposite results depending on whether markets for CEOs work well. With 
competitive markets for CEOs, higher σ η2 decreases r1∗, whereas with poorly-working markets 
for CEOs higher σ η 2 increases r1∗, 
 
What makes these differences? This happens because a CEO’ objective function 
dramatically changes as the markets become more competitive. With markets for CEOs 
functioning poorly, the only goal of the incumbent is to be reelected in a current firm, which 
happens if his estimated talent just exceeds potential rivals’ expected ability. With markets for 
CEOs working well, present performance is regarded as information about future performance. 
Knowing this, the incumbent seeks to appear as competent as possible to establish better 
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professional reputation in relevant markets for CEO. As Alesina and Tabellini claim, “if σ η 2   
becomes larger, this leads to an increase in φ, the signal to noise ratio”, suggesting that 
observed firm’s profits become a better signal about CEO’s talent.  Since a CEO seeks to 
maximize perceived talent, he abstains from excessive extraction of high rents. This is not the 
case with a CEO when the markets are underdeveloped. As σ η 2 becomes higher, reelection is 
less tied to talent, because it is more subject to randomness, which dampens career concern 
motives. Thus, he attempts to extract more rents, rather than to pretend to be more talented. In 
other words, a CEO strives to attain a threshold level of η, rather than to maximize his 
perceived ability. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper offers theoretical explanations as to how monitoring and disciplining of a 
CEO in a conglomerate differs from that of a business group’s CEO. In this paper, we especially 
compare turnover of a CEO of a business group to turnover of a CEO of a comparable 
conglomerate. Under a specific circumstance where a market for CEOs places a heavy emphasis 
on general managerial talent rather than firm specific expertise (in out context, CEO’s firm-
specific talent is highly correlated), replacement of a CEO of a business group seems to be less 
sensitive to poor performance of at least one of affiliates of the group.  
A conglomerate structure, however, does not always have a stricter disciplining 
mechanism. A diversified conglomerate tends to be less transparent than a business group 
because the conglomerate fails to provide appropriate division-level performance measures. 
The conglomerate usually offers information on aggregate performance that contains limited 
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information about talent of a conglomerate’s CEO. This suggests that firm performance is a 
noisier signal of talent, allowing a CEO to extract high rents from a conglomerate. In 
conclusion, CEOs’ organizational choices are determined by the parameter values used in the 
model: protection of outside investors and diversification, and precision of monitoring of CEOs.  
Our model presents a rationale for why some business groups exist even in Western 
European countries with well-functioning financial markets. We claim that with better legal 
protection of investors and precise monitoring mechanisms of a CEO (in our context, less 
uncertainty about talent), a CEO can increase his rents by choosing a business group. This claim 
generates theoretical predictions of the relationship between a business group and its 
diversification. In particular, relative to a business group in emerging markets, a business group 
in developed countries tends to be more focused. 
Finally, our model suggests why competitive CEO labor markets are key to rein their 
rent-seeking behavior back. With imprecise monitoring, when a CEO carries out more 
technically demanding tasks (in our model, this is captured by larger σ η 2 ), development of the 
CEO markets keeps him from extracting high rents, but underdevelopment of the CEO markets 
allows him to pursue high rents. This happens because a CEO’s objective function dramatically 
changes as the markets for CEOs become more competitive. High turnover rates lead CEOs to be 
concerned more about their reputation in the markets.  
We conclude by posing some open questions for future research.   
First, we have assumed that σ η 2 is an exogenously given parameter.   If we interpret σ η 2 
as a parameter related to diversification, we can establish a model in which a CEO decides the 
degree of diversification as well as corporate structures; the optimal diversification of each 
corporate structure.  
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Second, our model abstracts from specific ownership structures of a business group. 
Thus, the size of a firm is the only factor deciding whether to extract excessive extraction of 
rents from it. Once we allow for specific ownership structures in the basic model, we can address 
tunneling problems, which is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms to firms 
which are directly owned by controlling shareholders. This setup makes a CEO pursue a full-
extraction strategy more strategically. If a family takes control of a business group by a pyramid, 
a family is likely to implement a career concern strategy in a ‘core firm’, a firm that takes control 
of other firms in a pyramid. Moreover, tunneling from other member firms to a core firm also 
occurs to please core firm’ shareholders, which raises the reelection probability in the firm.  
Finally, we need to make a more rigorous model to see what happens when signals are 
partially correlated. This model will allow us to examine how an increase in competence 
correlation affects which corporate structure is optimal for shareholders.  
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5.0  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This dissertation has attempted to sketch out economic organizations, the judiciary, and 
their interactions in the context of South Korea. 
The first chapter has reported sentencing slant in favor of chaebols. Convicted chaebol 
defendants are much more likely to be given leniency relative to non- chaebol defendants. I 
empirically study the source of sentencing disparities. The result shows that observed leniency 
towards convicted chaebol-related offenders is a combination of concerns for economy-wide 
consequences of harsh sentences against tycoons and judicial hesitancy in civil law to restrict self-
dealing in chaebols. The second chapter has empirically investigated revolving door phenomena 
in the judiciary by examining whether connections influence sentencing decisions. I find that 
judicial connections have a substantial effect on sentences: convicted corporate offenders defended 
by revolving door attorneys are more likely to be given leniency than those by other ordinary 
attorneys.  I also find that the effect exhibits a huge discontinuity around the first year of exit of 
revolving door attorneys from the judiciary. Lastly, observed leniency disappears when cases are 
subject to media attention. Taking into account these observations, the second chapter presents 
causal relationship between judicial ties and lenient criminal sanctions.  
The final chapter has attempted to analyze a variety of trade-offs between business group 
and conglomerate corporate structures by focusing on how different the way a CEO signals his 
ability is and as a result, how different turnover of a CEO is with respect to corporate structures. 
The key claim is that if markets for CEOs place more weight to general managerial talent rather 
than firm specific knowledge, a CEO of business group can choose the hybrid strategy where he 
extracts the maximum rents in at least one(but not all) firms of the group.  In this respect, a business 
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group allows a CEO to be shielded from market disciplines. But a diversified conglomerate is 
generally more subject to imprecise monitoring due to its complicated structures and irrelevant 
performance measures, allowing a CEO to appropriate more rents from a conglomerate.  
This dissertation concludes by mentioning future research topics related to each chapter. 
The first chapter leaves one interesting topic for future research. Many studies show that family 
control is common around the world and contributes to national economy, suggesting that many 
other countries are likely to be confronted with similar problems, suggesting that our studies 
require further cross-country work. 
The second chapter also leaves several problems to be tackled.  
First, our study can be readily extended to analyze the impact of new regulations on 
Revolving door attorneys in Korea. After our sample period, two major government interventions 
were made: advisory sentencing guidelines in 2008 and a one-year cooling-off period in 2011. It 
remains to be seen how Revolving door attorneys responded to new circumstances.  
The second issue relates to a channel through the media affects judicial connections. While 
our findings provide a clear (negative) relationship between media coverage and the impact of the 
connections, not much is known about mechanisms of media attention that limits the operations of 
connections. Empirical investigations need to be made with regard to this issue.  
The last question involves a micro-foundation for favoritism granted to Revolving door 
attorneys. In this paper, it is still not obvious why sitting judges defer to Revolving door attorneys 
who are unlikely to directly affect their promotion prospects. Therefore more serious theoretical 
analysis is required to answer this question.  
The final chapter poses some open questions for future research. First, we have assumed 
that σ η 2 is an exogenously given parameter. If we interpret σ η 2 as a parameter related to 
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diversification, we can establish a model where a CEO decides the optimal degree of 
diversification as well as corporate structures.  
Second, our model abstracts from any specific ownership structures of a business group. 
Once the model relies on specific ownership structures, further discussion about tunneling 
problems can be possible: how the structure is related to CEOs’ rent-extraction strategies.   
Last, but not least, we need to establish a more rigorous model to see what happens when 
two signals are partially correlated. This model will allow us to examine how an increase in 
competence correlation affects which corporate structure is better for shareholders.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A 1 The Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
 
Note: “Loss” is measured by court’s determination of the monetary value of harm that a defendant has caused. (unit: 
USD million ). “Publicity” is constructed based on by the number of news articles covering a defendant from a starting date of 
investigation to one day before reaching a final verdict. “Lawyer” represents private attorneys that each defenant hires. “Ex-Senior 
Judge” represents counsels with “senior judge” experience that each defenant hires. “Senior judge” includes Supreme Court Justice, 
High (District) Court Chief Judge, High (Disctrict) Court Senior Judge. Revolving door attorney” denotes an ex- senior judge 
counsel who takes cases during the first year of retirement. The variable Survival takes on 1 if a firm for whom a convicted defendant 
works remains in business, and 0 if a firm goes bankrupt during or after a trial.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of  
observations 
No. of “ 
1” values 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
S.D. Min Max 
IMPRISONMENT  270 76    0 1 
IMPRISONMENT  
LENGTH 
270  32.9 30 13.8 0 96 
IMPRISONMENT  
LENGTH (actual 
time served) 
76  45.0 36 17.9 18 96 
Chaebol 270 155    0 1 
Controlling 
Shareholder 
270 133    0 1 
Size of Loss  270  22.679.9 0.1 241.9 0 2,817.6 
Survive 270 133    0 1 
Publicity   270  6.2 0 20.7 0 177 
Ex-senior judge 
Attorney 
270  1.8 1 1.6 0 9 
Revolving door 
Attorney 
270  0.6 0 0.8 0 6 
Lawyers 270  4.1 3 3.1 1 18 
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Table A 2  The List of Top 10 Law Firms in Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top 10 law firm in Korea  
KIM & CHANG http://www.kimchang.com 
BAE, KIM & LEE LLC http://www.bkl.co.kr 
LEE&KO http://www.leeko.com 
YOON&YANG LLC http://www.hwawoo.com 
SHIN & KIM  http://www.shinkim.com 
YULCHON http://www.yulchon.com 
BARUN LAW http://www.barunlaw.com 
HWANG MOK PARK http://www.hmpj.com 
KCL http://www.kcllaw.com 
LOGOS http://www.lawlogos.com 
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Table A 3 Judicial Organizational Structure in Korea 
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Table A 4 Public Prosecutorial Organizational Structure in Korea 
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Table A 5 List of Firms in our dataset 
 
COMPANY 
CHAEBOL NON-CHAEBOL 
DONGBU  SUNGWON E&C 
DONGBU E&C DONGA Mutual Savings and Finance 
SK C&C ICOLS 
SK  HAPKYUNG 
HAITAI Electronics JIHAN Data Tech 
NEWCORE KABOOL Telecom 
DONGHYUN Engineering C&M Communication 
SINHO Paper HANCI Netech 
HANSOL Telecom CHOONGANG Paper 
DAEWOO BAEK SONG CONSTRUCTION 
GLOBAL LOGISTIC DOREMI MEDIA 
HANSOL I Ventures SEWON DEPARTMENT STORE 
SINHO  KOREATENDER 
KOHAP JINDO E&C 
DOOSAN Heavy Industry HUMANCOM 
BOOYOUNG KEMONGSA 
Doosan Engineering & Construction Korea First Venture Capital Corporation 
DOOSAN SBI Investment KOREA 
SSANGYONG CEMENT INDUSTRY SGP 
DAESANG ACE DIGITECH 
KOREA Petrochemical FOCUS 
HANSOL Development DONGYANG STEEL PIPE 
KOREA Express Corporation FREECHAL 
NAMGWANG E&C Daemyoung construction 
DONGSUH Security Terra Corporation 
HANSHIN CONSTRUCTION DAEDONG WOOD Corporation 
GURPYONG BILLTRO 
Kukdong Engineering & Construction Regent Security Corp. 
DONGA E&C NANSAN E&C 
MANDO HEUNG CHANG 
SK Global KUNYOUNG 
DONGKUK STEEL MILL NASAN 
HANSHIN CONSTRUCTION GOLDBANK 
SSANGYONG CONSTRUCTION BAEK SONG CONSTRUCTION 
DONGA  ASIA Merchant Bank 
JINRO SAMHEUNG 
Shin Dong Ah TURBOTEK 
Halla Corporation WOOBANG 
Halla E&C HANGIL Merchant Bank 
DAEWOO MOTOR SALES Tiger Pools 
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CORPORATION 
DAEWOO SE POONG 
NEFS SM 
DOOSAN DOREMI MEDIA 
DAEWOO MOTOR MCI KOREA 
HAITAI Group Good Money 
SSANGYONG E&C Dogwang  
LOTTE E&C  
DONGA  
HAITAI  
HYUNDAI MOTOR  
SAEHAN  
Samsung EVERLAND  
GLOVIS  
HYUNDAI Security  
Hyundai Development  
HANSOL  
KOLON TNS  
POSCO  
Hyundai Construction  
Hanwha Security   
Hyosung   
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